History of Hellenic-Serbian (Yugoslav) Alliances from Karageorge to the Balkan Pact 1817–1954**

Abstract: The paper provides a review of efforts to make Serbian-Hellenic alliances and formal agreements since the last years of Karageorge’s life within the context of the relations between Serbia and Greece, and later between Yugoslavia and Greece. The circumstances that led to the signing of six formal alliances have been analysed including their content and scope. Out of the six alliances, four were bilateral, and two were Balkan (1934, 1953/54). All of them have been reviewed both in the bilateral and Balkan context. The following agreements have been analysed: The Treaty of Alliance and the Military Treaty from 1867/68, The Treaty of Alliance of the Kingdom of Serbia and the Hellenic Kingdom and the Military Convention of June 1, 1913, The Pact of Friendship, Conciliation and Judicial Settlement between Yugoslavia and Greece of 1929, the Balkan Pact (the Balkan Entente) of 1934, The Treaty on the Balkan Union between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Hellenic Kingdom of January 1942, the Balkan Pact of 1953/54. The issues related to the struggle of Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria about Macedonia and the question of the Serbian Free Zone of Salonica have also been discussed, as well as mutual relations during the Great War and at the beginning of the Cold War.

Keywords: Serbian-Hellenic alliance, Treaty of Alliance of 1867/68, Treaty of Alliance of Serbia and Greece of 1913, Balkan Pact (Balkan Entente) of 1934, Balkan Pact of 1953/54

The one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the first formal Serbian-Hellenic alliance of 1867 was marked by exhibitions in Belgrade, Thessaloniki and Athens, and it offered a chance to rethink a series of Greek-Serbian and Greek-Yugoslav agreements on friendship and mutual alliance.¹ In the period from 1976 to 2003, the institutes for Balkan Studies in Belgrade and Thessa-
loniki held six symposia on Serbian-Hellenic relations. Five of them dealt with topics that covered the political and cultural history of the nineteenth and twentieth century, and one was dedicated to the arts of Thessaloniki and the spiritual currents in the fourteenth century. Another scholarly conference was organised by the Institute of Historical Research of the National Hellenic Research Foundation in 2010. In that way, the state of research of Serbian-Greek relations in the nineteenth and twentieth century has been the result of decades-long cooperation of the institutes in Belgrade, Thessaloniki and Athens.

The first unofficial alliance

One could take as the first unofficial modern alliance between Greeks and Serbs the agreement made in 1817 between Karadjordje (Karageorge) Petrović, the leader of the First Serbian Uprising (1804–1813), and the secret Pan-Hellenic society Philike Hetairia (“Society of Friends”). The identity of both ethnic groups was at that time still ethno-religious and very much based on Christian Orthodox traditions. Ethnic Greeks still adhered to Byzantine traditions, and still called themselves Romaioi, in other words – Romans. However, educated ethnic Greeks were under the influence of the ideas of the Enlightenment and Adamantios Korais, and they increasingly viewed themselves as members of a culture inextricably linked with ancient Hellas, and their identity as Hellenic rather than exclusively Eastern Roman (Byzantine). Hetairia was established in 1814 in Odessa and initially had “the basic characteristics of a Masonic Chris-


3 Paschalis Kitromilides and Sophia Matthaiou, eds., Greek-Serbian Relations in the Age of Nation-Building (Athens: Section of Neohellenic Research/Institute of Historical Research of the National Hellenic Research Foundation, 2016).
tian organisation".\textsuperscript{4} The envoy for Serbia became Georgios Olympios (Djordje Olimpije in Serbian), a participant in the First Serbian Uprising, known among Serbs as Kapetan (Captain) Jorgač. During the Uprising in Serbia, Karadjordje did not have much confidence in Greeks as intermediaries but, when he found himself in exile in Moldova and Russia, he became close to the hetairists. In 1816, during his stay in St. Petersburg, he noticed that Russian official circles had no inclination to support an uprising among Balkan Christians. Following the Congress of Vienna, a legitimistic mood prevailed in St. Petersburg. Therefore, the hetairists happened to be a very rare group that advocated an uprising of Balkan Christians.

In Jassy, the office of dragoman (translator) was held by Georgios Leventis. He formulated the idea of a concomitant uprising in Greece and Serbia. It was Olympios who introduced the leader of the First Serbian Uprising to the plans of Hetairia. At that time, Karadjordje lived in Hotin (Khotyn) in Bessarabia.\textsuperscript{5} He came to the garden of Galata, in the vicinity of Jassy, to the house of Constantine Ypsilantis. There he met Leventis three times and, in June 1817, was initiated into the secret society Hetairia. Filimon described what Karadjordje swore to fight for on that occasion: “He [Karadjordje] swore on his own and his people’s behalf that he would be an eternal enemy of the tyrant [the Ottoman Empire], and would support Hellas, Serbia and all the Christians under the Turks, regardless of their ethnicity and creed, and that he would do everything to overthrow the tyrannical yoke.”\textsuperscript{6} The hetairist Mihail Leonardo provided him with a passport and, in June 1817, took him to the border with Serbia.\textsuperscript{7} His transfer to Serbia was meant to provoke a new action that would be a signal for a general uprising of Balkan Christians. These plans failed when Karadjordje was murdered only a few days after his arrival in Serbia. The warmongering policy of Karadjordje and Hetairia was very much at odds with the plans of gradualism advocated by the Serbian Prince Miloš Obrenović (Milosh Obrenovich).


“Karadjordje paid the clash of the two approaches with his own head.” He died a victim of the aspiration to mount a pan-Christian uprising among the Eastern Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire.

Ioannis Filimon (1798/1799–1874), historian and participant in the Greek Uprising of 1821 but also a hetairist, wrote *A History of Philike Hetairia* (1834) and *A History of the Hellenic Uprising* in three volumes (1859–1860). He described the shock felt among Serbian and Hellenic patriots after the death of Karadjordje: “That unfortunate act very much harmed Serbian and Greek interests. For Serbia, he was a great protector because he offered resistance to the Turks and made them afraid, and Hellas lost with him every hope of a future fight against the Turks. Due to this and quite naturally, Greeks were overwhelmed by sorrow after the death of this irreplaceable hero.”

From the spring of 1820, Hetaireia was led by Prince Alexander/Alexandros Ypsilantis (1792–1828). In January 1821, he sent a draft alliance treaty to Prince Miloš. It included ten articles, but the hetairist who carried it was caught in Ada Kale, taken to Constantinople and executed. Although Prince Miloš staged no insurrection during the Greek War of Independence, he helped Greeks whom he viewed as Christian brethren. In practically autonomous Serbia under Miloš Obrenović, Turks still pursued slave trade, which Serbs viewed with deep disapproval. When Turks brought Greeks who had been taken as slaves during the Greek War of Independence, Prince Miloš would pay their ransom and set them all free. For this he received from Otto, King of the Hellenes, the Grand Cross of the Order of the Redeemer/Saviour.

What connected Romeic Romans/Greeks and Serbs in the age of the Serbian and Greek uprisings was their adherence to the same religion. What will gradually develop as an obstacle between various Balkan nations, including Serbs and Greeks, would be the transformation of an ethnic into a national identity. In both the Principality/Kingdom of Serbia and the Hellenic Kingdom, it happened only in the second half of the nineteenth century.

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9 Ioannis Filimon, *Dokimon istorikon peri tis Philikis Etaireias* (Nauplio 1834); Ioannis Filimon, *Dokimon istorikon peri tis ellinikis Epanastaseos*, vol. 1–3 (Athens 1859–1860). Excerpts from this history were published in Serbian in 1907.

10 *Srbija i Grčka u XIX veku*, 23; Filimon, *Dokimon istorikon*, 10.

11 Filimon, *Dokimon istorikon*, 40; the work was edited by A. J. Kumanudi, Filimon, *Dokimon istorikon peri tis ellinikis Epanastaseos*, vol. 1, 9–10.

The first formal alliance of Athens and Belgrade

During his second reign, the Serbian Prince Michael (Mihailo) Obrenović III (1860–1868) launched a comprehensive action focused on the liberation of Balkan Christians. It was already during the second reign of his father, Prince Miloš (1859–1860), that efforts were made to reach an alliance between the Principality of Serbia and the Hellenic Kingdom. In August 1860, an envoy of the Hellenic government called Palaiologos brought an offer aimed at making an alliance between Greece and Serbia against the Ottoman Empire, but Serbia declined because it was not yet ready to launch a military offensive.13 Sometime later, Ilija Garašanin (Iliya Garashanin 1812–1874) began working on the alliance. In March 1861, he submitted to Prince Michael a draft proposal of an agreement with Greece. Garašanin’s view was that if the Hellenic Kingdom and Serbia remained peaceful, they would allow the European powers to make deals about the future of the Ottoman Empire without the Balkan states having a say in its fate.

At the same time, an offer for an alliance came from Otto, King of the Hellenes. On 19 April 1861, this offer was handed in Constantinople to Ilija Garašanin and Milan Petronijević by Markos Renieris (1815–1897), a Greek lawyer and historian, and an associate of the famous Greek historian Kostantinos Paparigopoulos (1815–1891). By June the documents that had been sent to Athens and Belgrade were harmonised. There were actually two documents: a draft convention between Serbia and Greece and an agreement on the alliance between Serbia, Greece, Romania and Montenegro. The draft included the obligation for both states to muster as many troops as possible; additionally, Greece was to arm as large a fleet as possible. The agreement was never signed, but both governments declared that they considered the draft as if it had been ratified and signed. It turned out that none of the signatories was able to equip a sufficiently strong army and that the great powers were against any military offensive of Serbia and Greece. The efforts to formalise this agreement in mid-1862 failed.14 During the talks on the agreement, a lot of time was spent on the issues of Bulgaria and Macedonia. An agreement was reached that Bulgarians should have their own government, and spheres of influence were defined in Macedonia. Serbia was supposed to deploy her agents down to the cities of Durazzo, Elbasan, Ohrid/Ohrida, Prilep, Veles/Velesa, Štip/Stip, Džuma and Kratovo. Greece was to develop her actions south of that line.15

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14 Ibid. 89–90.
15 Jakšić, “Prvi Srpsko-grčki savez”, 42–43.
Both Cretan rebels and potential rebels that Serbia counted on who lived south of her borders had an ethno-religious Christian identity that was different from the identity of some political leaders in Belgrade and Athens. In the two Balkan capitals one could detect a spirit of nationalism as early as the 1840s. A part of the political elite and some intellectuals had been educated in the West or at least exposed to Western ideas, and they advocated new ideas of nationality in their homelands. Such ideas were not common among the Christian masses of the Ottoman Balkans. Their identity was still very much based on the Christian-Muslim binary opposition.

The agreement between Serbia and Greece was meant to be an agreement between the two states and not between the two nations. Yet, the impulse to make such an agreement had come from the national movements in Italian and German lands. It soon proved that both states had aspirations to become Balkan hegemons, and that it was not an easy task to reach an agreement on territorial divisions. Macedonia turned out to be a particularly difficult problem, as did Russia’s clear message that she considered Bulgaria a part of her own sphere of influence.

In the background of the agreement, the Cretan Uprising was going on, and both governments were analysing the consequences it could have. The uprising of the Cretan Christians in the spring of 1866 attracted open sympathies for the rebels in Serbia. The defence of the Arkadi Monastery and the massacre of its defenders in November 1868 were received in Belgrade with great admiration and compassion. In December 1866/January 1867, religious services for those who lost their lives in Crete and the Arkadi Monastery were held in churches throughout Serbia. In February 1867, a special committee was formed in Belgrade to support Cretan refugees. In less than a month, the Committee was able to raise 30,000 golden francs and hand the funds to a Greek envoy in Vienna.\textsuperscript{16}

Serbian officials encountered a problem in their efforts to identify the main person in Athens in charge of the Cretan Uprising. Confusion resulted from the policy of the Hellenic government, which could not openly support the Uprising and instead did so through associations or hetairias which acted independently of the government and were even based on political affiliations. The Serbian government could not discern the real level of influence of the hetairias on the government in Athens. In Serbia, foreign policy was firmly in the hands of Prince Michael and his Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ilija Garašanin, who held both offices from December 1861 until November 1867. At the same time, the Serbian diplomatic envoy at the Porte was Jovan Ristić. After the removal of Garašanin, he became Serbia’s minister of foreign affairs.

Prince Michael ambitiously planned to make a pan-Balkan union and an agreement with the Hellenic Kingdom was the key part of that plan.

The agreement was signed in Bad Voeslau near Vienna on August 14/26, 1867 by Petros Zanos and Milan Petronijević as plenipotentiaries of the two rulers – King George of Greece and Prince Michael of Serbia. The study of the text of this agreement has usually focused on its political content and neglected to examine its phrasing in terms of what it implied about Balkan identities. Article 9 of the agreement stipulates: “the High Contracting Parties promise to exert influence on the spirit of liberation of the Christians of European Turkey with which each of them is respectively more particularly linked. The parties will aspire to attract Christians to this alliance and to prepare them for armed struggle.” In the wide area between Niš and Priština in the north and Epirus and Thessaly in the south, among local Christians existed not only an ethnic identity, but in many areas also a comprehensive pan-Orthodox Romeic identity. All the Orthodox Christians in that area were under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and therefore the formulation in Article 9 was more favourable for the Greek side because not only ethnic Greeks and Vlachs but also ethnic Albanians and some ethnic Slavs could easily be attracted to the Hellenic Kingdom through their Romeic identity or the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Ilija Garašanin had attended a Greek school in Zemun/Semlin in 1824–1826 and learned Greek there. He was a rare Serbian politician who was able to understand the possible implications of this wording, and he demanded a new formulation that would replace “with the Christian populations of European Turkey with which each of them is respectively more particularly linked” [“populations chrétiennes de la Turquie d’Europe avec lesquelles chacune d’Elles serait respectivement plus particulièrement liée.”] with “wherever one [of the contracting parties] has an opportunity”. Zanos, however, had no authority to make changes and the agreement was signed without any corrections. The text of the agreement is a testimony to the existence of a religious identity in the

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18 For this, see the studies of Paschalis Kitromilides collected in Paschalis M. Kitromilides, An Orthodox Commonwealth. Symbolic Legacies and Cultural Encounters in Southeastern Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).


20 Jakšić, “Prvi Srpsko-grčki savez”, 50.
Balkans, which in many areas of the Ottoman Europe of that time was equally important and sometimes even more relevant than the ethnic one. This is also the only Hellenic-Serbian agreement that was signed “in the name of the Holy and Indivisible Trinity”.

The agreement of 1867 stipulated that Serbia was to prepare 60,000 men by March 1868, and Greece was to prepare 30,000 men and a fleet “as readily as possible”. It was, however, never implemented. Prince Michael ratified the agreement on October 5, 1867, and, on January 22, 1868, instruments of ratification were exchanged in Athens. Before that was done, the deadline for military preparations had been extended from March to September 1, 1868. This was done by a special protocol signed in Athens on January 10/22, 1868, by Brigadier Franjo Zach on behalf of Prince Michael and Mihail Antonopoulos on behalf of King George.\(^{21}\) The alliance was completed by a military convention signed by Brigadier Franjo Zach and Major Nikolaos Manos on February 16/28, 1868. The ruler of Serbia, Prince Michael, was, however, assassinated on May 29 (June 10), 1868, three months before the expiration of the deadline for the preparations of the two armies.

Following the assassination of Prince Michael, a three-member Regency ruled Serbia until Prince Milan came of legal age. The Regency gave a positive reply to an enquiry of the Hellenic government on Serbia’s readiness to assist Greece in the Cretan Crisis of 1868. However, the issue of the alliance became more pressing for Serbia when the Herzegovina Uprising broke out in 1875, prompting the Eastern Crisis. At the beginning of 1876, when the discussions on a potential Serbian declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire reached their peak, Milutin Garašanin was sent to Athens. His mission was to ascertain if Greece still adhered to the Agreement of 1867. He was also supposed to sound out Greek public opinion and find out whether Serbia was to co-operate with the Military Committee in Greece.\(^{22}\) In March 1876, Garašanin met Prime Minister Alexandros Koumoundouros and Leonidas Voulgaris, the head of the Military Committee. He understood that the Hellenic government wished to remain neutral and recommended close relations with the Military Committee. Based on that recommendation, Vasa Toskić, himself of Greek origin, was sent to Athens. He brought funds amounting to 30,000 francs provided by the Serbian government for the Committee, but the war had already broken out before he was able to reach Athens.\(^{23}\)

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\(^{23}\) Ibid. 143–147.
The Agreements of 1867–68 were never implemented. However, “Belgrade and Athens, despite occasional disagreement and distrust, established much closer bilateral relations, and the Greek and Serbian publics found out how close and interdependent the two peoples were.”

**New enthusiasm, 1882–1893**

In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Serbian Orthodox Church in Serbia had an unusually favourable experience in gaining autonomy and full independence from the Patriarchate of Constantinople also known as the Great Church. All mutual decisions were made in agreement and by mutual consent. This was not the usual sequence of events in the process of gaining ecclesiastical autonomy and independence. The Great Church was in dispute even with the Hellenic Kingdom over its jurisdiction in 1833, and its relations with the Bulgarian Church, the so-called Exarchate, proclaimed in 1872, ended in an ecclesiastical schism which lasted until 1945. The Serbian Church in Serbia received autonomy from the Great Church in September 1831 by a concordat signed by Patriarch Constantine I of Constantinople. From then on, the “metropolitan of all Serbia” and bishops in Serbia were elected locally, and only the election of a new metropolitan was to be reported to the ecumenical patriarch. Having gained political independence in 1878, the Serbian authorities asked to get autocephalous status for their national church. That was granted by the act of the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in October 1879 when Joachim III (1878–1884, 1901–1912) served as ecumenical patriarch. From that moment, the Serbian autocephalous church in Serbia was headed by “the Archbishop of Belgrade and Metropolitan of all Serbia”. Filip Hristić (Christitch), the Serbian diplomatic representative at the Porte, noticed that the act of the Patriarchate “distinguished itself among all other acts of the same kind in that the Great Church proved much more generous and accommodating to us than to any other church in similar circumstances.”

The Congress of Berlin recognised the independence of Serbia, Romania and Montenegro. The Hellenic Kingdom did not take part in the congress, but the Ottoman Empire was asked to revise its borders in favour of Greece. In line with that, in 1881, the area of Arta in Epirus was ceded to Greece. Serbia expanded its territory after the Congress of Berlin by obtaining four new districts:

24 Bataković, “The Serbian-Greek Alliances”, 49.
26 Ibid. 383.
Niš, Pirot, Vranje and Toplica. The territorial changes of 1878–81 brought the two countries closer in geographic terms. It also encouraged their subsequent territorial aspirations. Belgrade focused its attention towards Skoplje and further south, while Athens looked eagerly to Salonica and further north. To reach a mutual agreement, the two countries were to harmonise their territorial aspirations, and they had to agree in principle on a line of demarcation in the area between Skoplje and Salonica which was about 250 kilometres wide.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, that geographic zone had a tendency to become an increasingly sacralised area for both countries and their nascent nationalisms. After the signing of the Secret Convention with Austria-Hungary in 1881, Serbia had to abandon her aspirations to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and she shifted her ambitions to Kosovo and Macedonia. It was in Skoplje that, in 1346, the medieval emperor Dušan had been crowned, taking the title of the emperor “of Serbs and Greeks [Romeic Romans (Romaioi)]” but from a nationalist perspective the second part of Dušan’s title was put aside, and Skoplje became a sacred Serbian town that was to be liberated. By the moment when, in 1900, the Serbian government commissioned a painting of the Coronation of Emperor Dušan from the Hungarian Serb Paja Jovanović (Paul Joanowitsch) for the 1900 Paris Exhibition, the process of sacralisation was almost complete.

Half a century earlier, the situation had been very different. In 1844, Serbia prepared a foreign and national policy programme now known as the Nachertaniye (the Draft). It was just a version of the plan devised by the Czech patriot and Polish agent Franjo Zach\(^\text{28}\) (who later participated in the negotiations on the Serbian-Hellenic alliance of 1867/68), and it gives rather different insights into the aspirations of Serbia. The Nachertaniye implied that the lands that were to be annexed to the Principality of Serbia were Bosnia and Herzegovina and Northern Albania. Macedonia was not mentioned at all, although the text contained references to the medieval empire.\(^\text{29}\)

The Hellenic case was similar. The first head of state of modern Greece, Count Ioannis Kapodistrias, replied to the three Protecting Powers that the northern borders of the new state should go up to the line of the River Aoon—

\(^{28}\) František (Franja) Zach (1807–1892) is the same person who later became a Serbian lieutenant colonel, colonel and general and who participated in the signing of the Serbian-Hellenic treaty of 1867/68 as the special envoy of Prince Michael.

Metsovon–Mount Olympus. However, the views on this question significantly changed by the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1904, Captain Pavlos Melos was killed by Turkish troops at the age of 34 in the village of Statista. He immediately became a national hero and martyr who fell fighting for Hellenism in Macedonia. His death created “what even the chauvinist sections of the Greek press had failed to bring about – the awareness that Greece had interests in Macedonia.” As Ioannis Kaliopoulos and Thanos Veremis have noticed: “Firmly believing in the righteousness of their cause and the Greekness of Macedonia due to ‘historical right’, and the ‘phronema’ of its Christian inhabitants, the generation of Pavlos Melas, Crown Prince Constantine and Eleftherios Venizelos pushed the Northern border of Greece deep into Macedonia – so deep that the new border was no longer a gateway leading to the ‘promised land.’”

Pavle Popović, a Belgrade professor of Yugoslav literature and an unofficial envoy of the Serbian government in London during the Great War, made a periodisation of Serbian-Greek relations up to 1914. He identified four periods. The first was the time of Karadjordje, the second – the 1860s, and the third – 1882–1891. As he noticed, it was in the third period that Bosnia and Herzegovina seemed lost forever for Serbia. “There remained only Macedonia, and Macedonia was of capital importance for Serbo-Greek relations, since by its deliverance from the Turk Greece and Serbia would acquire a common frontier.” Popović singled out two statesmen who at that time viewed a Balkan alliance as a matter of priority. In Serbia, it was Milan Piroćanac, and in Greece, Charilaos Trikoupis (1832–1896).

It was during the war with the Ottoman Empire in 1876–77 that Prince Milan repeated many times to the Greek consul in Belgrade that a war alliance of Serbia and Greece could lead to the realisation of many interests that Greece

32 Koliopoulos and Veremis, Greece. The Modern Sequel, 335–339.
34 Ibid. 268.
35 In a work the Serbian statesman Milan Piroćanac (1837–1897) published at the end of his life, he clearly expressed appreciation of the Balkan Alliance: “The idea of a Balkan Community may not be an empty figment of imagination. It is the only sound thought even now, amidst these weeds of small-mindedness and overwhelming support for personal interests that have taken over Serbia after the death of Prince Michael.” M. S. Piroćanac, Knez Mihailo i zajednička radnja balkanskih naroda (Belgrade: Državna štamparija Kraljevine Srbije, 1895), 93.
had in Macedonia. Prince (King from 1882) Milan spoke again about that with Greek diplomatic representatives in the period 1879–1885.\textsuperscript{36} Since November 1880, the Hellenic Kingdom had a minister plenipotentiary in Belgrade. Until then, Greece had been diplomatically represented by a consul general.\textsuperscript{37} In December 1880, the former war minister Tihomilj Nikolić was sent to Athens with a special mission. A step forward in the relations of the two countries was the signing of a trade agreement in May 1882.\textsuperscript{38}

During the crisis that followed the unification of Bulgaria in 1885, there were several suggestions about an agreement between Greece and Serbia. The main problem was that Serbia was not ready to attack the Ottoman Empire but rather wanted compensation from Bulgaria, while Athens had different plans. From April 1885 to April 1886, the prime minister of Greece was Theodoros Deligiannis. He attempted to make an agreement with Serbia both during and immediately after the Serbian-Bulgarian War, but his efforts bore no fruit. But, the idea of making an agreement survived many challenges. M. Laskaris noted that the idea of an understanding between Greece and Serbia “was destined to survive”.\textsuperscript{39} A novelty was that, from this moment, both countries viewed Bulgaria as their enemy, in contrast to the situation in 1867.

In 1886, St. Sava Society (“Društvo Sveti Sava”) was formed in Belgrade. Its president was Svetomir Nikolajević, a Hellenophile and personal friend of King Milan. His mother-in-law was a Salonican Greek and modern Greek was spoken at her home.\textsuperscript{40} King Milan confided to the Greek consul Nazos that he personally stood behind the establishment of the Society and supported it. Nikolajević believed that an agreement between the two nations could be achieved through associations and therefore began working with the Hellenic

\textsuperscript{36} Evangelos Kofos, “Greek-Serbian Relations and the Question of Macedonia 1879–1896”, in Greek-Serbian Cooperation 1830–1908 (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1982), 94–95.

\textsuperscript{37} In 1868–1880 the Hellenic Kingdom had a consul-general in Belgrade. The first minister served in Belgrade until 1885, and then followed several chargés d’affaires until 1902. That year M. Argoropoulos was appointed minister and remained in that position until 1908. He was followed by the chargé d’affaires N. Deligiannis until 1912, and then by the minister Ioannis (Jean) Alexandropoulos (1912–1915). Ministers of the Kingdom of Serbia in Athens were General Sava Grujić (1883–1885), Ljubomir Kaljević (1886–1889), Vladan Djordjević (1891–1893), Jovan Džaja (1899), Stojan Bošković (1899–1902) and Svetomir Nikolajević (1903). From 1906, the minister in Athens was Jovan M. Jovanović. He was succeeded by Mateja Bošković (1907–1913) and Živojin Balugdžić (1913–1917).


\textsuperscript{39} M. Lascaris, “Greece and Serbia during the War of 1885”, The Slavonic and East European Review 11/31 (July 1932), 99.

\textsuperscript{40} Božidar S. Nikolajević, Iz minulih dana. Sećanja i dokumenti (Belgrade: SANU, 1986), 171.
Association for the Advancement of Hellenic Letters but also through I. Mousikos, the chargé d’affaires of the Hellenic Kingdom in Belgrade, and, in September and November 1888 the latter informed Athens about that. In a special letter, Nikolajević suggested border lines in Macedonia which were almost completely consistent with the borders that would be established twenty-five years later, after the Second Balkan War, as the borders between the Kingdom of Serbia and the Hellenic Kingdom. His efforts aimed at reaching a compromise between the aspirations of the two nations were challenged by pretensions over Salonica that Milutin Garašanin channelled through Videlo, the organ of the Progressive Party.41

The Porte viewed the activities of St. Sava Society with a lot of concern, but they were well-received among the Serbian national activists in Old Serbia and Macedonia, and many of them began appealing not to the Serbian government but to the Society. This led to the resistance of the Serbian consuls appointed in 1887. The abdication of King Milan in 1889 also brought about a conflict between the Society and the new authorities in Serbia. Finally, in 1891, the whole educational programme was placed under the direct control of the Serbian government.42

In 1885, Milutin Garašanin, Serbian Prime Minister, defined Serbian policy in the Ottoman Empire. It was supposed to be based on three pillars: appointment of diplomatic representatives, launching educational and cultural propaganda, and facilitation of appointments of Serbian bishops through the Patriarchate of Constantinople.43 Stojan Novaković, the Serbian minister in Constantinople since November 1886, was particularly active in the efforts to materialise this policy. He was recalled from that office in October 1891.44 Novaković’s main task was to suppress the influence of Bulgaria in Macedonia and to make efforts to strengthen Serbian influence among the Slavic population of that area. He was to realise two things quite soon. The first was that, in his efforts to establish Serbian schools and facilitate appointments of Serbian

41 Evangelos Kofos, “Greek-Serbian Relations and the Question of Macedonia 1879–1896”, 97–98. Appended at the end of this article (pp. 105–106) is an English translation of the letter by Nikolajević to Mousikos of 15 November 1888.


bishops, he could possibly count only on the support of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and even that support was to come only in terms of their joint activity against Bulgarian influence and the Bulgarian Church – the Exarchate. His second realisation was that there was a precondition for the full co-operation of Serbia and the Great Church, and that the precondition was the previous agreement and support of official Athens. On the basis of these findings, in August 1890, he initiated negotiations about an alliance of the two states with the Hellenic minister in Constantinople Mavrokodratos, but the negotiations did not result in any agreement. 45

In June 1891, a visit of the prominent Hellenic politician Trikoupis to Belgrade had no practical results because he was in the opposition. Still, it encouraged new initiatives in relations between Belgrade and Athens. James David Bourchier, a correspondent of The Times from South-East Europe, noticed that since 1888 there had been an entente between Serbia and Greece supported by Russia. He concluded: “The friendship between Servian and Greek has been immensely strengthened by M. Trikoupê’s recent visit to Belgrade.” 46 The former Serbian foreign minister Chedomille Mijatovich was even more enthusiastic, and he also identified a wider Balkan component in the visit of Trikoupis. In his article written for a London Liberal review, he noticed: “If a Balkan Confederation ever becomes a reality, it will be due to the Greek statesmen, and its history will commence from the day on which M. Tricoupis left Athens for Belgrade and Sofia.” 47

When Trikoupis became prime minister for the sixth time (June 1892 – May 1893), negotiations on the alliance were renewed. At that moment, the Serbian minister in Athens was Dr Vladan Djordjević. 48 The talks between Greek and Serbian officials conducted in 1885, 1890, and 1892/1893 clearly demonstrated huge difficulties in terms of formulating a mutually acceptable line of demarcation in Macedonia, and not a single of these efforts led to a formal agreement. 49 New attempts made in June 1899 were again unsuccessful. On

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45 For more detail, see Mihailo Vojvodić, Stojan Novaković i Vladimir Karić (Belgrade: Clio, 2003), 80–110, and the chapter “Pregovori Srbije i Grčke o Makedoniji” in his Izazovi srpske spoljne politike, 320–333.


48 His Christian name was Hippocrates and he was of Greek-Vlach origin.

that occasion, an envoy of King Alexander Obrenović, Mihailo Milićević, was sent to Athens. In the draft of the agreement, he asked Athens to support the appointment of Serbian bishops in Skoplje and Veles, while Athens demanded the abolition of Serbian consulates in Salonica, Serres and Monastir.  

50 Serbian consulates had been opened in 1887 in Salonica and Skoplje, in 1889 in Priština and Monastir, and in 1897 in Serres.  

Reaching a mutually acceptable agreement became an increasingly difficult task in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. It was additionally complicated by separate interests that Athens and Belgrade had at the Porte. Since the 1880s, Belgrade needed two forms of support from the Porte: 1. against the Exarchate; and 2. for the confirmation of the appointments of Serbian bishops and consuls in Macedonia and Old Serbia. Athens needed the Porte’s support in three areas: 1. to sustain the influence of the Exarchate; 2. to protect Hellenism throughout the Ottoman Empire; and 3. to maintain the privileges of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. This made the interests of the two governments intertwined with their relations with the Ottoman sultans and governments. Additionally, the great powers always watched their moves carefully. To reach an agreement, at least three preconditions needed to be met concomitantly by each side: 1. governments that were in favour of mutual agreement had to be in power at the same time in Belgrade and Athens; 2. the particular conditions had to be such that both sides were in a position to disregard their considerations toward the Ottoman Empire and the Porte; and 3. sufficient political stability had to exist in both countries to enable their governments not only to begin but also to complete the negotiations. The last prerequisite proved a rather difficult one. In the period 1881–1903, Serbia changed twenty-five and Greece twenty-two governments. The list of preconditions incapacitated even Trikoupis in his efforts to reach an agreement with Serbia at the time when he was Greek prime minister (1892–1893) and the then Serbian government wanted an agreement. Both countries had the ambition to play key roles in the Balkans, but their real possibilities were different from their ambitions. When the Serbian minister in Athens, Dr Vladan Djordjević, told the Hellenic Minister of Foreign Affairs Stéfanos Dragoumis that he hoped that “the Greek government would act promptly in appointing its minister in Belgrade”, he received the reply that the financial situation of Greece was such that “we primarily have to see how to deal with it, and for that we need to save wherever possible”. Djordjević fared no better with Serbia. In December 1893, he sent his last dispatch from Athens.

The Serbian budget for 1894 had no allocation for the position of the Serbian minister in Athens.\textsuperscript{52}

\textit{Agreement of the Kingdom of Serbia and the Hellenic Kingdom in the triangle Belgrade-Athens-Sofia}

From the emergence of modern Bulgaria in 1878, Serbia and Greece had to negotiate with this country. When, in March 1878, Imperial Russia imposed the provisions of the San Stefano Treaty on the Porte, an autonomous Bulgaria with very wide borders was created. That act threw the apple of discord among Balkan Christian states, which would continue to fight for their borders until 1945. The borders of the San Stefano Bulgaria were annulled four months later by the Congress of Berlin. But, in spite of that, the Bulgarian national movement continued to consider the borders drawn in March 1878 as the natural borders of Bulgaria, and they stretched from the Danube to the Aegean Sea and from the Black Sea to the Lake of Ohrid/a. Pirot, Vranje, Skopje/Skopia, Tetovo, Ohrid/a, Korcha/Korytsa (Korçë), Kostur/Kastoria, Kavala and Xanthi were all within the borders of this projected Bulgaria, along with Salonica, which was not included in but fully circled by this territory. This scope of aspirations inevitably brought the Bulgarian national movement into a power struggle with both Serbian aspirations and modern Hellenism.

In ethnic and linguistic terms, Serbs were very close to Bulgarians. Western Bulgarian and Eastern Serbian dialects almost overlapped in places like Pirot, Velbuzhd or Pernik. From 1881 political parties could be officially formed in Serbia. The People’s Radical Party became the most influential. “Fraternal relations” with Bulgaria were a part of its official programme. Article 7 also envisaged aspirations “for unity and political activities in cultural development” with this country. What the Radical Party made a part of its programme was also a popular view in Serbia throughout the nineteenth century. Everything turned upside down following the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885, which was unpopular in Serbia and created deep and lasting mistrust between the two nations.\textsuperscript{53} Prompted by the personal ambitions of King Milan, the war ended in a bitter defeat for Serbia at the Battle of Slivnitsa.

King Milan once said to his close associate Vladan Djordjević: “In Serbia, Slivnitsa awoke awareness of Serbdom in Macedonia.”\textsuperscript{54} Be that as it may, Serbia and Bulgaria managed to come to an agreement in 1897, the so-called “Ugodba”.

\textsuperscript{52} Vladan Djordjević, \textit{Srbija i Grčka 1891–1893. Prilog za istoriju srpske diplomacije pri kraju XIX veka} (Belgrade: Srpska kraljevska akademija, 1923), 195, 300.


\textsuperscript{54} Djordjević, \textit{Srbija i Grčka}, 2.
As a diplomatic historian would note later, this first agreement “only heralded a rapprochement between our two close but conflicted countries”. The next step was the Alliance Agreement of 1904, which “opened the prospects of an alliance and friendship”. Since 1906, when the Customs War began, and especially since 1908 and the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbian intellectual and political élite was increasingly focused on the Yugoslav programme. It was only in this period that the Habsburg Monarchy began to be seen as the principal adversary of the Kingdom of Serbia. For this reason, it was important for Serbia to attract other Balkan counties to take part in an alliance against Austria-Hungary, but there was little interest in anything like that in Sofia and even less in Athens.

In October 1911, negotiations on making a Serbian-Bulgarian agreement were in progress. On that occasion, the minister plenipotentiary of Bulgaria in Rome, Dimitar Rizov, came to Belgrade. The main point of contention was the future border of the two states in the Slavic area of Macedonia. Finally, on March 13, 1912, the “Agreement on Alliance and Friendship between the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Bulgaria” was signed. The agreement was to be valid until 1920. There was an annex to the agreement. In its Article 2, Serbia promised that she would demand nothing beyond the defined line of demarcation. This was followed by a stipulation that the Russian tsar would determine the final borders.

Before the outbreak of the First Balkan War, the Hellenic Kingdom had an agreement with Bulgaria made on May 29, 1912, and Serbia had the alliance agreement with Bulgaria, and an agreement with Montenegro of October 23, 1908. She also had a military convention with Montenegro signed at the end of September 1912. Article 4 of the Military Convention set the deadline for declaring war against the Ottoman Empire at October 1. This led the diplomatic historian Bogdan Lj. Popović to describe this convention as “a war cry”. Montenegro also had an oral alliance agreement with Bulgaria made at the end of August 1912 about their joint war effort against Turkey. What follows from this is that Bulgaria was the only power that had agreements with all other allies: formal agreements with Serbia and Greece and an oral one with Montenegro. Bulgaria did not inform Greece about her negotiations with Serbia. In the summer of 1912, the Prime Minister of the Hellenic Kingdom Eleftherios Venizelos (1864–1936) was not able to get any information from Greek diplomats in Belgrade and Sofia either on the Military Convention between Serbia and Bulgaria of July 2 or on the decision of Montenegro to unilaterally attack the Ottoman

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56 Ibid. 519.
Empire. What he knew exactly cannot be discerned from the dispatches of Greek diplomats because he also had other sources. By the end of June, he was able to find out what was happening in the relations between Belgrade and Sofia through James David Bourchier, correspondent of *The Times*, who played an important role in reaching the agreement between Athens and Sofia, but also through foreign diplomats.

The various Balkan capitals were in a state of turmoil on the eve of the Balkan Wars, and not only those of Christian Balkan countries. The so-called Young Turk nationalism began, and the Albanian national movement also became visible. Nationalism had already reached its mass phase in Balkan capitals one decade earlier. By the beginning of the Balkan Wars, national passions in the Balkan Christian states escalated further. Mark Mazower in his book on Salonica cites reports by international observers that the First Balkan War was a “war waged not only by the armies but by the nations themselves”, and that the war objective was “the complete extermination of an alien population”.

In September 1912, Mateja Bošković, the Serbian minister in Athens, began negotiations on a Serbian-Greek agreement but they were not finalised by the beginning of the First Balkan War on October 18, 1912. Venizelos feared that an alliance with Serbia could draw him into a conflict with Austria-Hungary. The circumstances were different when, in January 1913, he visited Belgrade. On that occasion, he spoke with Prime Minister Pašić (Pashich) and that was the beginning of talks aimed at making an alliance. Negotiations were accelerated after the assassination of King George of Greece in Salonica in March 1913. The Preliminary Protocol of the Kingdom of Serbia and the Hellenic Kingdom was signed in Athens as late as May 5, 1913. That is the Protocol of Athens. After that, on June 1 (May 19) 1913, the Agreement on Alliance and the Military Convention were signed in Salonica, at the villa of Prince Nicholas. The Treaty of Alliance was signed by the Greek minister in Belgrade Ioannis Alexandropoulos and the Serbian minister in Athens Mateja Bošković. Ratification documents were exchanged in Athens on June 8/21, 1913.

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The alliance determined the outcome and winners of the Second Balkan War. The Military Convention clearly stated in Article 8: “the final objective of military operations of allied Hellenic and Serbian armies is to destroy the Bulgarian forces.”62 By signing the agreement with the Hellenic Kingdom, Serbia found herself in a very peculiar position of having at the same time two valid agreements that stipulated different demarcations lines: one with Bulgaria and one with the Hellenic Kingdom. It was not long before the former Balkan allies in the First Balkan War became bitter enemies. With the Serbian-Greek treaty, the Balkan Alliance of 1912 ceased to exist. The Alliance that was terminated was temporarily achieved in spite of numerous difficulties after more than half a century of various efforts begun in 1861.

The Military Convention between Serbia and Greece provoked decade-long enmity of Bulgaria towards Greece and Serbia (later Yugoslavia). The Treaty of Alliance of June 1, stipulated in Article 7 that the King of the Hellenes and his government would “provide all the necessary concessions and guarantees for a period of 50 years for the full freedom of Serbian export and import trade through the port of Salonica and by the railway line from Salonica to Skoplje and Bitolj [Monastir]. This freedom will be as wide as possible, under the condition that it is in line with full and intact exercise of Greek sovereignty.”63 On the basis of this article, an additional agreement was signed in Athens on May 10/23, 1914, entitled the “Greek-Serbian Agreement regarding Serbian Transit through Salonica” by which “the Serbian Free Zone of Salonica” was formed. The outbreak of the world war prevented the practical implementation of this agreement.

Owing to his insistence throughout the Great War that the Serbian-Hellenic Treaty of Alliance of 1913 had to be respected, Eleftherios Venizelos became the focal person of all subsequent narratives of Greek-Serbian co-operation. His many statements on this issue have often been quoted in various publications on Serbia. The two countries entered the First Balkan War without any written agreement. I would go as far as to conclude that it was precisely the lack of any written agreement that actually facilitated the mutual relations of the two states. Any written agreement would have to cover the issue of borders, and that would have included future demarcation lines. As the agreement between Serbia and Bulgaria clearly demonstrated, it was an impossible task to fully implement in practice such an agreement because the political events and courses of military operations always placed the signatory powers before situations that could not have been predicted in advance. Be that as it may, the Hellenic-Serbian alliance in practical terms was originally made not on the basis of an agreement

62 Milošević, Srbija i Grčka, 315.
63 Ibid. 308.
but based on the fact that there was no written agreement but rather a common interest during the First Balkan War.

Why was it that, in the end, the alliance of modern Hellenes and Serbs prevailed in the Balkans rather than a triple alliance of Christian Balkan states or a Serbo-Bulgarian or a Hellenic-Bulgarian alliance? There seem to be at least two reasons. The first is that the overlapping of territorial aspirations that resulted from national euphoria was smaller between Serbia and Greece than in any other combination. The second is that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the apple of discord of Balkan nationalisms was the identity of the Macedonian Slavs.

If in 1867 Athenian politicians had correctly assessed that the Hellenic Kingdom was able to attract the Christians of Macedonia with the Romeic identity, irrespective of their ethnic origin and mother tongue, by the beginning of the twentieth century this became an almost impossible task. The phase of mass nationalism that reached Belgrade, Sofia and Athens by that time was less pronounced but increasingly present in Macedonia. Mass nationalism, and mutually antagonistic educational and ecclesiastical networks in Macedonia financed by the three states, undermined the Orthodox community in Macedonia. The creation of the Exarchate was a decisive move towards ethnophyletism. What followed in the last decades of the nineteenth century was a sort of etatisation of Bulgarian and Serbian local priests by their respective states and their ministries of education. Priests were not only expected to preach the Holy Bible; they were also seen as potential national activists. The Bulgarian state began this process earlier than the Serbian and by 1900 was approximately four times more efficient in its efforts than the Kingdom of Serbia. The Hellenic Kingdom was equally involved and even the Kingdom of Romania followed suit. In this respect, Greece was even ready to enter into a dispute with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which had a more universal view on the Orthodox Commonwealth in the Balkans than various governments in Athens. By the beginning of the Balkan Wars, the final outcome of the activities of the three ethno-national Balkan Christian states in Macedonia was that a new binary opposition emerged, the one between the Slav and the modern Hellene. In this respect, a potential Hellenic-Serbian alliance was critically important to alleviate the effects of the new antagonism, since the wider Bulgarian aspirations in Macedonia based on the San Stefano Treaty were unlikely to result in any kind of compromise with Hellenism.

64 In 1900 there were 785 Bulgarian schools in Macedonia, while Serbia, by the beginning of 1899, was able to establish 178 Serbian schools in the vilayets of Usküb, Monastir and Salonica. In 1901, there were 927 Greek schools in the vilayets of Salonica and Monastir. James David Bourchier, s. v. “Macedonia”, The Encyclopaedia Britannica, The Eleventh Edition, vol. 17 (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1911), 219.
An unfinished process was the development of the identity of Macedonian Slavs. Dimitar Rizov was the diplomat who began negotiations with Serbia on a Serbian-Bulgarian alliance. He turned out to be very adamant about Bulgarian borders in Macedonia and was himself a Macedonian Slav. The memoirs of the famous Yugoslav and Croatian sculptor Ivan Meštrović provide a very interesting testimony on the dilemmas of the identity of this group. Rizov was the Bulgarian minister plenipotentiary in Rome. Just before the Balkan Wars, he told Ivan Meštrović: “Our folk used to be ‘a Macedonian Christian,’ and later when Greek propaganda developed, he became ‘a Macedonian Christian Slav.’ To us it was all the same which Christian country would help us to liberate ourselves from the Turks. I was born in Bitolj [Monastir]. There were several gymnasia [grammar schools] in Bitolj: Turkish, Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian. To us Slavs it was all the same which of the Slavic gymnasia we would attend.” In his realistic description of the fluid identity of Macedonian Slavs, Rizov clearly emphasises the opposition Slav–modern Hellene that developed by the beginning of the twentieth century among Macedonian Slavs. Therefore, their previous options were reduced, and they had to choose between Sofia and Belgrade. Rizov attended the Serbian gymnasium, but when he lost his scholarship he moved to the Bulgarian gymnasium and then to Sofia. “We say Macedonian Slavs, they say Bulgarians. And we got used to it. That is how I became a Bulgarian. Just as Kosta Stojanović and so many other Macedonians became Serbs in Belgrade.” In his conversation with Meštrović, Rizov revealed another issue that caused antagonism between Sofia and Belgrade. It was “the Macedonian Party” in Sofia or, as he said: “We Macedonians hold key positions in Bulgaria, and it is therefore natural that we would want the whole of Macedonia to come to Bulgaria.” In this way, a fluid local identity turned out to be an insurmountable barrier between Serbs and Bulgarians, since the political elites in both countries were able to convincingly claim them as theirs. After all, both countries were able to recruit Macedonia Slavs for their own purposes.

It is important to mention that, in the legal and political reasoning of Venizelos, the participation of Greece in the Great War was inseparably linked with the Protocol of Athens, in other words with the Serbian-Greek Treaty of Alliance of 1913. The agreement on the alliance was the fundamental document that Venizelos exploited as his justification to join the Entente Powers and, in the period 1915–17, adherence to the alliance with Serbia became his oft-repeated political slogan.

Relations of Serbia and Greece during the Great War

The Great War was initiated by the Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia on July 28, 1914. When the Entente Powers found themselves at war with the Central Powers, Serbia automatically became a member of the Entente. With the exception of Montenegro, the other Balkan allies of Serbia from the First Balkan War (Greece, Romania and Bulgaria) remained neutral in 1914. This prompted both alliances to make all possible efforts to attract the three states to their side. In the case of the Hellenic Kingdom, it turned out that all three of its protecting powers from the 1830s made up the Entente. King Constantine, however, was the son-in-law of the German emperor. Two great powers that had indebted Bulgaria, the United Kingdom and Russia, were also members of the Triple Entente. But in Bulgaria’s case, there was a similar situation since the king and an important part of the military élite considered that they could compensate their losses from the Second Balkan War by joining the Central Powers.

Relations between the Hellenic Kingdom and the Entente Powers were exacerbated by King Constantine’s insistence that Greece should remain neutral. On the other hand, Eleftherios Venizelos, citing his 1913 agreement with Serbia, wanted to bring his country to the side of the Entente Powers in early 1915, and again at the beginning of October 1915. Faced with the opposition of the king, Venizelos had to resign twice: on March 6, and on October 5, 1915. In the latter case, he submitted his resignation at the moment when Bulgaria was just about to attack Serbia, which happened on October 14, 1915. In 1938, one of the wartime leaders of the pro-Entente opposition in Bulgaria, diplomat Kosta Todorov, commented on the second resignation of the Hellenic prime minister: “Nowadays there is no doubt that, had Venizelos remained in power, there would have been a possibility to prevent the intervention of Bulgaria.”

In January 1916, France, citing its status of a protecting power of Greece from the 1830s, occupied the Ionian island of Corfu, which became the seat of the Serbian government and other Serbian officials during the Great War. It was also the place where, in January-February 1916, the Serbian Army was evacuated and reorganised after its exodus through Albania. Several Hellenic governments that followed after the resignation of Venizelos were under the full control of King Constantine, and they advocated a policy of neutrality and kept Greece neutral until 1917. In 1916, the Macedonian or Salonica Front was established and a reorganised Serbian Army was deployed there. In April 1916, the allies transferred the remaining Serbian Army that numbered 115,000 men to Salonica through the Corinth Canal.

66 Kosta Todorov, Politička istorija savremene Bugarske (Belgrade 1938), 252.
67 For more detail on the relations between the two states during the Great War, see Areti Tounda Fergadi, “The Serbian Troops on Corfu: the Problem of Transporting them to Thes-
Venizelos was tireless and, in September 1916, as an opposition politician, he again raised the question of the participation of Greece in the war. At the beginning of the next month, in Salonica, he proclaimed the Provisional Government of National Defence. This created the National Schism (“Ethnikos dihasmos”) in Greece, which lasted until June 27, 1917, when the Entente Powers forced King Constantine to leave the throne, and immediately after that Venizelos got his third tenure as prime minister of the Hellenic Kingdom (June 1917 – November 4, 1920).

In the summer of 1917, the secretary of the Serbian Legation in Athens was Jovan Dučić, subsequently a famous Serbian writer and poet. In August 1917, he noted his impressions from the session of the Hellenic Parliament: “The last week in the Hellenic Parliament is considered here as a full manifestation of popular anger and indignation caused by the shame that the nation suffered from the previous regime due to its disregard of the treaty with Serbia and its rejection of all the traditions of friendship with the Powers that created Greece… as is already known, very touching ovations for Serbia took place. They seemed unprepared and spontaneous, and they very much satisfied the Hellenic Government.” 68 Venizelos delivered a speech before the Hellenic Parliament on August 13/26. He was applauded for saying: “Gentlemen, when we permitted Bulgaria’s facilitated intervention in the war and her attack on Serbia – I have the right to proclaim it from this tribune with all the authority of my official position – we were flatly betraying our ally Serbia and not only Serbia – we were flatly betraying the vital interests of Greece and serving only the purely foreign interests of Germany.” At the end of his speech, he posed a question: “Was the policy of the Crown a policy of benevolent neutrality to Serbia – or was it a policy of betrayal?” and that was followed by the general outcry: “Betrayal!” 69

Venizelos’s frequent references to the alliance with Serbia were a part of war propaganda but also his long-term view that the alliance with Serbia was in the interest of Greece. In November 1917, during his visit to London, he replied

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in Mansion House to the welcome addresses by leading British statesmen and asked them to be understanding of what happened in Greece: “What, therefore, I ask you the people of this great country, is not to judge the Greek nation as responsible for the personal policy of the dethroned king, nor to consider the violation of the treaty with Serbia as reflecting upon us. (Cheers.) I can assure you that, during that protracted and painful crisis, the great majority of the Greek people never approved of that treacherous policy.” Venizelos repeated on quite a few occasions during the war how important the alliance with Serbia was to him.

By strengthening the Entente troops on the Macedonian Front, the Hellenic Kingdom under Venizelos significantly contributed to the balance of forces along the 450-kilometres-long front. In September 1918, on the very eve of the successful break through the front line, the troops of the two opposite coalitions were almost equal in terms of numbers. The Central Powers had 626,000 German, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian soldiers, and the Entente forces numbered 628,000, of which 180,000 were French troops, 150,000 soldiers of the Serbian Army (including 20,000 Yugoslav volunteers), 135,000 Greeks, 120,000 Britons, 42,000 Italians, and 1,000 Albanians under Essad Pasha.

By bringing the Hellenic Kingdom to the ranks of the Entente, Venizelos secured the Greek victory against Bulgaria. The Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine of November 1919 put the final stamp on the accomplishments of the Hellenic-Serbian alliance. Greece was granted Western Thrace, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes incorporated an additional 2,500 km² of formerly Bulgarian territories. What the San Stefano Treaty had envisaged as ‘Bulgaria of the three seas’ remained only the Black Sea Bulgaria. This, however, created a long-standing antagonism of Bulgaria to Greece and Yugoslavia. It is indeed a paradox that all of this happened in the period when the Serbian-Bulgarian agreement of 1912 was supposed to be valid and implemented until the end of 1920.

The Greek-Yugoslav Pact of Friendship, the Serbian Free Zone in Salonica/Thessaloniki and a new atmosphere in the Balkans

After the Great War, the newly-established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Hellenic Kingdom maintained their alliance but had different foreign policy priorities. Greece was focused on what would happen with Hel-
lenism on the eastern shores of the Aegean Sea, while the policy of the new kingdom was focused on protecting its borders in the Adriatic Sea against Italy. 73

The ecclesiastical issues were once again resolved with mutual agreement between the Serbian Church and the Patriarchate of Constantinople. This time, the Serbian Church was recognised as having the highest possible status – that of a patriarchate. When the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was created, it included multiple Orthodox bishoprics under various Eastern Orthodox ecclesiastical jurisdictions. There were the Archbishopric of Serbia, the Patriarchate of Karlovci, and the Metropolitanate of Montenegro. However, some areas in the former Austria-Hungary were under the direct jurisdiction of the Great Church (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Vardar Macedonia) and others under the Metropolitanate of Bukovina and Dalmatia. This time, the Patriarchate of Constantinople again met the Serbian requests, and by its act of 1920 recognised the incorporation of the bishoprics under its jurisdiction into the realm of the autocephalous and united Serbian Church. In November 1921, the raising of the Serbian Church to the rank of Patriarchate (1920) was confirmed by the patriarch of Constantinople, followed by the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in February 1922. The recognition of its new rank by other autocephalous Orthodox churches ensued. 74 At the time of the negotiations, Constantinople was under the occupation of the Entente Powers.

In contrast to the ecclesiastical question which was traditionally resolved by mutual agreement, the project of the Serbian Free Zone in Salonica was not resolved easily. The issue was reactivated at the end of 1922. At that moment, Greece found herself in a very delicate situation due to her defeat in the Greek-Turkish War and, in November 1922, she began negotiations with Turkey in Lausanne which were completed in July 1923. In the backstage of these negotiations, Yugoslavia and Greece discussed the Free Zone issue. The “Convention on the Settlement of Yugoslav Goods Traded through the Port of Salonica” signed in Belgrade on May 10, 1923, was supposed to establish the zone. On February 24, 1924, the Parliament of the Kingdom of SCS approved the convention, but the Hellenic Parliament never ratified it. The convention envisaged a zone of 52,000 m2. 75

Instead of the expected advancement of mutual relations that was to result from the convention, what happened was a crisis in relations in 1924 after the Politis-Kalfov Protocol was signed in Geneva on September 24, 1924. By


75 Adrianos Papadrianos, “Slobodna zona u Solunu i grčko-jugoslovenski odnosi 1919–1929. godine”, MPhil thesis (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, 2005), 51–68.
this agreement the Greek side recognised the Slav population of Macedonia as Bulgarians. At the end of October 1924, Dr Vojislav Marinković (Voislov Marinkovitch), Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of SCS, urged that a new protocol be signed, but Athens refused. Consequently, on November 17, 1924, the Kingdom of SCS sent a note to the Hellenic side in which it rejected the Treaty of Alliance of 1913.\(^{76}\)

Negotiations were resumed in February 1925, but the Greek side refused to accept additional Yugoslav demands and the negotiations were suspended on June 1, and resumed later that year. In June 1926, the talks on the Serbian Free Zone continued. At that time, the prime minister of the Hellenic Republic was General Theodoros Pangalos who had come to power through a coup d’état. He served as prime minister from June 1925 to July 1926, and then as president until August 1926. The new agreement of the two countries – “An Additional Agreement to the Belgrade Agreement of May 10, 1923” – was signed on August 17, 1926 in Athens during the last days of his dictatorship. Pangalos was ready to meet all the requests of the Yugoslav side and the Free Zone was defined as the territory of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and that was a breach of Article 7 of the Treaty of 1913. In return, the Yugoslav side signed the three-year “Agreement of Understanding and Friendship” between the two states, which was directed against Bulgaria. With the fall of Pangalos, both agreements were put aside since the Greek side never ratified them, and the new government rejected the agreement.\(^{77}\) Efforts to reach an agreement during 1927 failed to materialise. The Yugoslav government was very much focused not only on making a new agreement but also on organisational issues. For this purpose, on May 6, 1927, the Ministerial Council of the Kingdom of SCS adopted the “Decree on the Organisation of the General Directorate of the Serbian Free Zone in Salonica.”\(^{78}\)

The renewal of the alliance was made first unofficially in 1928 and then formalized in 1929. At that moment, the Hellenic prime minister was Venizelos for the fourth time (July 1928 – May 1932). He initiated a policy of rapprochement with Italy, which was very unfavourably viewed in London, Paris and Belgrade. On September 23, 1928, Venizelos signed the Greek-Italian Pact of Friendship, Conciliation and Judicial Settlement. On that occasion, the Italian leader Mussolini offered to protect Greek sovereignty over Salonica in case of a


\(^{77}\) Papadrianos, “Slobodna zona u Solunu”, 95–105.

\(^{78}\) Službene novine Kraljevine SHS [Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes], no. 112, 21 May 1927, 1–3.
foreign threat.\textsuperscript{79} It was clear that this formulation alluded to Yugoslavia and, unsurprisingly, it was very poorly received in Belgrade. Venizelos hurried to explain his move to Paris, where he also met the Yugoslav minister of foreign affairs, Dr Vojislav Marinković. Immediately after that, he came to Belgrade on October 10/11, 1928. On that occasion, the leading Belgrade daily \textit{Politika} republished an article that had been written by Venizelos in 1895.\textsuperscript{80} Originally published in the journal \textit{Avgi} in Chania, the piece advocated the appointment of a Serbian bishop in Prizren rather than a candidate of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which was a very uncommon view among Greek politicians of that time. The message of \textit{Politika} was clear: a great friend of Serbs comes to Belgrade! But this was not enough to reach an agreement immediately. The private secretary of Eleftherios Venizelos, Stefanos Stefanou, left a testimony on what happened: “...the Yugoslavs remained cold and not very forthcoming until the great Greek politician came face to face with King Alexander in a closed room of a royal palace. Venizelos did not have to remind the King of his great efforts of the past to forge the Greek-Serbian alliance of 1914 and to uphold Greece’s obligations towards that alliance. His living presence brought back memories that were capable of generating friendly emotions to the King and to counteract any hesitations and doubts from his side.”\textsuperscript{81} During his stay in Belgrade, two agreements were signed on October 11, 1928. They dealt with the Serbian/Yugoslav Zone in Salonica and with the Salonica–Gevgeli railway line.

The subsequent negotiations resulted in a series of protocols. On March 17, 1929, in Geneva, the “Protocol regarding the Settlement of Financial Claims on the line Salonica–Djevdjelija (border)” was signed. It specified the claims of both sides regarding the railway line and the Hellenic government accepted an obligation to compensate the Kingdom of SCS in the amount of 20 million francs. In return, the Kingdom of SCS abandoned its ownership claims to the railway line, a demand on which it had previously been very insistent. Eight protocols were signed in Geneva and they were promulgated as the “Law on the Protocols and the Ways of Implementation of the Convention of May 10, 1923 on the Serbian Free Zone in Salonica.” Having been sanctioned by both states,


\textsuperscript{80} “Venezelosovo prijateljstvo prema našem narodu od pre trideset i tri godine”, \textit{Politika} no. 7345, Belgrade, 11 Oct. 1928, 2.

the eight protocols came into force on April 17, 1929. The protocol on the railway line Salonica-Djevdjelija [Gevgeli] entered into force as a law on the day it was published in the Official Gazette of the Kingdom of SCS (June 12, 1929). The Protocols of 1929 were signed by the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, Dr Kosta Kumanudi (Koumanoudi), and the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexandros Karapanos (Carapanos), as the plenipotentiaries of King Alexander and the president of the Hellenic Republic.

Finally, the "Pact of Friendship, Conciliation and Judicial Settlement" between Yugoslavia and Greece was signed in Belgrade on March 27, 1929. The signatories were the same as in the case of the Geneva protocols. The exchange of the instruments of ratification took place in Athens on February 18, 1930. The Pact was valid for five years upon ratification, with a possibility of being extended for another five years (Article 36). This agreement was fundamentally different from all the previous Serbian-Hellenic agreements. Its aim, for the first time in the history of alliances of Belgrade and Athens, was not to obtain any territory but to consolidate the existing conditions and to prevent border changes.

Agreements with Italy and Yugoslavia opened up the possibility for Venizelos to make an agreement with Turkey, which he initiated immediately after his victory in the elections of 1928. The "Pact of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration" was signed between Turkey and Greece on October 30, 1930. The Pact confirmed that the Treaty of Lausanne represented the final territorial settlement between the two countries. Venizelos even nominated Ataturk for the Nobel Peace Prize, and the rapprochement of the two countries created possibilities for a new Balkan alliance. The conciliatory actions of Venizelos encouraged other similar initiatives. Leften Stavrianos quite correctly assessed

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82 The texts of the eight protocols were published in Serbo-Croat and French in Službene novine Kraljevine SHS [Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes], no. 90, 17 April 1929, 537–580.

83 The text of the Law on the Protocol was published in Serbo-Croat and French in Službene novine Kraljevine SHS [Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes], no. 136, 12 June 1929, 1053–1056.

84 Kosta Kumanudi (Costas Koumanoudis) came from a family of Adrianople Greeks who had moved to Belgrade in the 1820s. On the role of this family in Serbian and Greek history, see Sophia Matthaiou, "The Greco-Serbian Identity of the Koumanoudis family", in Kitromilides and Matthaiou, eds., Greek-Serbian Relations, 179–194.

85 The text of the agreement in Serbo-Croat and French ("Pacte d’amitié, de conciliation et de règlement judiciaire") was published in Službene novine Kraljevine Jugoslavije [Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia], no. 58, 13 March 1930, 487–497.

86 Ibid. 497.
that “inter-Balkan relations were better at the end of 1929 than they had been in years.”

This led to new initiatives, the most famous among them being the one undertaken by the former Greek prime minister Alexandros Papanastasiou (1876–1936), who organised Balkan conferences. Four such consecutive conferences were held between 1930 and 1933 in Athens (October 5–13, 1930), Istanbul (October 20–26, 1931), Bucharest (October 22–29, 1932) and Salonica/Thessaloniki (November, 5–11, 1933). In May 1930, the International Bureau of Peace sent invitations for the first conference to the six ministers of foreign affairs of the Balkan countries. The first meeting was held in Athens. On that occasion, in the presence of high officials of Balkan states, the statute of the organisation named the Balkan Conference was adopted. The organs of the Conference became: assembly, council, secretariat, and national groups. Each country got 30 voters, but also experts, secretaries and observers. The conferences gathered unofficial representatives of Balkan states, who nonetheless acted through national groups that included politicians, but also scientists and representatives of expert and peace associations. The creation of Balkan historical institutes was inspired by the activities of the conferences. What these meetings of Balkan delegations demonstrated was that Bulgaria and its public opinion did not accept the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine as final.

The Balkan Entente (The Balkan Pact)

The greatest achievement of Balkan statesmen in the interwar period was probably the Balkan Pact or the Balkan Entente. The Entente resulted from the negotiations held in Geneva and Belgrade. It was initiated in Belgrade on February 4 and signed in Athens on February 9, 1934, between the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Turkey and the Kingdom of Romania. Its main initiators were King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Kemal Pasha Ataturk, but it was Venizelos who paved the way for the Pact with his friendship agreements with Yugoslavia (1929) and Turkey (1930). He was, however, in the opposition when the Pact was signed because he lost the elections of March 1933, when his sixth and last government fell (January–March 1933). In October 1934, the ministers of foreign affairs of the signatory countries adopted in Ankara the statute of the Balkan Entente. The Pact envisaged meetings of ministers of foreign affairs every six months and the existence of the Permanent Secretariate and the Provisional Advisory Committee. With all such bodies both the Little Entente and the Balkan Pact were forerunners of post-war European integration.


The Pact was mostly interpreted as an alliance of anti-revisionist powers, but such an assessment is not fully justified. The pillars of the Pact were the new relations of Greece with Turkey, as well as the old relations of Greece with Serbia and Yugoslavia but also of Yugoslavia with Romania that had resulted from the Little Entente. Turkey shared no common interest with Greece and Yugoslavia regarding Bulgaria. A possibility was left, however, for Bulgaria to join the Pact and Yugoslavia was particularly interested in making this happen.89

The weak aspect of the Pact was that its signatories were de facto obliged to enter a war only if one of them was at war with Bulgaria, since Turkey secured an exception that it had no obligation to declare war on the USSR, and Greece got subsequent guarantees that she was not obliged to enter a war against Italy.

The Pact, however, should be viewed within the context of the spirit of the League of Nations, and the spirit of Balkan reciprocity which was quite present during the first two years of the Pact. At the beginning of the 1930s, Balkan statesmen were tired of the prospect of new conflicts and a pact of this kind, although it contained implicit anti-Bulgarian connotations, was primarily focused on providing a longer period of stability and peace in the Balkans. It was quite different from the previous two Balkan alliances: the first one conceived in the 1860s and the second one from 1912. It was not made to provide its signatories with new territories, but to maintain the status quo. The previous two alliances were made to prepare for war, whereas the 1934 one was designed to preserve peace. When, in October 1934, King Alexander, one of its architects, was assassinated in Marseilles, the Pact suffered a serious blow. It was a paradox that it was precisely Yugoslavia that challenged the Pact by signing a unilateral agreement with Bulgaria in January 1937. In September 1940, Romania left the Pact.

**Agreement on Balkan Union**

The Hellenic Kingdom and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia were the only two Balkan states officially at war with the Axis Powers for the entire duration of the Second World War in the Balkans, from April 1941 until May 1945. Both governments found themselves exiled in London after the attack of the Third Reich and its allies in April 1941. British diplomats were interested in their mutual relations as early as October 1941. On that occasion, the chargé d’affaires of the Yugoslav Legation in London, Vladimir Marjanović, said to Sir Orme Sargent

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89 According to Kosta Todorov, a pro-Yugoslav Bulgarian politician and a friend of King Alexander’s, King Alexander was ready to give back two towns in Eastern Serbia (Caribrod and Bosilegrad), ceded to Yugoslavia by Bulgaria under the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine, if Bulgaria accepted to join the pact. At the end of 1933 He even allowed Todorov to pass this information on to Sofia. Kosta Todorov, *Balkan Firebrand. The Autobiography of a Rebel, Soldier and Statesman* (Chicago and New York: Ziff-Davis Publishing Company, 1943), 253.
that the two governments “were in very cordial contacts. I emphasised that the basis of our policy in the Balkans was the cordial friendship and common action of Yugoslavia and Greece.” This statement was met with approval from his British collocutor.

The two governments in exile in London, the Hellenic and the Yugoslav, on January 15, 1942, made the Agreement on the Constitution of a Balkan union. The two governments were inspired by the motto “the Balkans to the Balkan peoples”, and this was explicitly stated in the preamble. Several months later, in September 1942, at a meeting of the Yugoslav Royal Government in London, Momčilo Ninčić (Momchilo Ninchitch), Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, clarified that his ministry had “taken the initiative to make the agreement with Greece as a union that should be the beginning, basis and framework for a future union of Balkan states”. He added that he was in contact with other allied governments and pointed out: “We have been cooperating particularly closely with Greece, but even with her we did not go into details about war objectives.”

The Agreement on Balkan Union was signed by the prime ministers of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Hellenic Kingdom, Slobodan Jovanović (Yovanovich) and Emmanouil Tsouderos. The Union was to have permanent organs with regular meetings: 1. regular meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs, and of two members of each government in the fields of economy and finance; 2. a permanent military organ with a joint general staff of the national armies; 3. permanent bureaus which would include three sections: political, economic and financial, and military; 4. the prime ministers would meet whenever needed; and, 5. parliaments would also collaborate. Article 10 envisaged the possibility of future accession “of other Balkan states ruled by governments freely and legally constituted”. The exchange of instruments of ratification took place on February 28, 1942. It goes without saying that the agreement was made in London in the context of the British strategic policy in the Mediterranean, and since 1917, Greece had been considered, with occasional oscillations, as the main potential ally of Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean.

At the beginning of May 1942, the agreement was announced in the Yugoslav Official Gazette (Službene novine) and was therefore publicly known. On
October 21, 1942, a member of the Yugoslav government, Srdjan Budisavljević, informed other cabinet members that Soviet Russia received negatively the agreement between the Greek and Yugoslav governments. The two signatories had reached no agreement on Albania. Greece preferred the annexation of Albania’s southern parts, and Yugoslavia advocated the preservation of old borders.

In March 1944 in London, King Peter II of Yugoslavia married Princess Alexandra of Greece, the daughter of King Alexander of the Hellenes (1917–1920). The marriage was to cement the union, but the victory of Yugoslav communists in the civil war in Yugoslavia several months later and the change of regime in Yugoslavia prevented this.

Therefore, out of a series of mutual agreements between Belgrade and Athens, the most influential one remained the Protocol of Athens of 1913. Up to 1942, it always served as the basis when mutual friendship was mentioned. Not a single Greek statesman can rival Venizelos in his credit for mutual alliances between 1913 and 1934. What is even more fascinating is that the credit should be given to him regardless of whether he was formally in power or in the opposition when a particular agreement was signed. He continued the policy formulated by Trikoupis, not unlike Nikola Pašić and Slobodan Jovanović who continued the policy initiated by Prince Michael Obrenović, Milan Piroćanac and Svetomir Nikolajević.

*The Balkan Pact*

It is interesting to note that, in 1953–54, a kind of Balkan entente was renewed, but this time without Romania. Although, in the period 1944–48, Yugoslav communists were the most vocal supporters of the Soviet Union and very loud opponents of Western democracies, growing tensions gradually emerged between the communist nomenclatures in Moscow and Belgrade. Stalin was particularly upset by the regional ambitions of Yugoslav communists since they could undermine his own foreign policy designs in Eastern Europe. The mutual misunderstandings escalated. At the second conference of the Cominform in Bucharest, the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) was accused of a series of charges, and the accusations were made public on June 28, 1948, the date of the Battle of Kosovo – Vidovdan. CPY publicly denounced the allegations. That brought about a radical disruption in the relations of the former axis Moscow–Belgrade. Yugoslav communists unexpectedly found themselves in almost total isolation both to the East and to the West. This desperate situation soon made them initiate closer relations with Western countries.

Before that, Yugoslavia had been one of the main supporters of the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG) led by the Communist Party of Greece in the Greek Civil War. DAG participated in this war against the officially recognised government of the Hellenic Kingdom in Athens. The Yugoslav involvement made the relations of Belgrade and Athens such that the years between 1945 and 1950 have been termed “grey years”, and the position of the two countries was called a “small war”. According to Milan Ristović, those five years “symbolized the lowest level of the relations in the modern history of the two countries and peoples.” First the USSR denied support to DAG as a result of Stalin’s policy of avoiding open confrontation with the United States of America. The USSR asked its satellites to follow its policy. This led Bulgaria and Albania to close their borders to Greece on May 13, 1949. Yugoslavia did the same eight days later. At the beginning of July, Josip Broz Tito declared that he was ready to cut any further assistance to the rebels in Greece. That facilitated the rapprochement of Communist Yugoslavia with the West, and that also meant conciliation with the official government in Athens. The news of the conflict between communist Yugoslavia and the USSR and the whole Soviet bloc, including Bulgaria and Albania, was received with great relief in Athens. The united northern front of the enemies of Greece (Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania) ceased to exist, and there were no longer any united protectors of the Slavic minority in Macedonia (Bulgaria and Yugoslavia). As Evanthis Hatzivassiliou noticed, “the nightmare scenario was put aside”.

The final result of Yugoslavia’s policy of rapprochement with the West was the new Balkan Pact between the Hellenic Kingdom, Turkey and Communist Yugoslavia. In 1953 and 1954, it was preceded by the accession of the Hellenic Kingdom and the Republic of Turkey to NATO in 1952. The first agreement was signed in Ankara on February 28, 1953. It was the Agreement on Friendship and Co-operation between the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, the Hellenic Kingdom and the Republic of Turkey, and it was signed by their ministers of foreign affairs: Koča Popović, Stefanos Stefanopoulos and Fuat Köprülü. Next year, on August 9, the same three ministers signed an expanded version of the agreement in Bled, Yugoslavia. The Ankara Agreement was to be valid for five years. It envisaged regular conferences of ministers of foreign affairs at least

once a year, and co-operation between the general staffs of the signatory countries. The Agreement signed in Bled defined in Article 2 what the signatories would consider “as aggression”: “any armed aggression against one or more of them to any part of their territory,” and, in that case, they would provide assistance “individually and collectively, to the party or parties attacked”. The agreement was to last twenty years, and the Permanent Council was introduced and was to meet two times per year.99

The Pact was a means to strengthen the South-East flank of NATO. For communist Yugoslavia, this happened in the midst of her conflict with the USSR that had begun in 1948. It was a way to avert a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia. The Pact “remained a unique cold war ’anomaly’”, and the agreements turned out to be “a mere historical curiosity”, although they had a positive impact on relations between Belgrade and Athens.100

Over the course of 1955, the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus took place and the September pogrom of Greeks happened in Istanbul (the so-called “Septemvriana”). These events rendered the Pact meaningless. The rapprochement between Josip Broz Tito and Nikita Khrushchev in 1955 meant that the Yugoslav side lost its basic interest in the Pact. However, the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 renewed the Yugoslav interest in military co-operation with Greece as a NATO member. That was confirmed during the visit of the Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis (PM October 1955 – March 1958, and May 1958 – September 1961) to Belgrade in December 1956, and also in a series of meetings of high representatives of the two countries in 1957–58. At that moment, Yugoslav officials clearly expressed their view that Greek membership of the Western alliance was precious to them, and Josip Broz even urged Karamanlis that the Hellenic Republic should remain in NATO.101 From 1954 until 1959, the bilateral relations of the two countries were strengthened. “In this period Greece was a desirable ally for Belgrade – an open window to the West – which operated as a channel of communication of the Yugoslav regime with the Western world.”102 In the subsequent period, the mutual relations were under the shadow of the “Macedonian Question”, which was raised by the leadership of the People’s Republic of Macedonia in Yugoslavia. The ministers of foreign

100 Ristović, Na pragu Hladnog rata, 458.
101 Hatzivassiliou, “From Adversity to Alliance”, 131–132.
affairs of the two states, Evangelos Averoff and Koča Popović, had to make two gentlemen’s agreements on avoiding this issue. The first was made in July 1960 and the second in December 1962 in Athens. The agreements did not overcome “the Macedonian Question”, which remained the unresolved issue in their mutual relations between 1962 and 1967. At the end of this period the introduction of the Colonels’ Regime (1967–1974) in the Hellenic Kingdom brought about a serious crisis in the relations between Yugoslavia and Greece.

After the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (1961), Communist Yugoslavia shifted the focus of its foreign policy from the Balkans to Africa and Asia and followed this policy until the 1980s. In that way, the issue of Balkan relations lost its previous significance for Yugoslav communists. It was communist Romania that became their closest neighbour in the late 1960s, throughout the 1970s, and even in the 1980s. Relations with Athens were still regarded as relevant, but not as a top priority like in the 1950s.

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