

UDC 930.85(4-12)

YU ISSN 0350-7653

SERBIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND ARTS  
INSTITUTE FOR BALKAN STUDIES

# BALCANICA XXXVI

ANNUAL OF THE INSTITUTE FOR BALKAN STUDIES

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BELGRADE  
2006



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## Did the Ancient Greeks Know of Collective Tyranny?\*

The picture of tyranny as the rule of a powerful individual predominates in both ancient and modern writers.<sup>1</sup> Thus H. Berve defines the tyrant as an individual violating the existing norms and laws, but not as a proponent of any particular social, political, national or quasi-religious idea, because to him, power is an end in itself.<sup>2</sup> A closer look at particular tyrannical regimes in ancient Greece, both archaic and classical, reveals, however, that many of them were not led by a sole despot wielding absolute power. In fact, power was often shared among brothers, a number of cousins, or even among unrelated people. For example, Polycrates and Cleisthenes seized tyrannical power, together with their cousins, in Samos and Sicyon respectively.<sup>3</sup> In the second half of the sixth century B.C. Athenagoras and Comas jointly ruled Ephesus as despots.<sup>4</sup> Irus, Ortyges and Echarus, assisted by a *betaireia*, managed to take control of their hometown, Eretria.<sup>5</sup> After the death of Jason of Pherai, power in Thessaly was at first shared by his brothers Polydorus and Polyphron. Collective rule in Pherai took place again when Jason's sons

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\* This is an enlarged and deepened version of one chapter of my book *Die Anfänge der Jüngerer Tyrannis. Vorläufer und erste Repräsentanten von Gewaltherrschaft im späten 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Frankfurt am Main, 2005).

The names of the ancient authors and their works are abbreviated after DNP (H. Cancik and H. Schneider, eds., *Der Neue Pauly. Enzyklopädie der Antike*, Vol. I (Stuttgart/Weimar 1996), xxxix-xlvi).

<sup>1</sup> Cf. W. Pircher, "Das Gesetz des Tyrannen", in W. Pircher and M. Tremml, eds., *Tyrannis und Verführung* (Vienna, 2000), 126-127; H. Berve, *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen* (Munich, 1967), x.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Berve, *Tyrannis*, ix-x.

<sup>3</sup> For Polycrates, cf. Berve, *Tyrannis*, 107-108; L. de Libero, *Die archaische Tyrannis* (Stuttgart, 1996), 261-262. For Cleisthenes, cf. Berve, *Tyrannis*, 28; de Libero, *Tyrannis*, 186-188.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Berve, *Tyrannis*, 100; de Libero, *Tyrannis*, 371-372.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Berve, *Tyrannis*, 96-97; de Libero, *Tyrannis*, 375-376.

seized power after Alexander had been assassinated.<sup>6</sup> Clearchus' son Timotheus appointed his brother Dionysius as his co-regent in Heraclea Pontica, and later Dionysius' sons also ruled together.<sup>7</sup>

That is why modern scholarship often uses the term *collective* or *corporative tyranny* for such cases. The ancient Hellenes, however, did not know the term. This posed no problems in the case of despotic regimes whose nature was unambiguous such as the Pisistratidean in Athens. On the other hand, more complex forms of collective tyranny such as the "Thirty" in Athens and the Theban regime of 382–379 B.C. are illustrative of the difficulties ancient writers faced when they tried to give an adequate conceptual definition of this regime type.<sup>8</sup> That is why the sources often describe such cases as *tyranny*, *oligarchy* and *dynastic regime* (*dynasteia*) all at the same time,<sup>9</sup> a fact that frequently affects modern views on such systems of government.<sup>10</sup> Hence the necessity of enquiring as to whether the ancient Greeks had an

<sup>6</sup> Cf. H.-J. Gehrke, *Stasis. Untersuchungen zu den inneren Kriegen in den griechischen Staaten des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Munich, 1985), 194–195; Berve, *Tyrannis*, 289; 293–294.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Berve, *Tyrannis*, 319; 322–323.

<sup>8</sup> For the regime of the "Thirty" as a collective tyranny, cf. Jordović, *Anfänge*, 169–214; Gehrke, *Stasis*, 318–319, and esp. n. 53; P. Cartledge, *Agasilaos and the Crisis of Sparta* (London, 1987), 90–91, 281; E. Frolov, "Tyrannis und Monarchie im balkanischen Griechenland. Die späte Tyrannis im balkanischen Griechenland", in E. Ch. Welskopf, ed., *Hellenische Poleis* (Berlin, 1973), Vol. I, 255; Berve, *Tyrannis*, 211; R. Osborne, "Changing the Discourse", in K. A. Morgan, ed., *Popular Tyranny: Sovereignty and Its Discontents in Ancient Greece* (Austin, 2003), 251, 262–266; H. Friedel, *Der Tyrannenmord in Gesetzgebung und Volksmeinung der Griechen* (Stuttgart, 1937), 59–60. R. J. Buck, *A History of Boeotia* (Edmonton 1979), 69–71; Gehrke (*Stasis*, 175–180, 318) and Berve (*Tyrannis*, 674) contend that the Theban regime was a collective tyranny.

<sup>9</sup> "The Thirty": tyranny (Xen. Hell. 2.3,16; 48; 4,1; Lys. 12,35; Diod. 14.2,1; 4; 3,7; 5,6; 32,1–2; 33,2; 4; 15.25,4; Aristot. Ath. pol. 41,2); oligarchy (Xen. Hell. 2.3,1–2; 17–18; 24; 26; 30; 32; 51; Diod. 14.3,3–4; 4,6; Aristot. Ath. pol. 34,3; 37,1; 38,4; 53,1); *dynasteia* (Diod. 14.32,6; Aristot. Ath. pol. 36,1).

Thebes: *dynasteia* (Xen. Hell. 5.4,46); tyranny (Xen. Hell. 5.4,1–2; 9; 13; 7.3,7; Plut. Pelop. 6,2; 9); oligarchy (Plut. Pelop. 5,2).

<sup>10</sup> Berve, *Tyrannis*, 211; R. Brock, "Athenian Oligarchs: The Number Game", *JHS* 109 (1989), 62; D. Whitehead, "Sparta and the Thirty Tyrants", *AncSoc* 13/14 (1982/3), 113; Frolov (*Tyrannis und Monarchie*, 255), and Friedel (*Tyrannenmord*, 59–60), consider the bloody regime of the "Thirty" a tyranny. It is defined as oligarchy by W. Nippel, *Mischverfassungstheorie und Verfassungsrealität in Antike und früher Neuzeit* (Stuttgart, 1980), 81; P. Krentz, *The Thirty at Athens* (Ithaca/London), 15, 144; *Xenophon Hellenika* II.3.11–IV.2.8, ed., introd., trans. and comment. P. Krentz (Warminster 1995), 122; M. Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law. Law, Society, and Politics in Fifth-Century Athens* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London), 460–496; H. Bengtson,

awareness of collective tyranny in order not only better to understand the evolution of Greek political thought, but also to avoid misunderstandings in assessing the character of certain regimes.<sup>11</sup>

*Dynasteia* is a state-theoretical notion that may help us further on. Our enquiries into this notion show that the Hellenes were very much aware of the specific character of collective tyranny and that they even had a term for it, not identical but still very close to the modern concept. This study also throws some light on the factors due to which *dynasteia* did not become the prevailing term for collective tyranny.

The complexity of the term *dynasteia* is reflected in the fact that from the outset it referred to extreme oligarchy which was very similar to tyranny. This is plain to see from Thucydides' description of the Theban regime as it was at the time of the wars against the Persians (Thuk. 3.62,3):<sup>12</sup>

For the constitution of our city at that time was,  
as it happened, neither an oligarchy under equal  
laws (ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσόνομον) nor yet a democracy;

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*Griechische Geschichte von den Anfängen bis in die Römische Kaiserzeit*, 2nd ed. (Munich, 1960), 252-253; G. A. Lehmann, *Oligarchische Herrschaft im klassischen Athen. Zu den Krisen und Katastrophen der attischen Demokratie im 5. und 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Op-laden, 1997), 9-128; G. A. Lehmann, "Überlegungen zur Krise der attischen Demokratie im Peloponnesischen Krieg: Vom Ostrakismos des Hyperbolos zum Thargelion 411 v. Chr.," *ZPE* 69 (1987), 54; Ch. Tuplin, "Imperial Tyranny: Some Reflections on a Classical Greek Political Metaphor," in P. Cartledge and F. D. Harvey, eds., *Crux. Essays Presented to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix on His 75th Birthday* (Exeter, 1985), 368, 373; C. A. Powell, *Athens and Sparta. Constructing Greek Political and Social History from 478 B.C.* (London, 1988), 279; P. J. Rhodes, "Oligarchs in Athens," in R. Brock and S. Hodkinson, eds., *Alternatives to Athens. Varieties of Political Organization and Community in Ancient Greece* (Oxford, 2000), 119-136; and M. Munn, *The School of History: Athens in the Age of Socrates* (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 2000), 235-236, 244. Some authors use both terms, tyranny and oligarchy, for the regime of the "Thirty"; cf. M. H. Hansen, *Die athenische Demokratie im Zeitalter des Demosthenes. Struktur, Prinzipien und Selbstverständnis* (Berlin, 1995), 41; G. A. Lehmann, "Die revolutionäre Machtergreifung der „Dreißig“ und die staatliche Teilung Attikas (404-401/0 v. Chr.)," in R. Stiel and G. A. Lehmann, eds., *Antike und Universalgeschichte. Festschrift Hans Erich Stier zum 70. Geburtstag* (Munster, 1972), 201-233; 218, n. 45; 225; Ch. Schubert, *Die Macht des Volkes und die Ohnmacht des Denkens. Studien zum Verhältnis von Mentalität und Wissenschaft im 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Stuttgart, 1993), 156-157.

<sup>11</sup> This category includes the regimes in Chalcis, Oreos-Histiaea, Eretria, and Messenia, about which there is divergence of opinions as to whether they were oligarchies or collective tyrannies; cf. Gehrke, *Stasis*, 40-41, 65-66, 74-75; Berve, *Tyrannis*, 300-303, 308, 674-677.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. J. Martin, "Dynasteia. Eine begriffs-, verfassungs- und sozialgeschichtliche Skizze", in R. Koselleck, ed., *Historische Semantik und Begriffsgeschichte* (Stuttgart, 1979), 228.

but its affairs were in the hands of a small group of powerful men (δυναστεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν) – the form which is most opposed to law and the best regulated polity, and most allied to tyranny.<sup>13</sup>

Thucydides' use of the term *dynasteia* has several distinctive characteristics: he does not use it to describe the oligarchic overthrow in Athens in 411 B.C.; it is connected with tyranny only when referring to the internal political situation in “developed” states such as Thebes and Syracuse (Thuk. 3.62,3; 6.38,3-4);<sup>14</sup> finally, he uses the term both for archaic and for “pre-state” systems such as those in Thessaly and among the Illyrians (Thuk. 4.78,2-3; 126,2).<sup>15</sup> It is worthy of note that, aside from pointing out that *dynasteia* is the traditional form of government in Thessaly, Thucydides also points out its oppositeness to *isonomia* (Thuk. 4.78,3).<sup>16</sup> Namely, the term *isonomia* originated in the context of aristocratic struggles against tyrannical autocracy.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>13</sup> *Thucydides*, vol. II, trans., ed. and introd. C. F. Smith (Cambridge, Mass/London, 1932; reprint 1975).

<sup>14</sup> In his speech Athenagoras connects the threat of tyranny with *dynasteia* (Thuk. 6.38,3-4). Cf. Alcibiades' speech in Sparta (Thuk. 6.89,4); cf. also *HCT* IV, 362; Berve, *Tyrannis*, 629; H. Leppin, *Thukydides und die Verfassung der Polis. Ein Beitrag zur politischen Ideengeschichte des 5. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Berlin, 1999), 68-69.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. also Plat. leg. 680b-c; 681d; Demosth. or. 59,74. According to J. Martin (*Dynasteia*, 229-230), such use of the term *dynasteia* is an expansion of Aristotle's notion. This use, however, is not necessarily in collision with the view that *dynasteia* and tyranny share some important characteristics. Plato is a good example because in his works this earliest system of rule and tyranny have a lot in common: instead of assemblies and laws, there only rules the despotism of individuals. In Brasidas' speech, *dynasteia* refers to barbarians and not to Peloponnesians (Thuk. 4.126,2); cf. *HCT* III, 614-615; S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. II (Oxford, 1996), 398-399.

<sup>16</sup> Plato also contrasts *dynasteia* with *isonomia* (Plat. rep. 291c-d). For the “tyranny – egalitarianism” contrast in sources, cf. e.g. Herodotus' “Constitutional debate” (Hdt. 3.80,5-6). The adjective *isonomos* appears in two scholia written in honour of Harmodius and Aristogiton, the tyrant-slayers (Athen. 695a-b).

<sup>17</sup> G. Vlastos, “Isonomia”, *AJP* 74 (1953), 337-366; V.J. Rosivach, “The Tyrant in Athenian Democracy”, *Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica* 30,3 (1988), 47-57; P. Spahn, “Individualisierung und politisches Bewußtsein im archaischen Griechenland”, in K. Raaflaub and E. Müller-Luckner, eds., *Anfänge des politischen Denkens in der Antike. Die nahöstlichen Kulturen und die Griechen* (Munich, 1993), 359-360; Chr. Meier, *Die Entstehung des Politischen bei den Griechen*, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt am Main, 1995), 293-294; 297-299; W. Lengauer, “Die politische Bedeutung der Gleichheitsidee im 5. und 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr. – Einige Bemerkungen über isonomia”, in W. Will and J. Heinrichs, eds., *Zu Alexander d. Gr. Festschrift G. Wirth zum 60. Geburtstag* (Amsterdam,

The most important characteristics of Thucydides' use of the term *dynasteia* correspond to Aristotle's attitudes presented in his *Politics*. In Aristotle, this term refers to the fourth and final form of oligarchy (Aristot. pol. 1292a 39 - 1292b 10; 1293a 12-34). The first type of oligarchy occurs when the exercise of public duties is accessible to a larger number of citizens. The second type takes place when the number of citizens enjoying political rights becomes smaller and their fortune proportionally larger. Entry into public service is by co-optation. As the office-holders are not yet influential enough, the law remains supreme authority. The third form of oligarchy depends on an even smaller number of affluent full-right citizens. Sons now legally succeed their fathers in government offices. In the fourth and the last type, the power of office-holders, backed by their wealth and supporters, goes beyond every measure. Individuals now rule instead of the law. Aristotle defines this type of oligarchy as *dynasteia* and finds it to be very similar to tyranny.<sup>18</sup>

That *dynasteia* as a form of government has many characteristics in common with tyranny is observable in several places in his *Politics*. Thus, a *dynasteia* came into being in Crete when "the powerful", intent on evading the courts, ousted *cosmic*, the highest officials, from power. In such a case the state ceases to be a state and loses its control function (Aristot. pol. 1272b 1-15). In that respect it is similar to tyranny which, according to Aristotle, is the worst possible system and remotest from constitutional government (Aristot. pol. 1289b 1-5; 1293b 25-30). Further similarities can be inferred from Aristotle's view that no system is constitutional unless it is governed by the law (Aristot. pol. 1292a 30-34), which, in his opinion, goes not only for

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1987), 53-87; J. Bleicken, *Die athenische Demokratie*, 4th ed. (Paderborn/Munich/Vienna/Zurich, 1995), 66-67; 338-341; Leppin, *Thukydides*, 22-23; Martin, *Dynasteia*, 232-233; M. Ostwald, *Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy* (Oxford, 1969), 96-120; 180-182; Nippel, *Mischverfassungstheorie*, 33; K. Raaflaub, "Einleitung und Bilanz: Kleisthenes, Ephialtes und die Begründung der Demokratie", in K. H. Kinzl, ed., *Demokratia. Der Weg zur Demokratie bei den Griechen* (Darmstadt, 1995), 49-51; K. Raaflaub, *Die Entdeckung der Freiheit. Zur historischen Semantik und Gesellschaftsgeschichte eines politischen Grundbegriffs der Griechen* (Munich 1985), 115-118; P. Barceló, "Thukydides und die Tyrannis", *Historia* 39 (1990), 414-416; K.-W. Welwei, *Das klassische Athen. Demokratie und Machtpolitik im 5. und 4. Jahrhundert* (Darmstadt, 1999), 8-9; 338, n. 33; Schubert, *Macht des Volkes*, 15-19.

<sup>18</sup> At one point Aristotle says that *dynasteia* is similar to tyranny, and at another he compares it to monarchy (Aristot. pol. 1292b 5-10; 1293a 30-34). As Aristotle elsewhere states explicitly that the main difference between tyranny and monarchy is that the latter is based on the rule of law and is beneficial to the subjects, it seems probable that here he refers to the illegal despotic rule of a single person rather than to legal kingship (Aristot. pol. 1285a 17-1285b 4; 1295a 5-24; 1310b 40-1311a 5).

tyranny, but also for *dynasteia* and extreme democracy (Aristot. pol. 1289b 1-5; 1292a 15-39; 1292b 5-10).<sup>19</sup> An important criterion in evaluating a system of government is whether it is beneficial to all citizens or only to power-holders (Aristot. pol. 1279a 17-23). According to Aristotle, tyranny and *dynasteia* are comparable in this respect, too (Aristot. pol. 1310b 40 - 1311a 11; 1279b 5-10).<sup>20</sup> Tyranny has more in common with oligarchy: wealth as an end in itself,<sup>21</sup> the disarmament, oppression and expulsion of the masses from the city to remote areas (Aristot. pol. 1311a 8-15).<sup>22</sup> In his *Politics*, the similarity between *dynasteia* and tyranny is additionally confirmed by his thesis that tyranny often develops from an extreme oligarchy or a dynastic regime.<sup>23</sup> This thesis also appears in his pattern of successive constitutional systems. Namely, kingly rule is succeeded by a system where at first affairs of state are managed by the citizens, and then the system turns into an oligarchy.<sup>24</sup> From the oligarchy develops a tyranny, which is eventually succeeded by a democracy (Aristot. pol. 1286b 7-20). Listing the advantages of the system based on *mesoi*, Aristotle finds that it hardly ever leads to tyranny, by contrast to extreme democracy and oligarchy (Aristot. pol. 1295b 40 - 1296a 8). Dynastic regime may also turn into tyranny when dynasts (power-wielders) rule for a long time (Aristot. pol. 1308a 13-24). Finally, Aristotle sees tyranny as a combination of the last form of oligarchy and democracy (Aristot. pol. 1310b 1-8). Most important for the problems analyzed herein is Aristotle's claim that differences between extreme oligar-

<sup>19</sup> Aeschines has a similar attitude. According to him, tyrannical and oligarchic systems are ruled by power-holders and not by laws; by contrast, in democracies rules the authority of the law (Aischin. leg. 4-5).

<sup>20</sup> This can also be seen in the example of the development of *dynasteia* in Crete, cf. above.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. E. Schütrumpf and H.-J. Gehrke, "Aristoteles, Politik IV-VI, Übersetzt und eingeleitet von E. Schütrumpf, Erläutert von E. Schütrumpf und H.-J. Gehrke", in *Aristoteles Werke in Deutscher Übersetzung*, Bd. 9, Teil 3 (Berlin, 1996), 553.

<sup>22</sup> The fact that here and elsewhere Aristotle uses the term oligarchy and not *dynasteia*, is not so important. *Dynasteia* being the last form of oligarchy, characteristics common to oligarchy and tyranny are even more applicable to *dynasteia*.

<sup>23</sup> It is worthy of note that, according to Herodotus' "Constitutional Debate", Darius gives very similar arguments against oligarchy in favour of one-man rule (Hdt. 3.82,3); cf. also Thuk. 8.89,3. For the Constitutional Debate, see J. Bleicken, "Zur Entstehung der Verfassungstypologie im 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr.", *Historia* 38 (1979), 148-172.

<sup>24</sup> Since a change of the form of government results from deteriorations in the existing system, the assumption seems plausible that the worst form of oligarchy here refers to *dynasteia*.

chy and tyranny are quantitative rather than qualitative (Aristot. pol. 1312b 34-38):<sup>25</sup>

And to speak summarily, all the things  
that we have mentioned as causing the downfall  
of unmixed and extreme oligarchy and of the last  
form of democracy must be counted as destructive  
of tyranny as well, since extreme oligarchy and  
democracy are in reality divided tyrannies.<sup>26</sup>

That the number of power-holders usually appears to be Aristotle's sole criterion for differentiating between tyranny and *dynasteia* is inferable from his account of the transformation oligarchy undergoes in times of war.<sup>27</sup> According to him, oligarchy becomes tyranny when a general takes over power supported by mercenaries. However, when several commanders seize power together, then it is *dynasteia* (Aristot. pol. 1306a 20-25). The central importance Aristotle attaches to the number of power-holders in his *Politics* can also be recognized in his comment on the oligarchy in Elis. Listing the ways in which oligarchies may decline, Aristotle takes Elis as an example for oligarchy within oligarchy, because Elis was led by an aristocratic council of only "90" members (Aristot. pol. 1306a 13-19).<sup>28</sup> Symptomatically, he

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<sup>25</sup> It is noteworthy that Xenophon ascribes a similar thinking to Critias and his supporters. Critias (Xen. Hell. 2.3,16): *Then Critias (for he still treated Theramenes as a friend) replied that it was impossible for people who wanted to gain power not to put out of the way those who were best able to thwart them. "But if," he said, "merely because we are thirty and not one, you imagine that it is any the less necessary for us to keep a close watch over this government, just as one would if it were an absolute monarchy, you are foolish."* Theramenes says something comparable in his speech (Xen. Hell. 2.3,48): *But I, Critias, am forever at war with the men who do not think there could be a good democracy until the slaves and those who would sell the state for lack of a shilling should share in the government, and on the other hand I am forever an enemy to those who do not think that a good oligarchy could be established until they should bring the state to the point of being ruled absolutely by a few.*

<sup>26</sup> Aristotle. *Politics*, ed., transl. and introd. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass/London, 1932; reprint 1998).

<sup>27</sup> The reason that the sources generally associate tyranny with one-man rule may be twofold. Firstly, it was in accordance with tradition; secondly, the contrast "state-powerful individual" was, beyond any doubt, fascinating. The notion of a powerful individual ruthlessly imposing his will upon the whole community provides a far more spectacular and sharper contrast than that between the community and a group of people. This is observable in the ancient sources which are mainly interested in great tyrants, whereas the regimes led jointly by a group of tyrants are usually given much less attention.

<sup>28</sup> It is significant that Aristotle compares this council with the Spartan *gerousia*. Namely, it has often been suggested that the committee of the Athenian "Thirty" was shaped on the model of the *gerousia*; cf. Krentz, *Thirty*, 67-68; Whitehead, *Thirty Tyrants*, 120.

describes the selection of council members as dynastic.<sup>29</sup> The significance of this example becomes clearer when one bears in mind that, for instance, the Athenian governing body in 404/03 B.C. consisted of only thirty members, and that an even smaller group ruled in Thebes from 382 to 379 B.C. In addition to *Politics*, Aristotle connects *dynasteia* and tyranny in his *Nicomachean Ethics* (Aristot. eth. Nic. 1176b 3-4). So, when he speaks of the happiness, pleasure and amusement of tyrants he also uses the term *dynasteia*. It is important to emphasize that happiness, pleasure and amusement of the tyrant are among the central elements of the tyrant typology.<sup>30</sup>

The most precise and detailed description of *dynasteia* and its similarities to tyranny is given by Thucydides and especially Aristotle. But the relatedness of this notion to autocracy is also observable in other ancient writers, such as Plato, Xenophon, Lysias, Isocrates, Demosthenes and Diodorus. In this regard, it seems necessary to note that, with the exception of Diodorus, all these authors, including Thucydides and Aristotle, were under the strong impression of fifth- and fourth-century-B.C. developments in Athens, and that some of them belonged to the so-called "critical community".<sup>31</sup>

At one point Plato says that *dynasteia* belongs to intermediate constitutions, but fails to give a clear definition of its characteristics (Plat. rep. 544d).<sup>32</sup> And yet, from what he says elsewhere we can conclude that this term implies a type of regime that is more similar to tyranny than to oligarchy. Only once does Plato use the term *dynasteia* to describe oligarchy (Plat. polit. 291d). On the other hand, in his dialogue *Gorgias*, Callicles advocates the right of the stronger speaking about the individuals capable of founding an empire, *dynasteia* or tyranny by virtue of their natural strength (Plat. Gorg. 492b). In his *Republic* Plato uses the terms *dynasteia* and *basileia* expounding the view that philosophers should take charge of the state or else either the sons of rulers or rulers themselves inspired with the love of true philosophy by divine providence (Plat. rep. 499b-c).<sup>33</sup> In view of Plato's experience with Dionysius II, it seems that the term *dynasteia* here refers to

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Schütrumpf and Gehrke, *Politik*, 501.

<sup>30</sup> Jordović, *Anfänge*, 140-148.

<sup>31</sup> For the so-called "critical community", cf. J. Ober, *Political Dissent in Democratic Athens. Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule* (Princeton, 1998), 7-12, 15, 28-33, 43-51, 250, 286-288.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. J. Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, with critic. notes, commentary and app., Vol. I-II (Cambridge, 1902), 199-200.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Adam, *Republic*, 38; J. Hirmer, "Entstehung und Komposition der platonischen Politeia", *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, Suppl. 23,8 (Leipzig 1897), 668; W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, Vol. IV (Cambridge, 1975), 24-25; K. Trampedach, *Platon, die Akademie und die zeitgenössische Politik* (Stuttgart 1994), 211-214; 260-264; cf. also Plat. rep. 473c-e; ep. 7,326a-b. For Plato and Dionysius II, cf. Plat.

tyranny.<sup>34</sup> Namely, it is not very likely that Plato would have used the term *basileia* for the most notorious tyranny of his time.<sup>35</sup> The rulers of a *dynasteia* are listed alongside with despots and tyrants in the *Laws* where Plato compares their attitude to the weaker than themselves with the attitude of a master to his slave (Plat. leg. 777e). There is yet another place in the *Laws* showing that *dynasteia* has a lot in common with tyranny, because there rules the whim of an individual instead of the law and the assembly. This use of the term shows, however, that Plato, just like Thucydides, relates it to the earliest, or most primitive, form of government as well. In his words, *dynasteia* still exists with many Hellenes and barbarians, and that it is exactly what Homer referred to when speaking of the settlements of the Cyclopes (Plat. leg. 680b-c; 681d).

It is not only in his account of the Athenian “Thirty” that Diodorus equates *dynasteia* with tyranny (Diod. 14.32,6; 14.2,1; 4; 3,7; 5,6; 32,1-2; 33,2; 4; 15.25,4).<sup>36</sup> He often uses this term rather than tyranny to describe the rule of Dionysius I of Syracuse (Diod. 13.96,4; 14.8,4; 9,4; 10,2; 14,2; 18,1). Clearchus’ short-lived administration as the harmost of Byzantium in 403/02 B.C. is also defined as a tyranny and dynastic regime (Diod. 14.12,2-4). The fact that Diodorus makes no distinction between tyranny and *dynasteia* in three separate cases – the “Thirty”, Dionysius I and Clearchus

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ep. 7,326a-333a; 344-345b; for the significance of his Seventh Letter as a source, cf. Trampedach, *Platon*, 255-258.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. O. Apelt, “Platons Staat”, in O. Apelt, *Platon. Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. 5, Herausgegeben und mit Einleitungen, Literaturübersichten, Anmerkungen und Registern versehen von O. Apelt (Hamburg, 1920-1922; reprint Hamburg 1998), 497, n. 62; Trampedach, *Platon*, 102-124; 260-264; esp. 211-214; Guthrie, *Philosophy*, 18-19; 24-31; A. Vilhar and B. Pavlović, *Platon. Država*, 4th ed. (Belgrade, 1993), 365, n. 32.

<sup>35</sup> The fact must be borne in mind that Plato’s view of tyranny was powerfully (if not decisively) influenced by the rule of Dionysius I; cf. A. Heuss, “Aristoteles als Theoretiker des Totalitarismus”, *A&A* 17 (1971), 29; 33-35; 37; 40; K. F. Stroheker, *Dionysios I. Gestalt und Geschichte des Tyrannen von Syrakus* (Wiesbaden, 1958), 4; A. Lintott, *Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City* (London/Canberra, 1982), 185-186; 240; 246; 249; H.-J. Gehrke, “Die klassische Polisgesellschaft in der Perspektive griechischer Philosophen”, *Saeculum* 36 (1985), 150; Schütrumpf – Gehrke, *Politik*, 487; cf. also Berve, *Tyrannis*, 353; J. v. Ungern-Sternberg, “Zur Beurteilung Dionysios’ I. von Syrakus”, in W. Will and J. Heinrichs, eds., *Zu Alexander d. Gr. Festschrift G. Wirth* (Amsterdam, 1988), 1145-1146; 1151. As a result, it is less likely that he would have used the terms such as kings, royal and monarchy for the tyrants of Syracuse. Indeed, even earlier, speaking about kings and power-holders who should become philosophers, Plato thought of power-holders as tyrants (Plat. rep. 473c-e); cf. Adam, *Republic*, ad loc.

<sup>36</sup> This is even more significant because Diodorus always characterizes the regime of the “Four Hundred” as oligarchic (Diod. 13.36,2; 38,1).

– is very significant because he draws information from different writers. The assumption that the use of the term *dynasteia* originally comes from Philistus, a supporter of Dionysius I, is especially tempting.<sup>37</sup>

The notion of *dynasteia* is given tyrannical connotations by Isocrates, too. An example is his letter to Timotheus, whose father Clearchus, a disciple of his, had established tyrannical rule in his hometown Heraclea Pontica. It is indicative that Isocrates defines as dynastic not only the rule of Timotheus, but also his father's regime, notorious for ruthlessness and brutality (Isokr. ep. 7,1). He speaks in the same manner of the tyrant Cleommis of Methymna (Isokr. ep. 7,8).<sup>38</sup> In his first letter to king Philip of Macedon, Isocrates terms the rule of the Great King as *dynasteia* (Isokr. ep. 2.408,8).<sup>39</sup> In his *Panathenaicus* he defines the Pisistratidean autocracy as a dynastic regime, pointing out that the tyrant acted both against the oligarchs and the demos (Isokr. or. 12,148). He also sees the tyranny of Dionysius I as *dynas-*

<sup>37</sup> It relies above all on the fact that the term *dynasteia* is far more "neutral" than tyranny, and thus may have been more suitable to Philistus. It should also be noted that Diodorus classifies the regime of Dionysius I as *dynasteia* in his account of the fortification of Syracuse (Diod. 14.18,1). This report comes most probably from Philistus; cf. Stroheker, *Dionysios I.*, 63; K. Meister, *Die sizilische Geschichte bei Diodor. Von den Anfängen bis zum Tod des Agathokles* (Munich 1967), 86.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Berve, *Tyrannis*, 337.

<sup>39</sup> For the fact that the ancient sources mostly saw the rule of Persian kings as tyrannical, cf. U. Walter, "Da sah er das Volk ganz in seiner Hand." – Deiokes und die Entstehung monarchischer Herrschaft im Geschichtswerk Herodots", in M. Meier, B. Patzek, U. Walter and J. Wiesehöfer, eds., *Deiokes, König der Meder. Eine Herodot-Episode in ihren Kontexten* (Stuttgart, 2004), 86–92; M. Meier, "Die Deiokes-Episode im Werk Herodots – Überlegungen zu den Entstehungsbedingungen griechischer Geschichtsschreibung", in M. Meier, B. Patzek, U. Walter and J. Wiesehöfer, eds., *Deiokes, König der Meder. Eine Herodot-Episode in ihren Kontexten* (Stuttgart, 2004), 29; H. Sonnabend, *Geschichte der antiken Biographie. Von Isokrates bis zur Historia Augusta* (Darmstadt 2003), 24; Berve, *Tyrannis*, 193; 625–626; R. Bichler, *Herodots Welt. Der Aufbau der Historie am Bild der fremden Länder und Völker, ihrer Zivilisation und ihrer Geschichte* (Berlin, 2000), 275–277; 282–285; K. F. Stroheker, "Zu den Anfängen der monarchischen Theorie in der Sophistik", *Historia* 2 (1953/4), 382–395; J. M. Alonso-Núñez, "Die Verfassungsdebatte bei Herodot", in W. Schuller, ed., *Politische Theorie und Praxis im Altertum* (Darmstadt, 1998), 19 with n. 2; 25; 27–29; D. Lateiner, *The Historical Method of Herodotus* (Toronto, 1989), 163–186; K. Raaflaub, "Athens >Ideologie der Macht< und die Freiheit des Tyrannen", in J. M. Balcer, H.-J. Gehrke, K. Raaflaub and W. Schuller, eds., *Studien zum attischem Seebund* (Konstanz, 1984), 74; Raaflaub, *Entdeckung*, 67, 123–125, 323; Heuss, *Aristoteles*, 25; S. Borzsák, "Persertum und griechisch-römische Antike. Zur Ausgestaltung des klassischen Tyrannenbildes", *Gymnasium* 94 (1987), 289–297; G. Walser, "Zum griechisch-persischen Verhältnis vor dem Hellenismus", *HZ* 220 (1975), 529–542; H. Drexler, *Thukydides-Studien* (Darmstadt, 1976), 23–25; 66–67; B. Snell, "Aischylos und das Handeln im Drama", *Philologus* Suppl. 20,1 (Leipzig, 1928), 66–77.

*teia* (Isokr. or. 6,45). The term *dynasteia* is used for both kingly and tyrannical rules that violate the law and care only about their own advantage (Isokr. or. 12,242-244). The tyrannical connotation of the term *dynasteia* can also be recognized in Isocrates' view of the foreign policy of Athens and Sparta. Thus he calls upon the Athenians to renounce their tyranny and *dynasteia* (Isokr. or. 8,142), while the Spartan *dynasteia* is referred to in the context of the advantages of the previous Athenian hegemony by comparison with the bad experiences under Spartan dominance (Isokr. or. 12,68). The dominance (*dynasteia*) of Athens is directly compared with tyranny in Isocrates' speech *Antidosis* (Isokr. or. 15,64). His *Panegyricus* commends the Athenian hegemony for freeing many Greeks from lawlessness and *dynasteia* (Isokr. or. 4,39).

In his *Hellenica*, Xenophon uses the term *dynasteia* only for the Theban regime of 382-379 B.C., but he also characterizes it as a tyranny (Xen. Hell. 5.4,1-2; 9; 13; 46; 7.3,7).<sup>40</sup> Lysias uses the term *dynasteia* in his *Funereral oration* to define the rule of the Pisistratids (Lys. 2,18). Andocides defines the oligarchy of the "Four Hundred" both as tyranny and as dynastic regime (Andok. 1,75; 2,27).<sup>41</sup> In Aeschines' speech *On the Embassy* the term *dynasteia* refers to Philip's rule and the rule of Macedonian kings in general (Aischin. leg. 2,29).

A link between *dynasteia* and tyranny can be found in Demosthenes too. In his speech *On the Crown*, Demosthenes says that the Macedonian ruler imposed his *arché* and *tyrannís* on the Greeks (Demosth. or. 18,66),<sup>42</sup> but immediately adds that Philip has made many personal sacrifices for the sake of his *arché* and *dynasteia* (Demosth. or. 18,67).<sup>43</sup> He refers to the Athenian and Spartan hegemonies as *dynasteia* when speaking about the Greeks declaring war on the Athenians and the Spartans because the latter's abuse of their hegemony in Hellas (Demosth. or. 9,24). When commenting only on Spartan political dominance and foreign policy, Demosthenes uses the

<sup>40</sup> For other sources, cf. Gehrke, *Stasis*, 177. This regime in Thebes is interesting because of its similarity to that of the "Thirty" in Athens. As in Athens, it was a rather violent rule of a small group led by Leontiades, Philip, Hypates, Archias and their *betaireiai*, and they seized power only through Spartan intervention. Just as in Athens, a Spartan garrison was stationed on the Theban Cadmea. Modern scholarship mostly sees this regime as a collective tyranny; cf. H.-J. Gehrke, *Jenseits von Athen und Sparta. Das Dritte Griechenland und seine Staatenwelt* (Munich, 1986), 63-65; Gehrke, *Stasis*, 168-180; 317-319; Berve, *Tyrannis*, 299-300; 674.

<sup>41</sup> H. Berve, *Tyrannis*, 632 thinks that the term *dynasteia* refers to the rule of the "Thirty".

<sup>42</sup> Cf. also Demosth. or. 11,4.

<sup>43</sup> In 18,270 Demosthenes defines Philip's international political domination as *dynasteia*.

term tyranny (Demosth. or. 20,70). As for Athens, it should be noted that otherwise the widespread term for its *arché* was tyranny.<sup>44</sup> In the *Fourth Philippic* Demosthenes describes Philip's followers as yearning for tyranny and *dynasteia* (Demosth. or. 10,4). It is hard to believe that here Demosthenes wanted *dynasteia* to mean "oligarchy", since the rest of his speeches condemn Philip for establishing tyrannies in Greek states (Chalcis, Oreos-Histiaea, Eretria, Messenia), although these were governed by several power-holders (Demosth. or. 6,21; 8,36; 9,17; 23; 33; 57-62; 10,8; 17,4; 7; 10-11; 29; 18,71; 79; 81-82; 295).<sup>45</sup> Demosthenes' statement that Philip installed three tyrants to rule together in Eretria is especially remarkable in this respect (Demosth. or. 9,58).

As the term *dynasteia* had never been as widespread as tyranny or oligarchy, the reasons for that need to be looked at.

The fact that the term *dynasteia* is of a later date than tyranny and oligarchy may have been one of the reasons.<sup>46</sup> According to Chr. Meier, it came into use at about the same time as *politeia* – about 430 B.C.<sup>47</sup> The earliest written evidence for the term *dynasteia* can be found in Sophocles' tragedy *Oedipus Tyrannus* (Soph. *Oid. T.* 593). Although Chr. Meier rightfully concludes that its meaning in the drama is "rule in the general sense", it should be pointed out that it unambiguously refers to the rule of an individual, which is at the same time termed tyranny.<sup>48</sup> The term *dynasteia* does not occur in Herodotus' Constitutional Debate (Hdt. 3.80-82). He uses only the verb *δυναστεύω* to describe the powerful position of certain aristocrats or states (Hdt. 5.66,1; 97,1; 6.35,1; 66,2; 9.2,2-3). In Thucydides

<sup>44</sup> Cf. K. Raaflaub, "Polis Tyrannos. Zur Entstehung einer politischen Metapher", in G. Bowersock, W. Burckert and M. C. J. Putnam, eds., *Arktouros, Hellenic Studies Presented to Bernard M. W. Knox on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday* (Berlin/New York, 1979), 245; Raaflaub, *Ideologie der Macht*, 69-78. K. Raaflaub, "Stick and Glue: The Function of Tyranny in Fifth-Century Athenian Democracy", in K. A. Morgan, ed., *Popular Tyranny: Sovereignty and Its Discontents in Ancient Greece* (Austin, 2003), 59-94; Tuplin, *Imperial Tyranny*, 348-375; T. Morawetz, *Der Demos als Tyrann und Banause. Aspekte antidemokratischer Polemik im Athen des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Frankfurt am Main, 2000), 49-132. For identification of Athenian *arché* with tyranny cf. also Barceló, *Thukydides*, 416; 419-424.

<sup>45</sup> On the question as to whether these regimes were or were not collective tyrannies, cf. Gehrke, *Stasis*, 40-41; 65-66; 74-75; Berve, *Tyrannis*, 300-303; 308; 674-677.

<sup>46</sup> Meier, *Entstehung*, 286, 299-302; 304-305.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Chr. Meier, "Der Wandel der politisch-sozialen Begriffswelt im 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr.", in R. Koselleck, ed., *Historische Semantik und Begriffsgeschichte* (Stuttgart, 1979), 211; 214; Meier, *Entstehung*, 299-300; 304-305.

<sup>48</sup> Meier, *Entstehung*, 304-305.

this term is in the shadow of the term *oligarchia*, although his notion of *dynasteia* is consistent and precise. Thus the former term occurs twenty-six and the latter only four times.<sup>49</sup> In other writers this contrast is even more conspicuous.<sup>50</sup>

Another factor hindering the spread of the term *dynasteia* was a tendency of different authors to ascribe it different meanings. Apart from referring to a narrow and violent oligarchy, the term also implied political control in general, dominance, hegemony, vassal principality. Isocrates is an especially good example of this tendency, since an entire spectrum of different meanings of the term *dynasteia* can be found in his works which, due to their conventionality, provide an excellent insight into the intellectual tendencies of the time.<sup>51</sup> He equates the Spartan hegemony until the Battle of Leuctra with *dynasteia* (Isokr. or. 5,47).<sup>52</sup> Using this term, he often means power in general (Isokr. or. 5,133; 145). *Dynasteia* also refers both to the dominance of selfish Athenian orators causing damage to their own polis, and to the power of the statesmen who made Athens great (Isokr. or. 8,121; 15,316).<sup>53</sup> Furthermore, this term can be a synonym for oligarchy or kingship (Isokr. or. 4,105; 12,126).<sup>54</sup> It is often synonymous with the word hegemony (Isokr. or. 6,110).<sup>55</sup> So many different meanings of the term must have hindered its use and diffusion. That and the widespread use of the term oligarchy probably made *dynasteia* unsuitable for speeches before a larger audience. And finally, the concept of *dynasteia* is already contained in the concept of oligarchy.

<sup>49</sup> Of that number, it once refers to Thessaly and once to barbarians.

<sup>50</sup> Lysias uses the term *dynasteia* twice, and *oligarchia* more than twenty times.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Ober, *Political Dissent*, 250.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. also Demosth. or. 9,24; 18,322, although Demosthenes characterizes the Spartan hegemony as tyranny when speaking of it separately (Demosth. or. 20,70).

<sup>53</sup> Cf. also Aischin. Ctes. 3; 145; Demosth. or. 25,7; ep. 2,1; 6.

<sup>54</sup> Isokr. or. 4,105: "On the contrary, we regarded harmony among our allies as the common boon of all, and therefore we governed all the cities under the same laws, deliberating about them in the spirit of allies, not of masters; guarding the interests of the whole confederacy but leaving each member of it free to direct its own affairs; supporting the people making war on despotic powers (ταῖς διναστέαις), considering it an outrage that the many should be subject to the few, that those who were poorer in fortune but not inferior in other respects should be banished from the offices, that, furthermore, in a fatherland which belongs to all in common some should hold the place of masters, others of aliens, and that men who are citizens by birth should be robbed by law of their share in the government". Isocrates, Vol. I, ed. and transl. G. Norlin (Cambridge, Mass/London, 1928; reprint 1991).

<sup>55</sup> Cf. also Demosth. or. 9,24; 18,67; 250; 20,70.

Yet another factor is that tyranny was one of the oldest Greek political concepts, which assumed markedly negative and pejorative connotations.<sup>56</sup> Coupled with the contemporaries' fascination with tyranny as a political and historical phenomenon, this was the main reason why the term tyranny was given preference over the term *dynasteia* in ancient evaluations of collective tyrannies. This is supported by the fact that the notion of tyranny includes all types of regimes that modern scholarship defines as collective tyrannies.

The last important factor is that most of the relevant sources were powerfully influenced by the Athenian political developments of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., as well as by the evolution of political thought in that period. The experiences of 411 and 404/03 B.C. were fundamental in this sense, because each overthrow was carried out by a group – the “Four Hundred”, the “Thirty” – which aspired to oligarchy.<sup>57</sup> Of some significance must also have been the fact that, from the Peloponnesian War at the latest, the Spartans were considered as champions of oligarchy, whereas the Athenians saw themselves as defenders of democracy. All this helped the dichotomy “oligarchy-democracy” become dominant in the political life of Athens.<sup>58</sup> The importance and scope of this influence can be deduced from the fact the bloody regime of the “Thirty” was seen as an oligarchy by most citizens and contemporaries, although it was really a collective tyranny.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>56</sup> Cf. J. Cobet, “König, Anführer, Herr, Monarch, Tyrann”, in E. Ch. Welskopf, ed., *Soziale Typenbegriffe im alten Griechenland und ihr Fortleben in den Sprachen der Welt*, Vol. III (Berlin, 1981), 47-55; Berve, *Tyrannis*, 190-206; de Libero, *Tyrannis*, 23-38; V. Parker, “Τόραυος. The Semantics of a Political Concept from Archilochus to Aristotle”, *Hermes* 126 (1998), 145-172.

<sup>57</sup> As for the “Thirty”, this turned out to be the case with only a part of new power holders, whereas the other part wanted it only nominally; cf. Jordović, *Anfänge*, 185-214.

<sup>58</sup> This process has been made much easier by the fact that the overthrows showed clear features of a tyranny, such as arbitrariness and violence, which applies especially to the “Thirty”; cf. Jordović, *Anfänge*, 194-202; Raaflaub, *Entdeckung*, 301-302. As a result, the difference between these regimes and tyranny lessened, while their difference from democracy became more prominent. Another reason why oligarchy as a counter-model to the rule of the people gained appeal was that the “Thirty” had risen to power with the help of the Spartans. The Spartans had already been known as opponents of tyrannical regimes, and by the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War had become considered champions of oligarchy (Thuk 1.18,1; 6.53,3; 59,4; Aristoph. *Lys.* 1149-1156; Aristot. *pol.* 1312b 7; Isokr. *or.* 4,125); cf. R. Bernhardt, “Die Entstehung der Legende von der tyrannenfeindlichen Außenpolitik Spartas im sechsten und fünften Jahrhundert”, *Historia* 36 (1987), 257-289; Barceló, *Thukydides*, 409-410; P. Barceló, *Basileia, Monarchia, Tyrannis. Untersuchungen zu Entwicklung und Beurteilung von Alleinherrschaft im vorhellenistischen Griechenland* (Stuttgart, 1993), 188-189.

<sup>59</sup> Jordović, *Anfänge*, 169-214.

What contributed to their misconception is the selective character of collective memory, where some circumstances are retained and others pushed aside or even forgotten.<sup>60</sup> Rhetoric played an important role in that process. Namely, speeches as a rule were given immediately or soon after the events they referred to, and were given in front of the masses. As a result, a clearer and nuanced distinction between regimes or the use of relatively complex notions such as *dynasteia* became increasingly impracticable, which in turn encouraged the spread of stereotypes and phrases.<sup>61</sup> This is clearly noticeable from different labels designating the “Thirty” in speeches (Lysias, Demosthenes, Aeschines), and in historical and theoretical works (Xenophon, Diodorus, Aristotle).<sup>62</sup> It is not surprising then that, due to the “oligarchy-democracy” dichotomy, contrasting oligarchy and democracy became a common rhetorical turn, as noticed already by G. Kaibel (Lys. 12,78; 25,17; Andok. 1,99; Isokr. or. 15,27; Aristot. Ath. pol. 38,4).<sup>63</sup>

That the influence of this dichotomy on the spread of the term *dynasteia* cannot be underestimated may be seen from the example of the “tyranny-democracy” dichotomy that had preceded it. In the fifth century B.C. tyranny was repeatedly denounced as the main threat to the rule of the people. Even after oligarchy had appeared as an alternative to democracy, tyranny continued to figure as an important contrast.<sup>64</sup> This state of affairs is clearly reflected in Aristophanes and Thucydides.<sup>65</sup> Fear of tyranny among the masses was impressively caricatured in Aristophanes’ comedy *Wasps*

<sup>60</sup> Vgl. J. Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen*, 3rd ed. (Munich, 2000), 34-48; A. Wolpert, *Remembering Defeat. Civil War and Civic Memory in Ancient Athens* (Baltimore, 2002), xiv-xv; 76-87.

<sup>61</sup> An especially good review of this problem can be found in A. Wolpert, *Remembering*, 75-141; 146 n. 8. It should be noted that A. Wolpert focuses on speeches and thus his findings mostly refer to them; Wolpert, *Remembering*, XII-XV.

<sup>62</sup> It is not merely a coincidence that historical and theoretical works use different state-theoretical terms.

<sup>63</sup> G. Kaibel, *Stil und Text der ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ des Aristoteles* (Berlin, 1893), 196; cf. also P. J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaiou Politeia* (Oxford, 1981), 461-462.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. E. Ruschenbusch, *Athenische Innenpolitik im 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Bamberg, 1979), 160-164; Rosivach, *Tyrant*, 47-49; 51-57; Meier, *Entstehung*, 285-286; Raaflaub, *Stück and Glue*, 59-94; Raaflaub, *Entdeckung*, 258-277; H. Heftner, *Der oligarchische Umsturz des Jahres 411 v. Chr. und die Herrschaft der Vierhundert in Athen. Quellenkritische und historische Untersuchungen* (Frankfurt am Main, 2001), 122; A. Rubel, *Stadt in Angst. Religion und Politik in Athen während des Peloponnesischen Krieges* (Darmstadt, 2000), 199-200 and n. 64.

<sup>65</sup> For confirmations in the sources, cf. Berve, *Tyrannis*, 197-206; 627-629; K.-W. Welwei, “„Demos“ und „Plethos“ in athenischen Volksbeschlüssen um 450 v. Chr.”, *Historia*

(Aristoph. *Vesp.* 417; 463-507), and parodied in his other comedies (Aristoph. *Equ.* 257; 447; 452; 475-479; *Av.* 483; 1072-1075; 1605; *Lys.* 616-634; *Thesm.* 335-351; 1136-1144). The enormous fear of tyranny in Athens on the eve of the Sicilian campaign is clearly seen in Thucydides as well (*Thuk.* 6.15,5; 27,3; 53,3; 60,1).<sup>66</sup> But Demophantus' decree is especially interesting. This psephism forcing people to take the oath that they would pitilessly pursue the enemies of democracy was issued after the downfall of the "Four Hundred" (*Andok.* 1.96-98).<sup>67</sup> It is indicative that this oath saw tyranny as the main threat to the democratic system even after an obviously oligarchic revolution. Indeed, twenty or thirty years before 411 B.C. there had already begun to circulate oligarchic views or concepts that were a far more realistic alternative to democracy than tyranny.<sup>68</sup> The fact that tyranny was still seen as the main threat to democracy shows that former oppositions often prevailed even when they no longer had support in reality.<sup>69</sup> Aristophanes' and Andocides' comments show that even the contemporaries were aware of the fact (*Aristoph. Vesp.* 488-507; *Andok.* 4,27).<sup>70</sup>

Based on the Greek sources, this study has shown that the Hellenes used the term *dynasteia* for the type of regime that modern scholarship defines as collective tyranny. The term referred to the despotic rule of a small clique that wielded absolute power and ignored the law and the rights of citizens. It should be added that the highest government offices were hereditary.<sup>71</sup> These characteristics, as well as the information provided by the

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35 (1986), 179-180; 190; Brock, *Athenian Oligarchs*, 160-164; Ruschenbusch, *Innenpolitik*, 33-40; Barceló, *Thukydides*, 412-417.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. Jordović, *Anfänge*, 131-168.

<sup>67</sup> Welwei, *Athen*, 405 n. 305; 311; B. Bleckmann, *Athens Weg in die Niederlage. Die letzten Jahre des Peloponnesischen Krieges* (Stuttgart/Leipzig, 1998), 432-442; A. Dössel, *Die Beilegung innerstaatlicher Konflikte in den griechischen Poleis vom 5.-3. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Frankfurt am Main, 2003), 56-69.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. Raaflaub, *Entdeckung*, 258-259; 270-277; M. Ostwald, *Oligarchia: The Development of a Constitutional Form in Ancient Greece* (Stuttgart, 2000), 21-30; Welwei, „*Demos*“ und „*Plethos*“, 190; H. Heftner, „Oligarchen, Mesoi, Autokraten: Bemerkungen zur anti-demokratischen Bewegung des späten 5. Jh. v. Chr. in Athen“, *Chiron* 33 (2003), 1-41.

<sup>69</sup> One of the reasons for preferring tyranny as a contrast to moderate oligarchy is that its differences from democracy are more conspicuous and thus easier to perceive. As moderate oligarchies often involve a considerable part of citizens and are rarely associated with despotism and terror, their divergence from democracy is less observable. Cf. Meier, *Entstehung*, 285-286; Raaflaub, *Entdeckung*, 259.

<sup>70</sup> For Andocides, cf. Brock, *Athenian Oligarchs*, 161, n. 5.

<sup>71</sup> This is not necessarily of crucial importance to this study, because dynastic regimes, collective tyrannies and tyrannies were usually short-lived, and therefore could not fully develop all their forms and elements; cf. a brief review of the meaning of the term in

sources, demonstrate similarities between *dynasteia* and collective tyranny.<sup>72</sup> This study has also shed light on the reasons why this term nonetheless failed to become the prevailing label for this type of tyranny. The results of this research have led us to conclude, firstly, that the picture of tyranny is not as simple as it is often thought to be, and secondly, they suggest that in assessing the character of ancient Greek oppressive regimes whose nature was open to controversy one should not reduce oneself to thinking in terms of oligarchy and tyranny, since the ancient evaluations of such regimes often conformed to these conventional ideas.

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*UDC 316.3(38)*  
*94:316.462](38)*

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Martin, *Dynasteia*, 231; L. Whibley, *Greek Oligarchies: Their Character and Organisation* (London 1896; repr. Rome 1968), 124.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. Gehrke, *Stasis*, 318-319; Gehrke, *Jenseits von Athen und Sparta*, 63; 65.