


SERBIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND ARTS  
INSTITUTE FOR BALKAN STUDIES

LIII



2022

# BALCANICA

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ANNUAL OF THE INSTITUTE FOR BALKAN STUDIES

UDC 930.85(4-12)

BELGRADE 2022

ISSN 0350-7653  
eISSN 2406-0801

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## **Belgrade 1969–1972. The Uncertainties and Hardships of the Yugoslav Experiment in the Eyes of a Newly Graduated Italian Scholarship Holder**

**Abstract:** Half a century ago, the author of this paper, a recent graduate, received an exchange scholarship from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a research visit to Belgrade on the subject of self-management and the theory of the state. At that time, the central, and by no means merely theoretical, problem of Yugoslavian society was how to respond to the impact of the market on the system of self-management. In addition to the production structure, this question also affected the relations between the republics and the political centre of the state. Two serious crises were to be decided by the decisive intervention of the charismatic leader, who put an authoritarian model from another era back into force. The young scholar observed and did not understand much, but in return became familiar with a lively and hospitable city. Critical reflections would come in the years to follow.

**Keywords:** Yugoslavia, communism, self-management, Tito, Belgrade

In three to four years in the 1960s and 1970s, Yugoslavia experienced an impetuous economic transformation, a profound institutional reorganisation and at least two political crises, probably the most serious in the thirty years between the Cominform and Tito's death. Serbia's part in these events has been conspicuous, though not spectacular. In addition to being the capital of Serbia and the Federation, Belgrade was, at that time, a prestigious observatory and centre of international initiative, far above the importance that a developing country, or a city that anthropologists described as the scene of hasty and unfinished urbanisation, could have.<sup>1</sup> I was lucky enough to live in that lively and experimental environment for ten months in 1969 and 1970, and then to return for shorter periods in the following years. I did not necessarily understand much of what

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<sup>1</sup> A. Simić, "Urbanization and Cultural Process in Yugoslavia," *Anthropological Quarterly*, 47 2 (1974) interprets the process of urbanization in Yugoslavia, and especially in Belgrade, in the sense of simultaneous modernization of the peasantry, and peasantization of the city" (p. 217). This concept is taken from Stevan K. Pavlović, who writes precisely about the "rurbanization" of Belgrade in Serbia. *La storia al di là del nome* (Trieste: Beit, 2010), 236.

I was seeing because I was young and saw the world the lens of ideology rather than the other way around.

In 1969, I was a student at the University of Padua, majoring in law. The year before, I had spent six months at the student protests, and now I was poring over my books and preparing to take my last exams, graduate and leave a college I unjustly detested. The topic of my thesis, in Philosophy of Law, was nothing less than "The Theory of the Extinction of the State in Contemporary Marxist Thought". It dealt with some insights found in the writings of Marx, and even Lenin, according to which (if I may be allowed to grossly oversimplify the matter), the state, as a structure of constraint based on class domination, once this domination is overthrown and socialism grows and matures, the state itself is destined to gradually become extinct. This is the theory of the extinction of the state, the withering away of the state, *odumiranje države*. However, my dissertation also bore a fatal subtitle: "with special reference to the Yugoslav experience of self-management". One should not think that the Marxist theme of my thesis was unusual or surprising: if the University was conservative, my thesis advisor was a remarkably distinguished and open-minded scholar. Rather, I realise today, surprising was the tolerance for that subtitle, which claimed to subsume an ongoing historical experience into a theoretical framework – and claimed to do so by using a very meagre and highly ideological documentary basis, namely, primarily, the Yugoslav propaganda materials in Italian published and disseminated to legitimise the 1948 turnaround with the "discovery" of the theoretical foundations of self-management in 1949–50.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile, in my daily routine between home and the library, I was reading Franco Petrone's correspondence from Belgrade in *L'Unità*, the PCI daily. For some years now, a special, asymmetrical relationship existed between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, a party-regime in a shifting balance between the East and the West, and the Italian Communist Party (PCI), a mass party of constitutional opposition in a NATO member country. The special attention that *L'Unità* and the PCI accorded Yugoslavia was conveyed by themes such as (alleged) anti-dogmatism, economic experimentation, and criticism of

<sup>2</sup> On the emergence of self-management (workers' councils) as the second (after the partisan war) myth on which the legitimacy of the regime is based, see D. Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974*, (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1977), 51–61. In 1958, the "Action Program of the League of Yugoslav Communists" (adopted at the 7th Congress of the LCJ) still maintained the principle of the "historic law on the death of the state"; and Tito commented that "by transferring factories and companies into the hands of the workers" the first and main act on the way to the death of the state occurs: R. Gati "Marxismo e politica nell'ideologia e nella prassi del socialismo yugoslavo". In *Lenigma yugoslavo. Le ragioni della crisi*, ed. S. Bianchini, (Milan: Angeli, 1989), 323–345. Then the official doctrine shifted the emphasis from the demise of the state to the necessary regulatory functions that the "transitional state" would have to maintain or assume in the new situation.

bloc politics in Europe. Naturally, the Czechoslovak question could only feed the trend of mutual interest and sympathy.<sup>3</sup>

I eagerly awaited and eventually received a letter from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informing me that I had been granted a scholarship to that mythical place. After receiving it, I kept a photocopy of the letter on me for personal comfort. And so it was that, having graduated only a week before, after a night on the train, I arrived in Belgrade on 29 November 1969. The city was covered in 20 cm of snow and the offices were closed, because I had been so clueless as not to take into account that that day was Republic Day. Over the next few days, I was assigned Prof. Najdan Pašić as my supervisor, an expert on the theoretical relationship between the state and self-government, a very kind but very busy person, who hurriedly gave me appointments at the Faculty of Political Science at 6am. I was enrolled at the *Institut za strane jezike*, an excellent school of Serbo-Croatian for foreign students, and began attending the Svetozar Marković University Library, although I was still unable to read Serbo-Croatian. I found a room to rent with a family in a large building belonging to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 27. Marta Street. The name on the doorbell showed that Franco Petrone lived a few floors up. A few years ago, a fellow historian, writing about another and more famous journalist from *L'Unità*, Renzo Foa, described Franco Petrone as “an awkward character, fascinating for his sharp wit and culture”.<sup>4</sup> For me, he was to become a kind of temporary older brother. He was more experienced, but I had the “theoretical background”.

At that time, in the winter of 1969–70, we were on the eve of the 9th Congress of the LCJ, the first congress to be held after the economic reform of 1965, Ranković's dismissal in 1966, and the student demonstrations of June 1968. The dominant theme in the public debates was, and would remain for some years, the impact of the market on the self-management system. The positive effects on the production units were obvious, as they stimulated an interest of workers' collectives in product quality, work-dependent wages, and prudent disposition of the accumulation fund. But the market action also generated new,

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<sup>3</sup> In the context of increasingly close relations between the two parties, since 1963 the salary and expenses of the correspondent of the daily magazine *Unità* in Belgrade were covered by the Yugoslav side: P. Dragišić, *Šta smo znali o Italiji? Pogledi iz Beograda na Italiju 1955–1978*, (What did we know about Italy? Views from Belgrade to Italy 1955–1978), (Belgrade: Institute for Recent History of Serbia, 2019), 231. This interesting and very useful historical essay by Dragišić, mainly from a political and diplomatic angle, can be read alongside the text by F. Rolandi, *Con ventiquattromila baci. The influence of Italian mass culture in Yugoslavia (1955–1965)*, (Bologna: Bononia U. P., 2015); which is instead focused on customs and consumption.

<sup>4</sup> L. Scaraffia, “Introduction to Renzo Foa's”, *Ho visto morire il comunismo*, (Venezia: Marsilio, 2010), 10.

dramatic macroeconomic problems: inequalities, strikes, unemployment, and emigration. In 1969–71, emigration to Germany reached its peak, and workers' remittances fuelled the dispute over who, as an institution, was entitled to control and manage the valuable foreign currency (in addition to that brought by tourism). Moreover, the world of economic emigration provided manpower for the terrorist enterprises of the Ustaša emigration against Yugoslav agencies abroad.

Under these conditions, the extinction of the state, which had never been erased from the League's programmes, remained in the background and the distant future while the leadership preferred to speak of a "transitional state" and offered one justification after another in its support: from the classic Leninist ones concerning the defence against the enemies of socialism and the still incomplete workers' control of society to the more up-to-date ones denouncing the unequal development produced by spontaneous market forces and indicating the need to intervene with corrective measures and coordination: concretely, it was a matter of effectively managing the so-called compensation fund in favour of the underdeveloped regions.

A distinctive Yugoslavian characteristic of the "transition state" was its federal structure, which was by then acquiring confederal connotations in the whirlwind of reforms triggered by the urgent need to adapt and to reconcile the institutional system with the economic one. In 1970–71, the Serbian party was explicitly and very clearly in favour of a broad devolution of competences to the republics and assigning to the federal government those few and well-defined powers that characterised sovereignty. I dare say that there was broad consensus in Yugoslavia on the balancing function that an authoritative collective presidency (in terms of including representatives from all over the country), capable of mediating between the potentially conflicting interests of the republics and also capable of handling the succession to Tito, should have assumed.

However, the country had a hierarchy of power superior to the state hierarchy, that of the party, and there could be no discussion, not even in abstractly theoretical terms, of its possible extinction or its prospective obsolescence in favour of the expansion of self-management. They spoke of the party as an ideological guide, expressed their good intentions of moving from the method of command to that of persuasion. But in the meantime, the League had to be unified, disciplined, kept in order by democratic centralism, and the more the republics became autonomous, the more the party centre had to be strengthened to support the ultimate and supreme power of the charismatic leader.

There were thus two presidencies in Yugoslavia, and Tito was at the head of both. The first was the presidency of the semi-federalised state, undermined by local bureaucracies, technocrats and nationalists, whom Tito left on a long leash in order to concentrate – understandably from his point of view – on

international relations from which he hoped to reap some prestigious results before the end of his days. The other was the presidency of the party, in which he seemed not to have absolute control, given that the old leader introduced an Executive Bureau of 14+1 members, reduced to 8+1 in 1972, on the eve of the showdown with the Serbian leadership. In 1972, the 8+1 concentration of power was equal to that of the 1949 Politburo. And Tito was its master, no longer its arbiter.

Perhaps the reader has guessed by now that the preceding pages are a loose summary of what *L'Unità* correspondent Franco Petrone was writing at the time. Petrone had conversations with leading actors in Yugoslav politics, such as Krste Crvenkovski and Miko Tripalo, both members of the Executive Bureau and, therefore, often in Belgrade. In truth, Tripalo was not one "example" among many. He was omnipresent, almost monopolistic, in the work of "translating" not so much the linguistic as the conceptual terminology of the Yugoslav communists, which was laden with ideology and normativism. And if problems arose, they could take recourse to Edvard Kardelj's authentic interpretations. Very boring stuff.

As I have mentioned, Tito considered foreign policy to be his prerogative, and this could give rise to some friction with the foreign minister, like when Marko Nikezić challenged Tito over the unbalanced pro-Arab line he had taken in the Middle East crisis.<sup>5</sup> To anyone who read the newspapers at the time, the global situation appeared rather turbulent. In Northern Ireland, people were being killed every day. In the Indian subcontinent, the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan was taking place amidst mass slaughter. In Indochina, American bombing was expanding from Vietnam to Cambodia. There were border clashes on the Ussuri River between China and the USSR. The Non-Aligned Movement was split between the moderates and the militant anti-imperialists, and Tito's mediation did not make the Lusaka Conference a success. Tito was often on the road, but when he was in the country, illustrious guests visited him in Belgrade or Brioni: Richard Nixon, Walter Scheel, the architect of Ostpolitik, with Willy Brandt, Leonid Brezhnev in 1971. The last visit was reciprocated by Tito, who was given a state reception in Moscow: the old Bolshevik's self-respect thus got the better of three years of polemics, mistrust and caution generated by the Czechoslovak question.

Italy's importance in Yugoslavian foreign policy (and vice versa) was confirmed by the number and level of visits to Belgrade made by high Italian officials: Foreign Minister Nenni, the President of the Republic Saragat, the head of the PCI delegation to the 9th League Congress, Napolitano, the PCI Secretary

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<sup>5</sup> D. Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, 214; J. R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a country*, (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1996), 304.

Berlinguer. In the autumn of 1970, Tito's visit to Italy was scheduled for 10 December. At the last moment it was postponed with a joint communiqué from the two diplomacies, apparently because of nine words uttered by the then Foreign Minister Aldo Moro during a parliamentary question: "Italy does not renounce its legitimate national interests".<sup>6</sup> Of course, he was referring to the 1954 London Memorandum of Understanding; the Belgrade newspapers reacted by keeping their tones low; not so those of the two north-western republics. Instead, the visit took place in March (1971), with little rhetoric and a lot of business.

At the beginning of October 1969, when I had not yet left for Belgrade and was still in Padua, preparing to defend my thesis before a graduation committee, *L'Unità* published an unusual six-column article by Franco Petrone on the Belgrade "micro-riots".<sup>7</sup> It was about the ongoing public discussion on the new general urban plan, which would invest considerable resources in the redevelopment and urbanisation of the area at the confluence of the two rivers. Ventilation and oxygenation effects were expected in the central parts of the city. Furthermore, a new "Friendship Park" would have divided and at the same time connected the old and the new part of the city, much the same - I observe today - as the "green garland" in the Proposal formulated by Emilijan Josimović back in 1867.<sup>8</sup> Franco Petrone was an intellectually curious person. Obviously this excursion of Petrone from the field of politics was guided by his conversation with an expert mentioned in the article, Dr Kovačević from the Institute of Urban Planning at the University of Belgrade. But I am reasonably confident that I can attribute that interview to the intermediation of a young researcher from that Institute, Danilo Udovički.

Today Danilo Udovički teaches the history and theory of architectural design at the University of Texas, Austin. In January or February 1970, I met him at Franco Petrone's house. About three years older than me, he was also a student at the Faculty of Philosophy. At that time, thanks to the presence of some prominent figures among the teaching staff, the Sociology and Philosophy

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<sup>6</sup> This event and its historical background was carefully reconstructed by S. Mišić, *Reconciliation on the Adriatic. Yugoslavia and Italy on the Road to the Osimo Agreements of 1975*, (Belgrade: University of Belgrade, Faculty of Political Sciences, 2018), chapter II ("In the Vortex of Internal Instability"), 135–166.

<sup>7</sup> October 3rd 1969.

<sup>8</sup> E. Josimović, "Objasnenje predloga za regulisanje onog dela varoši Beograda što leži u Šancu" (Explanation of the proposal for the regulation of that part of the city of Belgrade that lies in Šanac); see Lj. Blagojević, "La regolazione urbana di Belgrado nel 1867: traccia contro cancellazione", 166–170. In *Città dei Balcani, città d'Europa. Studi sullo sviluppo urbano delle capitali post-ottomane*, a cura di Marco Dogo e Armando Pitassio, (Lecce: Argo, 2008), now also available in the Serbian edition: M. Dogo & A. Pitassio, *Градови Балкана, градови Европе*, (Београд: Клио, 2008).



departments in Belgrade were the strongholds of critical and humanist Marxism. After a few years of theoretical incubation between Zagreb and Belgrade, Critical Marxism had acquired a public resonance with the student protests in early June 1968 at the University of Belgrade. The unifying theme of the movement had been the struggle against social inequality – and it is worth remembering that even the party and the institutions, at that time, were discovering the damage caused by the free action of the market and were agonising over the remedies to be adopted. After a week of unrest, the situation was resolved by Tito with a televised speech that was greeted by the students and newspapers as a jolt of loyalty to ideals on the part of the old revolutionary, who had proved the demonstrators right.

A few years ago, Danilo Udovički published a small book in Novi Sad entitled *Treći juni 1968*, with the intriguing subtitle “Od kritike svega postojećeg do uništenja svega postignutog”,<sup>9</sup> a sort of generational stocktaking between the young Marx and Yugoslavia in the early 1970s. His retrospective assessment of Tito’s intervention is different. The substance of Tito’s speech on 10 June, Udovički writes, boils down to the following: “We ‘up here’ understand the restlessness of the students caused by the difficulties in implementing the economic reform, and, in fact, we started discussing all of this many months before the student protests. So, rest assured, go back to your studies, and we will take care of everything. Of course, a minority among the students supports the enemies of our self-management socialism, and we will also deal with that”.<sup>10</sup>

Later, Tito’s hostility towards the intellectuals and professors of the Sociology and Philosophy departments in Belgrade became explicit: “We can no longer tolerate that the same elements who have proved to be opponents of socialist society continue to educate and train Yugoslav cadres and youth!”<sup>11</sup> Those intellectuals and professors remained in their posts as long as the “liberal” leadership in power in Serbia was able to offer them some protection, even though they did not share their worldview. Then they were all swept away by the old leader’s return to authoritarianism. Danilo Udovički received two years in prison and on his release did several jobs until he eventually left the country. And yet, writing forty years after the events, he believes that “we did not have a totalitarian dictatorship... there was not an important intellectual achievement in the

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<sup>9</sup> D. Udovički, *Treći juni 1968. Od kritike svega postojećeg do uništenja svega postignutog* (June 3rd 1968. The critics of everything that does exist to negation of everything achieve), (Novi Sad: Kiša, 2014).

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 24–25.

<sup>11</sup> F. Petrone, *Rilancio dell’attività dei comunisti jugoslavi, l’Unità*, 17th December 1969.



world, a book, a magazine, that we did not publish and discuss.<sup>12</sup> We travelled freely wherever and whenever we wanted or had the money to do so. This did not change even after the elimination of the Liberals”.<sup>13</sup>

I spoke with Danilo Udovički two or three times at Petrone’s house, without any results. He was not interested in proselytising, and I had seen enough disasters in Padua to be interested in the student movement in Belgrade. Living in Belgrade was quite pleasant. The scholarship was largely eaten up by the room rent, but the cost of living was low. A *burek* with yoghurt cost next to nothing, as did a meal in the university cafeteria (where the food was good but your clothes would soak up its smell), and a plate of *ćevapčići* in a *kafana* was very cheap; a secret resource was the restaurant at *Klub novinara*, to which Petrone had introduced me, and sometimes I even managed to go to the old bohemian quarter of Skadarlija. For cultural contacts, I occasionally frequented the Department of Italian Studies led by Eros Sequi and characterised by the presence of the “three Sergi”: Sergio Turconi, Sergej Šlenc and Srđan, and also the Italian Cultural Institute directed by Giovanni Mafera. I vaguely remember a collective visit to Danilo Kiš’s house, of which I was only impressed by the beauty of his wife, Mirjana Miočinović.<sup>14</sup> And the concert of Duke Ellington’s orchestra at Dom Sindikata, on 14 July 1970, which I recently discovered, to my surprise, was covered in a chapter of a PhD thesis (discussed at the University of Trieste) on US cultural diplomacy/propaganda in socialist Yugoslavia.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Udovički is right. On the shelves of Belgrade bookstores (and I assume it is the same in other capital cities in Yugoslavia) you could find everything from all over the world. Thirty years before D. Ugrešić (*Muzej bezuvjetne predaje*, Belgrade, Zagreb: Samizdat B92, Konzor, 2002, ed. it. *Il museo della resa incondizionata*, (Milano: Bompiani, 2002) showed that most of the titles in an average Croatian family library (at the time when this author was a girl, that is, in the fifties and sixties) was almost identical to the titles in the library of one such Italian family. A researcher from Poland once admitted, at a summer seminar of Slavic studies in Zadar and Zagreb, that while traveling through Belgrade, he entered a bookstore and realized that “Serbs translate books equally from the East and the West.” (...) I noticed Steinbeck, Kafka, Faulkner, Kenan, Fromm and Mandelstam. There were also some books by authors such as Gray, Baum, Pearl Buck, Jules Verne ... and Karl May ... and Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, *How Steel Was Tempered* by Ostrovsky, as well as Zygmunt Bauman”: M. J. Kryński, “Yugoslavia 1970: The Country, the Slavic Seminar and Some Polonica”, *The Polish Review*, 16 2 (1971), 91–92.

<sup>13</sup> D. Udovički, *Treći juni 1968*, 16.

<sup>14</sup> Danilo Kiš’s biography on the socio-political-literary foundations of Yugoslavia at the time: M. Thompson, *Birth Certificate. The Story of Danilo Kish*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell U.P., 2013).

<sup>15</sup> C. Konta, *Waging Public Diplomacy: The United States and the Yugoslav Experiment (1950–1972)*, Doctoral thesis. (University of Trieste: Department of Humanities, A. A. 2014/2015). Chapter 4 (“Between Art and Sound Diplomacy: The Cultural Presentation Program and

In October of that year, I was called up for military service in Italy. In August 1971, I was granted, like everyone else, the so-called ordinary leave of ten days. In theory, I was supposed to wear my uniform all the time, and going abroad was grounds for court-martial. But my friend and mentor, Franco Petrone, was about to finish his term in Belgrade, and I wanted to say goodbye to him before leaving. And so I did, without a passport, using my identity card to enter Austria at Villach and go from there to Yugoslavia. And then I left the other way round.

The new correspondent, Arturo Barioli, began writing his first articles in September 1971. Perhaps the handover had been too quick because, faced with the Croatian crisis that had begun on 29 November with the “currency strike”,<sup>16</sup> Barioli seemed a little disoriented. The affair unfolded swiftly, with the killer role entrusted to Stane Dolanc, secretary of the Presidency’s Executive Office. The final formulation is quite memorable: “Communists, and in particular members of the party leadership who are not prepared to fight for the line we have adopted, are offered the opportunity to leave their leadership posts in a democratic manner. If they do not do so, the bodies that elected them are obliged to revoke their mandates.”<sup>17</sup> It took Barioli a few weeks to arrive at the comment that Croatian nationalism had a moderately sized base and that an agreement had to be found with this.<sup>18</sup>

In 1972, having finished my military service, I was starting to work as a teaching assistant at the Faculty of Political Science in Padua. I needed material on Yugoslav economic emigration for a research group on international workers in Europe.<sup>19</sup> Arriving in Belgrade in mid-March, I was to find the city blocked by a smallpox epidemic, possibly spread - these were the rumours - by a pilgrim returning from Mecca. In Belgrade alone, 200,000 vaccinations a day were being administered.<sup>20</sup> Doctors recommended against drinking alcohol, and the *kafanas* were desolately empty. I could not return home without a vaccina-

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the Yugoslav Voice of America”), among other things, includes a photo of Duke Ellington signing autographs during a concert.

<sup>16</sup> A mass strike organized by students in Croatia in order to establish the right of Croatian companies to keep (and not hand over to state institutions) foreign currency earned in tourism and foreign trade: S. P. Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias. State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–2005*, (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana U.P., 2006), 256–259.

<sup>17</sup> A. Barioli, “Indetta la seconda conference dei comunisti jugoslavi”, *L’Unità*, December 11th 1971.

<sup>18</sup> A. Barioli, “Prosegue la lotta contro il nazionalismo”, *L’Unità*, December 27th 1971.

<sup>19</sup> M. Dogo, “Jugoslavia, un paese d’emigrazione”. In *L’operaio multinazionale in Europa*, ed. A. Serafini, (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1974), 181–195.

<sup>20</sup> *L’Unità*, March 25th 1972.

tion certificate, and obtaining it was not so easy because I had recently had my military vaccinations, and my antibodies were still alive and strong.

In June, Tito achieved his personal triumph in Moscow, and at the end of September, Dolanc announced the imminent release of a document by the President and the Executive Office on unity of action and democratic centralism in the party. When the letter was made public, it was seen to trace back to the 6th Congress, held in 1952, the origin of the party's gradual abandonment of its "leading role" under pressure from "liberal theories" that had encouraged the federalisation of the party and the rise of the technocratic-managerial elite.<sup>21</sup> No names were mentioned, but Tito was referring to the leaders of the Serbian party, those whom the American historian John Lampe, in his now classic *Yugoslavia as History*, characterises by their five objectives: market economy; a modern Serbia; abandonment of the ballast of Serbian Yugoslavism; support for technocrats; and cooperation with the other republics.<sup>22</sup> This time, Tito personally launched an attack in the Presidency and discovered, for the first time in the post-war period, that he was in the minority; he then reconvened the body, manipulated its composition to his taste and reopened the proceedings, declaring, like a good Bolshevik, that "when the line, achievements and weaknesses of a Party are under discussion, the number of interventions for or against a certain point of view is not the decisive factor in the revolutionary choice and in the evaluation of which path to take and what should be done..."<sup>23</sup> The resignation of Serbian party leaders followed, and some notable victims were also recorded in Macedonia and Slovenia.

The comment of the correspondent of *L'Unità* was that "some of the resigning leaders are people of great repute, especially in Yugoslav intellectual circles, but with no ties to the party base and the popular masses... and they all subscribe to the so-called liberal or "anarcho-liberal" line of Marko Nikezić... who in the last 5–6 years has been the theorist of the most comprehensive liberalisation of the Yugoslav market... which has not promoted the development of democracy and self-management, but neither has it benefited the economy..." In short: "Nietzschean theories demonstrate their inadequacy in the Yugoslav reality".<sup>24</sup> Such a comment, while Dolanc was attacking "liberal tendencies" around Yugoslavia, amounted to an apologia of a coup d'état.

As for me, I did not understand much and was inclined to think that "if Tito and the LCJ act like this, they must have good reasons to do so". Luckily for

<sup>21</sup> D. Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, 318.

<sup>22</sup> J. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 303.

<sup>23</sup> D. Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, 324.

<sup>24</sup> A. Barioli, "I problemi dell'economia yugoslava alle radici dello scontro politico, *L'Unità*, November 4th 1972.

me, I had moved on to study Svetozar Marković and the Russian populists, who were far more interesting than the extinction of the state.

A few years later, when Tito was admitted to a clinic in Ljubljana, the editorial staff of *Rinascita*, the PCI weekly, asked me to write a short biography of him to have ready for publication when he died. I wrote it and ended with a quotation from Chapter XXIV of *The Prince*: “In this way there accrues to him a twofold glory, in having laid the foundations of the new Principedom, and in having strengthened and adorned it with good laws and good arms, with faithful friends and great deeds”. When Tito died, my piece was published in full, but the quotation from Machiavelli had disappeared.<sup>25</sup> At the time, it bothered me, but I did not try to discover the reasons for its removal. Then it was lost to oblivion. Today, that editorial intervention has my full posthumous approval, although for reasons probably different from those of the editors of *Rinascita*.

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ISSN 0350-7653



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