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On a One-sided Interpretation of the Yugoslav Past


The reasons for the creation, preservation and violent demise of the Yugoslav state are summed up into four rhetorical questions of which two, “Did people simply become victims of nationalist manipulation?” and “Was its violent collapse inevitable?”, give a hint of Calic’s line of thinking.
She emphasises that her book is not primarily concerned with structures of longue durée or “distinctive roads” in the Balkans but rather with the dynamic of overall changes, interconnections and interactions, general “features and parallels”, and that its “most important question” is how “development and progress were conceived of in different times and what means were used to achieve them” (pp. 13–15).\(^1\) The author’s attachment to “modernisation” theory, to a narrowed view of history as continuous advancement seems to be unquestionable.

Calic believes that her “approach to the problem distances the book away from popular interpretations of the Yugoslav problem, while drawing to the foreground structural factors, such as ethnocultural oppositions and civilisational incongruities”, and proceeds to put forward her central thesis that “what undermined the project of Yugoslav union was not the well-known Balkan intolerance or perpetual hatred between peoples” but “the politicisation of differences in modern twentieth-century mass society”. The central question of the book as defined by its author is “who, why, under what circumstances and how turned ethnic identity and diversity into an object of dispute”, and offers the answer straightaway: it was all about “the actors’ interests, worldviews and motives, socio-economic processes as well as cultural-historical dimensions of collective experiences, memories and interpretations of history” (p. 15).

A look at the contents of the book itself reveals a certain imbalance. If we take it as somewhat understandable that the period preceding the creation of Yugoslavia, 1878–1918, is given 78 pages, the criterion remains vague for devoting as few as 64 pages to the first Yugoslav state, and as two and a half as many, 166, to communist Yugoslavia, 1945–1991. On the other hand, the author puts much effort into making the book appear balanced by seeking to distribute her attention evenly among, and by taking a generally positive attitude towards, all Yugoslav peoples, including those that are not South Slavs (Albanians). There is also a tendency to compare phenomena and processes, which may be a very useful method in principle; but in her effort to be balanced, Calic not infrequently goes too far in that she constructs balance where there can be none, which results in “false equivalence” or “ethnic symmetry”, and compares incomparable phenomena and processes. By doing so, she “equates” them, i.e. places them symbolically on the same plane. Those who do not know much about the history of Yugoslavia may find the book quite balanced and impartial all through until the penultimate chapter which is devoted to the disintegration of the country and the wars of its succession and which uncritically retells the “politically correct” narrative of the ICTY.

\(^1\) All bracketed pages in the text refer to the Serbian edition of the book.
The book is marked by inconsistency, selectiveness, contradiction, major factual oversights, confusion in some interpretations, even anachronisms. In the second subchapter, “Peoples, nations, identities”, Calic argues that “there was no Yugoslav nation at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries or a clear notion of what it meant to call oneself a ‘Slovene’, a ‘Croat’ or a ‘Serb’”, that “none of the subsequent constituent peoples of Yugoslavia had made up one integrated community” and that “the notion of the transhistorical existence of a people which may be objectivised by means of language, culture, religion or origin has remained widespread till this day, but historically the idea is completely erroneous” (pp. 26–27). “To put it more simply,” she concludes, “around 1900 the lands of subsequent Yugoslavia were mostly inhabited by South Slavs who were related by linguistic-cultural kinship” (p. 27).

If we assume for a moment that all the above is basically true and that the conclusion is value-neutral in principle, then it is completely unclear why Calic previously, on her “imaginary journey through the South Slavic lands around 1900”, explicitly names “Slovenes”, who lived in a “mixed community with Germans, Italians, Croats and others”, and “Croats”, who lived in their historical provinces and in “Bosnia and Herzegovina and southern Hungary” (pp. 22–23), while mentioning, on the same page, in reference to the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina, “South Slavs of Orthodox, Muslim and Catholic faiths” even though the Serbs in Bosnia, evasively called “Orthodox Slavs”, had, according to most contemporary domestic and foreign sources, a clearly defined national consciousness (p. 23). Similar inconsistency occurs on the next page in connection with Montenegro, where despite its incontestable Serbian identity she claims lived “Orthodox Slavs” and a few thousand Turks, Albanians and Slavs of Muslim faith” (p. 24). For the vilayet of Kosovo (Stara Srbija/Old Serbia), she claims that “its more than 1.6 million inhabitants made up an ethnic and confessional hotchpotch”, while in Serbia lived Serbs who also lived in the Habsburg Monarchy 3 (pp. 25–26). Similar confusion can be found later in the book, for example, with reference to the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia

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3 Calic also claims that the population was half Christian and half Muslim, which is not true. For precise data that indicate a Muslim majority see M. Jagodić, Srpsko-albanski odnosi u Kosovskom vilajetu (1878–1912) (Belgrade 2009), 252–256 and 260–262.

3 The insignificant anachronism set aside – from the 1867 Compromise the Habsburg Monarchy was called Austria-Hungary – Calic offers inaccurate data on the population of present-day Vojvodina, relying on the pro-Croat historian Jozo Tomasevich, namely that of 1.3 million inhabitants Magyars accounted for 32%, Serbs for 29%, Germans for 23% etc. Calic is obviously unaware of the Austro-Hungarian census of 1900 which shows a population of about 1.43 million, of whom 33.7% Serbs, 26% Magyars, 23.5% Germans etc. For more detail see D. Djordjević, “Die Serben”, in Die Habsburgermon-
and Herzegovina in 1878: to the “South Slavs” already living in Austria-Hungary now “joined nearly two million Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats” (p. 56), and then, two pages later, we reencounter “Muslims” and “Orthodox and Catholic Christians” (p. 58). It is a mystery why she clearly identifies inhabitants of some Yugoslav areas (Slovenes, Germans, Italians, even Albanians and Turks) while subsuming others under more general categories (Slavs). In point of fact, the lack of clear-cut criteria is one of the major scholarly shortcomings of this book.

This as well as arbitrariness can best be seen in the case of the population of Montenegro. Calic unenthusiastically admits that “many Montenegrins considered themselves as being Serbs” because of the “association of Orthodox with ‘Serbian’, which in many areas continued into the 1930s” (p. 29), but she still insists that “a part of Montenegrins saw themselves as a distinctive people” (p. 59) and that “while supporters of the Popular Movement saw Montenegrins as ethnic Serbs and advocated the unification of ‘two Serbian states’, the monarch and the government insisted on separate historical-political identities” (p. 75).5

The Illyrian movement is presented as both Croatian and Yugoslav “given that it was open and inclusive” and that “it did not function only as Croatian national ideology but also opened a transcendental space to all South-Slavic peoples” (p. 54). However, an important component of the “Illyrian idea” is omitted: having been rejected by almost all Slovenes and Serbs in the 1830s, it came to be used as an exclusive model for the integration of Štokavian-speaking Catholics into the Croat nation in the following decades and in a large area considered as “Illyrian”. The author also seems to be unaware that the Habsburg Monarchy called Serbs an “Illyrian nation” in the second half of the eighteenth century, finally abandoning the appellation after 1804.6

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4 The first census of Bosnia and Herzegovina carried out by Austro-Hungarian authorities in 1879 shows a figure of about 1.15 million people. Cf. Dj. Pejanović, Stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine (Belgrade: Naučna knjiga, 1955).

5 Calic either does not know or chooses to ignore the fact that throughout the nineteenth century and even before there was in Montenegro a strong, almost zealous sense of Serbian identity, a sense shared by Prince (from 1910 King) Nikola Petrović Njegoš himself. It is unscholarly to speak of Montenegrin identity – invented in the 1930s as part of the Yugoslav Communist Party’s policy against “greater-Serbian hegemony” and introduced by decree in 1945 – in the period of the past the author refers to.

6 There were at the court in Vienna the Illyrian Court Deputation and the Illyrian Court Chancellery responsible for all Serbs of the Monarchy. Cf. V. Gavrilović, Temišvarska sabor i Ilirska dvorska kancelarija (1790–1792) (Novi Sad: Platoneum, 2005).
The South Slav idea, derived from Illyrianism in the 1860s, is associated with “enlightened elites who believed in progress”, i.e. with “the liberal middle classes, the intelligentsia and the Catholic clergy”7 headed by J. J. Strossmayer who “led the opposition to Austrian centralism” (p. 55). On the other side of the spectrum was, “as a rival”, the Croatian Party of Rights led by Ante Starčević and Eugen Kvaternik with its “irredentist and hegemonist nationalism” which “denied individuality to the other South-Slavic peoples” (pp. 55–56). Calic fails to mention that Strossmayer’s vision of the South Slav idea involved proselytic intentions (to bring the Orthodox Serbs to a union with Rome), which is to say, he did envisage a South Slav state but Catholic, with its seat in Zagreb and within Austria-Hungary.8

If Calic on the whole overestimates the strength of the South Slavic movement, she does not do so with Ilija Garašanin’s “Načertanije”, the first Serbian foreign policy programme drafted in 1844, “whose thought decisively influenced the Serbian national programme” until 1914. Yet, something of an exaggeration is her claim that with it began the “shaping of the mental map of a future (greater) Serbian state” (p. 60), borrowed from Holm Sundhaussen’s stereotypical, one-sided interpretation. The concept of mental map seems to imply that the entire Serbian society was imbued with the ideas contained in the “Načertanije”, while in fact was a secret document only known to few Serbian politicians, a document inclusive in nature (the unification of Serbs in Turkey in Europe as the first phase towards a broader union, which would not become possible until twenty years later) and, finally, a document which did not become known to the public until the beginning of the twentieth century.9 The very active role of the Polish emigration headed by Count Adam Czartoryski in drawing up the “Načertanije” is presented as passive, while the fact remains unrevealed that a “draft” for Garašanin’s “Načertanije” was the work of a Polish agent of Czech origin, F. Zach.10 Finally, Calic offers a fairly one-sided assessment of Serbian na-

7 An interesting observation on Yugoslavism is offered by the British historian A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy 1809–1918. A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary (London 1976 [1941]: “The ‘South Slav’ idea was an intellectual creation, not the outcome of national development” (p. 190), and “The South Slav idea, synthetic and intellectual, won only the educated middle class which looked at Strosmajer’s collection of pictures; mass nationalism, in Croatia as everywhere else, sprang from the soil and hated its nearest neighbours” (p. 223).


9 R. Ljušić, Srpska državnost 19. veka (Belgrade: SKZ, 2008), 140.

10 Ibid. 133.
nationalism. She claims that it had a “tendency to marked self-awareness, irredentism and expansionism” – as if a movement for national liberation in the nineteenth century had been a bad thing and not a legitimate European model for unification which had given rise to Germany and Italy – and then softens the statement by allowing that one should “not necessarily infer some greater Serbian mania for conquest from that” (p. 60). Summing up the national programmes, Calic insists that “different national ideologies perhaps contributed more to differences between peoples than religious and linguistic differences”, but admits that Croats and Slovenes were “more disposed to a compromise with the Habsburg Monarchy” which would have involved a “federal reorganisation of the existing Habsburg system” given that “the Habsburgs, after all, imposed their rule through a contractual relationship (Pacta Conventa) and not through military subjugation”, and that “the Catholic faith was a bridge between rulers and subjects”. The renowned Croatian historian Nada Klaić demonstrated as early as fifty years ago that the Pacta Conventa (1102) is a later forgery, that there was no contractual relationship between Croatia and Hungary or Austria but only classical conquest, which means that there was no legal continuity. On the other hand, “opposite Catholic universalist state-building thought which invoked legal state continuity and the idea of a stable historical territory was more expansive Serbian cultural nationalism whose starting point was independent Serbia and its Serbian-Orthodox state church” (p. 64). If this is so, and it is, it is not clear why Calic chooses not to follow her own line of argument any further and infer that religious and linguistic differences, as a phenomenon of longue durée, determined some elements of the national ideologies.

Basic oversights can be found in the account of the Ilinden Uprising as well, where Calic attributes a Macedonian national character and the slogan “Macedonia to Macedonians” to the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) (p. 64) even though the organisation’s Bulgarian orientation is obvious from its very constitution. While mentioning the mass demonstrations against Ban Khuen-Hédérvary in Zagreb and other parts of Croatia in 1903 and interpreting them as a sign that the Croats abandoned their loyalty to Austria-Hungary, Calic fails to men-

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11 The author seems to lose sight of all Austro-Ottoman wars waged from the end of the seventeenth to the end of the eighteenth century, notably the War of the Holy League 1683–1699 and the Napoleonic Wars that ended in 1815. In those wars the Habsburg Monarchy could hardly enlarge its territory by means of some willingly established “contractual relationships”.


13 For more see J. M. Jovanović, Južna Srbija od kraja XVIII veka do oslobodjenja (Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1941).
tion major anti-Serbian demonstrations in Zagreb in 1902 (not to mention those lesser in 1899 and 1901) combined with ethnically motivated persecution and property destruction. Even though she speaks of political cooperation of Serbs and Croats through the Croat-Serbian Coalition in 1903–1905 as a strategic rather than a tactical cooperation forced by Austro-Hungarian growing repression (pp. 66–68), Calic admits that in ethnically mixed environments the public, the press, the cultural, political and sports associations, even savings bank were “increasingly divided along national lines” and that “with the exception of the Socialists and the youth movement there were virtually no supra-ethnic or supra-religious political organisations” (pp. 70–71).

Succumbing to the new, pro-Ottoman trend in interpreting the Balkan Wars in European and other historiographies, Calic claims that the armies of the Balkan states advancing into Ottoman territory “committed appalling atrocities against civilian population” and that “deportation, expulsion and partial destruction of undesirable minorities was common practice aimed at justifying territorial aspirations which were no longer legitimate”. To illustrate her claim, she chooses to speak of Serbs alone, and invoking the second-hand information Leon Trotsky gathered while sitting safely in a Belgrade hotel: so Serbs, she quotes the pro-Albanian lobbyist Noel Malcolm, “in order to correct ethnographic statistics in their favour, simply engage in the systematic destruction of Muslim population”, and then “balances” the claim by stating that the armies of the other Balkan states, which for some reason remain unnamed, carried out ethnic cleansing; their motive, however, was to “stifle resistance”. The paragraph ends with the detailed description of crimes against Albanians put together by “an independent international committee of inquiry” (p. 82), the very same committee, by the way, that the British expert R. Seton-Watson described as an instrument of Bulgarian propaganda.

The review of the context that led to the Balkan Wars leaves out the persecution of Serbs prior to 1912, especially in the vilayet of Kosovo in 1878–1912 when Muslim Albanians played the role as “bulwark” of the Ottoman Empire against Christian states, which was a good enough reason to turn a blind eye to their abuse and violence against Serbs and other non-Muslims and non-Albanians. Left out is also the fact that official Serbia took diplomatic action with the Sublime Porte in a bid to stop Albanian violence in the vilayet of Kosovo and that in 1899 it published a bilingual “blue book on Albanian acts of violence” which was to be submitted

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to the international peace conference at The Hague.\textsuperscript{15} The consequence of those acts of violence was ethnic cleansing indeed but of 135,000 Serbs and other Orthodox Christians, of whom 100,000 fled the area north of the Šar Mountain (present-day Kosovo and Raška) and 35,000 the areas south of it.\textsuperscript{16} All of that was part of the policy of systematic expulsion with a view to weakening the claims of Serbia and Montenegro, as well of other Balkan states, on Ottoman-held territory. Despite all that, which Calic does not seem to know, on the eve of the war the Serbian government issued a proclamation which guaranteed property, religious, personal and linguistic rights to Albanians and stated that “all that came to pass between Serbs and Albanians is now committed to forgiveness and oblivion”.\textsuperscript{17}

Calic is relatively objective in writing about the Sarajevo assassination, the July crisis and the outbreak of the First World War. The assassination is described neither as the cause of the war nor as organised by the Serbian government nor as predominantly orchestrated from Serbia. She believes that the conspirators “acted upon their own initiative, but with support from the Serbian military secret service and the organisation Black Hand”. She does not mention the indiscriminate destructive anti-Serbian demonstrations in the aftermath of the assassination, to which the authorities turned a blind eye, or murders, hangings, deportations to camps, high treason trials and various other forms of discrimination against the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{18} She discusses the drawing up of the ultimatum to Serbia and Austria-Hungary’s diplomatic preparation for war, defining very precisely that “the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne on 28 June 1914 was only a trigger for the military explosion of international power competition which had been exacerbating for years”, and that “emperor Franz Josef would have never attacked Serbia without ‘back-covering’ and encouragement from Germany” (p. 86).

\textsuperscript{15} Documents diplomatiques concernant les actes de violence et de brigandage des Albanais dans la Vielle-Serbie (vilayet of Kosovo) 1898–1899 (Belgrade: Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 1899); see also Jagodić, Srpsko-albanski odnosi u Kosovskom vilajetu, 183–222, with a detailed list of recorded crimes on p. 205.


\textsuperscript{17} Jagodić, Srpsko-albanski odnosi u Kosovskom vilajetu, 361.

\textsuperscript{18} In detail in V. Ćorović, Crna knjiga. Patnje Srba Bosne i Hercegovine za vreme svetskog rata 1914–1918 (Sarajevo: B. Djurdjević, 1910).
Writing about Austria-Hungary’s invasion of Serbia in the autumn of 1914, Calic remarks that Croats, Slovenes and Serbs “had to fight” in its army, and that they “accounted for up to 40% of some units” (p. 87). Her probably inadvertent oversight set aside – namely, members of these peoples, notably Croats, accounted for more than 50% of the army that invaded Serbia in the autumn of 1914,19 and 11% of the entire army on all fronts20 – the remark that they had been coerced into fighting does not hold water. As observed by A. J. P. Taylor: “The Croat masses ‘voted by their feet’ by marching enthusiastically against Serbia.”21

If Calic does not try to downplay crimes committed by Austro-Hungarian troops (pp. 88–89) or systematic pillage, persecution and discrimination under the occupation regime in 1915–1918 (pp. 91–92), she implies an equivalence between the “ruthless policy of bulgarisation, occupation and economic exploitation” in the Bulgarian zone of occupation in 1915–1918 and the policy allegedly pursued by Belgrade in the “areas acquired in 1912/3” which she describes as “merciless ‘serbianisation’” (p. 91), however unfeasible it was within less than two years of Serbia’s effective control over the New Areas of Serbia.

Speaking about the creation of the state, Calic offers a detailed account of the activities of the Serbian government but fails, for some impenetrable reasons, to mention the 1914 Niš Declaration, an intellectual such as Jovan Cvijić, the Croat and Serb politicians assembled in the Yugoslav Committee and the 1917 Corfu Declaration. She overrates the extent of acceptance of the Yugoslav idea in Slovenia and Croatia “where only some sections of the Catholic clergy were against” and unnecessarily introduces the question of self-determination in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia (pp. 97–98). In 1918 Serbian Macedonia was an ethnic mix-up (of Bulgarians, Serbs, Albanians, Vlachs, Greeks, Macedonian Slavs), while 42 of 54 counties in Bosnia-Herzegovina had voted for immediate and unconditional unification with the Kingdom of Serbia by 3 December 1918 when the voting process was ceased because it was learnt that unification had been proclaimed in Belgrade two days earlier. The reader learns nothing about Stjepan Radić’s statement of 1914 that the Serbs are an “unsavoury enemy of the August [Habsburg] dynasty, of our Monarchy, and especially of the Croat way of life” 22 or of Antun Korošec’s, relating to the

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22. Ibid.
May Declaration of 1917 – which the author believes had an “elating effect on the South Slaves” (p. 96) – that “our Croat-Slovene people is firmly and entirely resolved to be true and loyal, to the death, to the monarchy and the August ruling house of Habsburg”.

Describing the end of the First World War Calic quotes an interesting if quite ambiguous remark of Miroslav Krleža: “...when our Austro-Magyar reality drunkenly rolled down under the throne of the Karadjordjevićs like an empty beer bottle into garbage...” (p. 98). This remark perhaps unconsciously summed up the attitude of the dominant Croat elites towards the new state. What really inclined the Croat and Slovene elites to join, unwillingly, the new state was the “fear” of Italy which, among other things, had pretensions “to Istria and Dalmatia” (p. 99). On the other hand, Serbia saw the new state as the accomplishment of the national striving for the liberation and unification of Serb-inhabited areas. Underestimating the role of foreign factors, Calic argues that Yugoslavia “was by no means an artificial experimental state dictated by the Machiavellian interests of the great powers” (p. 98), even though, in the opening chapter of the following part titled the “Versailles system”, she clearly states that the great powers created a “belt of nation states” from the Baltic Sea to the Balkans which formed a sanitary cordon towards “revolutionary bolshevist Russia” and “Germany’s revisionist aspirations” (p. 103).

In the part of the book devoted to the Kingdom of SCS 1918–1929 and Yugoslavia 1929–1941, factual errors occur more frequently and so does the author’s effort to construct false equivalences and a negative image of the first Yugoslavia above all from the viewpoint of the idea of progress and modernisation in order to emphasise the purported superiority of the post-1945 federal system. In doing so, Calic fails to acknowledge the tremendous achievements the Kingdom made precisely in the area of modernisation: it carried out the agrarian reform and colonisation, built thousands of schools, educational facilities for women, hospitals and other health facilities, set up the universities of Ljubljana and Skopljë and a theatre in Skopljë, and emancipated, according to its means, a considerable part of backward and undeveloped areas from Kosovo and Macedonia to Bosnia, Herzegovina and Montenegro. By the way, in the area of culture, Tito’s Yugoslavia could not boast as high quality magazines as the interwar Srpski književni glasnik in Belgrade and Nova Evropa in Zagreb. In fact, the reader gets the impression that one of the author’s goals is to draw a strong contrast between an allegedly Serb-dominated centralist and unitary state whose society is

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23 Ibid.

oppressed by poverty and backwardness and its sheer opposite, modernisation that followed after the establishment of communist dictatorship in 1945. Calic overlooks that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was organised on the model of France, the most progressive European nation at the time, and that its demolishers, with the exception of Croat nationalists, were external forces of fascist and authoritarian persuasion: Hitler’s Third Reich, Mussolini’s Italy, and revisionist states with authoritarian nationalist regimes such as Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania.

In the foreground of Calic’s account is the conflict between the unitary state concept championed by Serbian politicians and federalism championed by Croatian politicians. She gives a detailed description of the process of adopting the constitution of 1921 but nonetheless suggests that the entire process “was octroyed” and that “the state had a serious lack of legitimacy from the very outset” (p. 107). She proceeds to describe in detail the Yugoslavism propagated from “above” which was supposed to overcome internal divisions because, in Calic’s view, “differences in culture, religion, dialect, temperament and mentality between Slovenes and Serbs did not seem any greater than those between Venetians and Neapolitans or Bavarians and Prussians”25 (pp. 107–108). Yet, she remarks that by then “it probably was already too late” to create a Yugoslav nation and that “the idea of three tribes left enough room for the fulfilment and assertion of one’s own national identity” (p. 109).

Mentioned in that connection are Slovenes who achieved national integration precisely within Yugoslavia given that they were free “for the first time to cultivate and develop their own language and culture” (p. 109), that the University of Ljubljana was established in 1919, Slovenian Radio in 1928 and, finally, the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1938. It is even safe to say that in 1929, when the Kingdom was reorganised into banovinas, they practically obtained a rounded-off ethnic territory: Drava Banovina. The fact is completely ignored that Slovenes had strong support from Belgrade and King Alexander himself who made considerable personal donations to various Slovenian scientific and cultural institutions. Calic is of the view that the same goes for Croats, integrated in the 1920s through the mass national mobilisation of the peasantry effected by the activity of Stjepan Radić’s Croatian Peasant Party (p. 112). On the other hand, she claims ahistorically that the population of Macedonia “had already had a clear awareness of their distinctiveness but were not recognised as a ‘tribe’” even though their grouping into Serbs, Bulgarians and Albanians was stronger

25 Calic does not distinguish between regional and ethnic/national identities. An equivalent for her examples (Bavarians, Prussians) in the Yugoslav case would be, say, Šumadijans, Vojvodinans, Herzegovinians, Slavonians, Dalmatians etc.
than their local, geographically defined identity. As far as Bosnian Muslims are concerned, Calic claims somewhat confusedly that they “could cultivate a distinctive historico-religious, pre-national group consciousness which, in their view, only lacked a tribal name”, a consciousness which “had developed within the framework set by Islam” and, at the time, “did not necessarily imply a theological or an ideological or an ethnic-national affiliation” (p. 110).

Yet, a little later she claims that the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation (JMO) had an “ethnic attribute” (p. 115). A similar if milder confusion about the identity of Bosnian Muslims can be found later in the book (pp. 142–143).

If Yugoslavism indeed enabled a practically unimpeded building of distinctive national identities, it is unclear why Calic seeks to suggest a greater-Serbian hegemonism. Apart from reiterating propagandistic allegations made by the Croat economist Rudolf Bićanić,26 her key proof of the “privileged position of Serbs in the government, army, bureaucracy, police and many important sectors of society” is a quotation from the Croat historian Ivo Banac according to whom “out of a total of 656 ministers in Yugoslav governments, which as a rule did not remain long in office, 452 were Serbs and only 137 Croats, 49 Slovenes and 18 Muslims”, and to complement the impression suggested by the figures adds that “it was not much different in the army and state administration” (p. 113–114). Finally, there is a very explicit, and as uncritical, conclusion: “Social practice showed that the common Yugoslav house was nothing but greater-Serbian decor” where “many politically engaged people, disappointed with reality, turned against the idea of Yugoslavism” (p. 151). The only exception was the communists for whom “Yugoslavism was, as it had been for the Young Bosnians before the First World War, not just a vision but daily practice”. The truth, however, is that until Stalin’s directive for the creation of the Popular Front in the mid-1930s they, vociferously and often in collaboration with the Ustashas, decried “greater-Serbian hegemonism” and, acting upon the Comintern’s recipe, propagated the demolition of Yugoslavia. So, what we have here is not only an absurd confusion but also an injustice to the followers of the Young Bosnia movement, genuine supporters of Serbian and Yugoslav unification.27

Recent research has seriously challenged the stereotype about the “greater-Serbian” character of the Yugoslav state.28 The thesis about “great-

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26 E.g. that “parts of the country that belonged to the former Austria-Hungary pay 80% of all taxes, while Serbia and Montenegro take more than 70% of investments for their infrastructure” (p. 113).


28 S. Božić, Srbi u Hrvatskoj 1918–1929 (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008) as well as her “Serbs in Croatia (1918–1929): between the myth of ‘greater Ser-
er-Serbian hegemony” was in fact an instrument, propagandistic above all, of the Croat political elite for achieving the national homogenisation of the masses and for ensuring as good a position as possible in their escalating conflict with the Serb political elite.

The “greater-Serbian hegemony” thesis, a hollow phrase which was quite dear to the communists too, can find no support in the documentary sources for the simple fact that the Serb elites had no means to impose hegemony. As opposed to 960 factories in Slovenia and Croatia in 1919, Serbia had no more than 70, and the end of the war had found it ravaged in every way, including the loss of a third of its pre-war population. Of a total of 2.5 billion dinars deposited in all Yugoslav banks, two billions were in Zagreb banks and so Zagreb, formerly a provincial Austro-Hungarian town, practically became the financial centre of the interwar Yugoslav state. Slavonia provides a telling example of the actual scale of “greater-Serbian hegemony”. Of its 2112 civil servants in 1921, 206, or 9.75%, were Serbs even though they accounted for 23.4% of the total population. Calic also fails to mention the fact that a considerable number of officers of the former Austro-Hungarian army were admitted to the ranks of the new army of the Kingdom of SCS, even some known to have committed crimes against Serbs.²⁹

That Yugoslavism was not exactly a “vision” and “everyday practice” to the communists is evidenced by the Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) held in Dresden in 1928, which Calic does not mention. She mentions the Third Conference of the CPY held in January 1924, mistakenly calling it the Third Congress (which, however, was held in Vienna in 1926), which addressed the national question for the first time (p. 117) in terms of federalisation. The Fourth Congress, however, envisaged the demolition of the Yugoslav state and the creation of independent Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro and Macedonia (with support from IMRO), while expressing support to the “Kosovo Committee” in the struggle for “Greater Albania”, i.e. for the annexation of Kosovo and Metohija by Albania, just as it envisaged the annexation of northern Vojvodina to Hungary.³⁰

The part of the book devoted to the first Yugoslavia contains quite a number of unfounded assertions such as the one that the “Catholic Church for the most part took a loyal stance towards the state in 1918” or that the Catholic clergy, “with the exception of the archbishop of Sarajevo Josip Štadler”, “was pro-Yugoslav” (p. 140). Confrontation of the Catholic Church

²⁹ For more detail see M. Bjelajac, Vojska Kraljevine SHS 1918–1921 (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1988).

with Belgrade is downplayed to a mere reaction to the failure to conclude a concordat, and there is yet another attempt to draw a false equivalence, in this case between the “laic” Croatian Catholic movement and the “pro-fascist and ultranationalist” Orlovi (Eagles) and Križari (Crusaders), on the one hand, and an “extremist Orthodox faction” (svetosavlje), on the other (p. 160). Calic is obviously unaware that the attitude of the Catholic Church at first towards the creation of the Yugoslav state and then the state itself was on the whole explicitly negative, while the Croatian Catholic movement can hardly be described as laic.\(^3\)

Calic states that J. B. Tito “returned to his homeland in early 1935” from training in the USSR, while he then in fact left for the USSR and returned in late 1936.\(^3\) What should also be noted is her not overly critical portrayal of the communists who “believed in universal historical laws and in the building of humane society in the world in which revolutionary consciousness should triumph over ethnic intolerance”, were tied by “the faith in a just future and the unflinching will for change”, and enjoyed “an ever growing support of intellectuals, middle classes and youth” (p. 158). If the importance and extent of the support extended to the communists is played up, the importance of the Ustasha movement and the extent of support it enjoyed is, to put it mildly, downplayed, which is combined with an attempt to equate it with its ideological counterpart in Serbia, the Zbor movement, which had a negligible support in its environment (pp. 153–156).

Even though formally balanced and unbiased, the next part of the book, devoted to the Yugoslav space in the Second World War, suffers from serious shortcomings: numerous factual oversights, far-fetched constructions, selective presentation of facts, unqualified use of disputable casualty figures, the already observed tendency towards false equivalence and a quite partial portrayal of one warring party as morally superior to the others. Her account of Tito’s communist movement is slanted and uncritically dependent on the image the communist regime created of itself. Apart from some slight differences and scarce critical remarks, invariably made in passing, her interpretation largely coincides with the official Titoist narrative, or the official version of history imposed in the course of the thirty-five years of communist dictatorship in the second Yugoslavia.

Speaking about the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), she says that the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS)

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2. Ibid. 289–299.
Vladko Maček declined the offer to be its prime minister (p. 172), which is true, but it is also true, and she remains silent on that, that he called upon the Croat people to be loyal to the new Ustasha regime and that most members of the Croatian Peasant Defence and the Croatian Civil Defence sided with the new regime. She states that the Ustasha regime relied on “militia, army, secret police, special courts and more than twenty concentration camps”, but claims that “support to the new regime remained thin” and that it found approval only “in the right wing of the HSS, in a part [sic] of the Catholic Church and among intellectuals and nationalist university students”. Calic’s claim that “this anyway heterogeneous base crumbled within only a few months of the Ustasha taking power” (pp. 172–174) seems to be contradicted by the fact that the regime remained in place until May 1945. On the other hand, speaking of General Milan Nedić, Calic seeks to equate him with D. Ljotić, leader of the pro-fascist Zbor, losing sight of the fact that Nedić did not command the Serbian Volunteers Corps which was organised by Ljotić and placed under direct German command. Nedić was and remained the local governor of an occupied rump Serbia with no power of decision.

Calic almost entirely accepts the official communist interpretation of the civil war 1941–45, especially as regards the relationship between Chetniks and Partisans (pp. 181–188). Even though she correctly identifies their respective social bases as well as the ideological differences between the two antifascist movements, she makes no distinction between Dragoljub Mihailović’s Yugoslav Home Army (YHA) and Chetniks. The latter is a general and imprecise term under which may also be subsumed smaller collaborationist groups such as the one of Kosta Pećanac. She argues explicitly that D. Mihailović “sent false news about military successes to London and at the same time received financial aid from the Serbian collaborationist government and served the Germans and Italians” (p. 181), that he, “in June 1941 circulated a memorandum titled ‘Homogeneous Serbia’ envisaging the expulsion of Croats and Muslims from a large part of territory”, which implies that he advocated ethnic cleansing (p. 184). Calic apparently is unaware of the reliably established fact that the memorandum was not Mihailović’s; it was put together by Stevan Moljević, a lawyer from Banjaluka, whom Mihailović first met in May 1942. She also seems to be unaware that this piece of writing had never been discussed, let alone adopted by Mihailović’s

34 Paramilitary units set up by the HSS as “a state in the state” in the mid-1930s. Calic refers to them as “peasant and civil guard” and estimates their strength at about 200,000 men (p. 159).
35 See e.g. D. Stranjaković, Najveći zločini sadašnjice. Patnje i stradanja srpskog naroda u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj od 1941. do 1945 (Gornji Milanovac 1991).
movement, but remained Moljević’s personal view. Moreover, she uncritically reiterates post-war communist propaganda about Mihailović’s willing and earnest collaboration, thereby creating an ideological black-and-white rather than scholarly picture of the Second World War in Yugoslavia. If Mihailović really was such an earnest collaborator with the Germans, how come that in a large number of German documents Mihailović, and not Tito, figures as the Third Reich’s enemy number one in the Balkans almost until the end of the war. As if the “wanted” circular for General Mihailović was not issued as early as 1941 and for them both in 1943 on the same poster. A photograph of the poster is available in books that Calic cites.

Many YHA members were incarcerated in the camps in Banjica, Sajmište and in Niš. The one in Banjica even had an alternative name, DM camp, camp for supporters of D[ragoljub] M[ihailović], while communist supporters did not begin to be incarcerated there until 1943. The book makes no mention whatsoever of thousands of Mihailović’s men who were captured and sent to concentration camps at Mauthausen and Osnabruck, where many of them died. Nor is there any mention of many non-Serbs in the ranks of his army (e.g. Croats Niko Bartulović and Vladimir Predavec, Bosnian Muslims Mustafa Mulalić, Dr Ismet Popovac, Fehmija Musakadić etc.), of the YHA units in Slovenia (Karel Novak, Uroš Šušterčič – Vojvoda Triglavski, Mihailović’s intelligence officer Aleksandar Bajt “Berman”, subsequently a leading Yugoslav economist) even though the subject has by now received quite a body of useful literature – notably books by Kosta Nikolić, memoirs of Dimitrije Djordjević and Zvonimir Vučković, Western books on Mihailović and his soldiers – which offers a different picture from the one painted by Calic and her, primarily Croat, literature.

In Calic’s view, on the other hand, Tito and the Partisans did “quite the opposite”: they “preached concord among peoples”, “advocated a so-

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cialist revolution”; “built a combat force with firm leadership within a few months”; and were successful because “they managed to combine all those different forms of protest and resistance under the ‘popular liberation’ slogan”; given the Chetniks’ waiting strategy, Tito “challenged Mihailović’s title of not only the greatest hero of resistance but also of the future head of state [sic]” as early as 1941 (pp. 184–185), and by the time the uprising in Serbia collapsed in 1941 his forces had “about 80,000 men and women under arms” (p. 186). There are detailed descriptions of their difficulties in 1942 (p. 187), of German, Italian, Chetnik and Ustasha offensives against them (pp. 189–191) from which they emerged victorious; she uncritically attributes to Tito the “legendary qualities of a leader” and claims that he “radiated with self-confidence, determination and natural authority” (p. 189). She emphasises in particular the Partisans’ contribution to the emancipation of women who were given active and passive voting rights in 1942 (p. 207), and in general their positive achievements in the area of culture, the economy, education and progress under wartime conditions (pp. 205–208) even though the purpose of most of their activity was to spread communist propaganda and, ultimately, to establish a Stalinist type of government by revolutionary means.

As far as the uprising of 1941 is concerned, Calic does mention that Chetniks and Partisans fought together against the Wehrmacht, but fails to impart the important fact that the first liberated city in occupied Europe was Loznica, western Serbia: it was liberated in August 1941 by Chetniks under the command of Lt.-Col. Veselin Misita. She also mentions that the two parted ways in September 1941, but places the blame on the Chetniks (p. 185) without mentioning the fact that one of the reasons for the split was the overt establishing of communist authorities on the ground. Even though she is explicit about Mihailović’s collaboration, she claims that the Germans declined his offer and attacked his headquarters on Ravna Gora (p. 184). The Chetniks’ occasional and brief collaboration with the Italians is an incontestable fact – it was the result of their enmity towards the Germans, Ustashes, Partisans, Ljotić’s and Muslim supporters of Hitler – but it did not have the character Calic attributes to it in a bid to fit it into her black-and-white picture of the very complex processes that were unfolding in the civil war in Yugoslavia.

It is precisely into this black-and-white and consequently inaccurate picture of the Partisans fighting alone against all that the secret negotiations between Tito’s representatives and the Wehrmacht held in March 1943 can hardly be fitted. Highest functionaries of the communist movement (V. Velebit, K. Popović, M. Djilas) negotiated in Zagreb, the capital of the Ustasha NDH, about collaboration against the Allies whose possible landing on the Adriatic coast would have inevitably meant Allied support to
Mihailović. They expressed their readiness to fight the Western Allies and Mihailović’s forces side by side with the Wehrmacht. Mihailović’s YHA, as the bearer of pre-war Yugoslavia’s state legitimacy, was the main in the eyes of Tito’s communist forces and the latter did not even try to conceal it from the Germans. This is a clear example of how misleading can be the simplification of the exceptionally complex picture of the civil war in Yugoslavia where various armies – with the exception of the Croatian Ustasha and regular army forces (domobrani) who remained Hitler’s faithful allies until the bitter end – and movements fought against one another, frequently “everyone against everyone” and occasionally collaborating with one or another occupation force.40

Calic uncritically takes over the post-war propaganda claim that the Partisan army was a 300,000-strong force in 1943 (p. 190). According to the statement of Tito’s main intelligence officer V. Velebit at the above-mentioned March 1943 negotiations, the Partisan army had about 50,000–60,000 combatants.41 Two quite serious oversights should also be noted at this point. Speaking of the Second Session of the Antifascist Council for Popular Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in Jajce on 29 and 30 November 1943, Calic claims that “142 delegates from all parts of the country proclaimed themselves to be the supreme legislative and executive body. Only Macedonians were unable to get to Bosnia due to fighting” (p. 191). The fact is not mentioned that these 142 delegates were a minority by comparison to 161 absent delegates and that the quorum problem was “solved” in such a way that the absent were declared to be present. Moreover, the AVNOJ was not even a representative body with any kind of legitimacy but rather an ad-hoc assembly of communist functionaries and few lesser pre-war politicians. The other oversight is one of selectiveness. In order to show that “none of the institutions of socialist Yugoslavia embodied the ideal of ‘brotherhood and unity’ as clearly as that multinational volunteer army” and to create the impression that all Yugoslav peoples equally contributed to the struggle against fascism, Calic offers the figures for the composition of the Partisan army in the spring of 1944: “44% Serbs, 30% Croats, 10% Slovenes, 4% Montenegrins, 2.5% Bosnian Muslims and other ethnic groups” (p. 207). But it should be borne in mind that she is talking about 1944, the year when, after Italy’s capitulation and the Wehrmacht’s defeat in the USSR, the Third Reich was evidently losing the war; therefore a comparison with the composition of Partisan and Chetnik units in 1941 would reveal a much higher percentage (more than 80%) of Serbs and, consequently, not as ideal

40 M. Leković, Martovski pregovori 1943. godine (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1985).
41 For more detail see P. Simić, Tito, tajna veka (Belgrade: Novosti, 2009).
a picture as the propaganda one uncritically taken over from the Titoist literature and offered as a fact.

Both chapters devoted to ethnic cleansings, mass crimes and the dynamic of violence offer detailed accounts and rightfully point to the crimes committed by Ustasha, Chetnik, German, Italian, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Albanian forces (pp. 196–205). What is controversial is Calic’s interpretation of Chetniks’ crimes as resulting from a pre-existing ideologically coloured master-plan for ethnic cleansing. Such plans had indeed been there in all other cases, and in this one, the master-plan is supposed to have been the obscure brochure “Homogeneous Serbia” attributed once again to General Mihailović (p. 199) instead of its actual writer, Stevan Moljević. This is yet another attempt at false balance or ethnic symmetry, at equating D. Mihailović’s antifascist movement with all collaborationist forces that committed ethnically motivated crimes, most infamously the Ustahas. The following two quotations of several similar in this part of the book would seem a good illustration: “Just as the Ustahas dreamed of an ethnically ‘pure’ greater Croatia, so the Chetniks trumpeted the idea of a greater Serbia” (p. 199) and “the Chetniks did not at all lag behind the Ustahas in barbarity” (p. 203).\(^{42}\) That the Chetniks, especially smaller groups that did not recognise Mihailović’s command authority, committed crimes is not a matter of dispute. But then again they did not have the character that Calic ascribes to them given that they were more often than not committed against Serbs of different ideological persuasions (e.g. supporters of Ljotić and communists), and when committed against other national and ethnic groups, in the NDH, Montenegro and Kosovo, they as a rule were a retaliation for crimes previously committed against Serb population. What Calic also tends to overlook is that the captured Chetniks, whom she sees as classical collaborationists and not an antifascist movement, were sent to Nazi death camps, while the Ustahas, whom she equates with the Chetniks over and over again, fought shoulder to shoulder with Wehrmacht troops at Stalingrad in 1942 (Francetić’s “Black Legion”).

\(^{42}\) E.g. Calic says that “in the summer of 1941 the Croat and Muslim Ustasha militia murdered hundreds [sic] of Serb families and burnt down their houses”, but adds straightaway that “thousands [sic] of Muslims in Foča, Goražde, Vlasenica, Srebrenica and many other places fell victims to massacres” (p. 203), leaving out the fact that these massacres were committed by Chetniks in retaliation for thousands and not hundreds of Serb civilians in eastern Bosnia massacred by Muslim Ustahas from the cited places. There is not a single word about the Ustahas’ grisly crimes in Herzegovina whose brutality outstrips all other crimes committed in the NDH. For more on this see S. Skoko, *Pokolje hercegovačkih Srba ’41* (Belgrade: Stručna knjiga, 1991) and his *Krva-vø kolo hercegovačko 1941–1942*, 2 vols (Pale: SKPD Prosvjeta and Belgrade: Planeta, 1999–2000).
On the other hand, what is worthy of mention and credit is Calic’s account of the role of the Catholic Church in the NDH and, in particular, of the archbishop Alojzije Stepinac in the conversion of 200,000 Orthodox Christian Serbs to Catholicism or of the Catholic press which “extolled the Ustashas”. Calic even mentions a few other clerics who took part in Catholicisation and crimes (p. 199, 202), although with the typical qualification that “the role of the Catholic Church in Croatia and its archbishop Alojzije Stepinac remains highly controversial till this day” (p. 198–199). Magnum Crimen, the monumental book of Viktor Novak, a Croatian historian of Yugoslav orientation appalled at the complicity of the Catholic clergy in the Ustasha regime, amply furnished with archival documents, press excerpts and first-hand testimonies, is not even listed in the bibliography, let alone quoted from. Perhaps in order to downplay the extent of the Catholic clergy’s collaboration with the Ustasha regime? Only those who have not consulted Magnum Crimen can be misled into believing that the Ustasha regime had the support of “only a part of the Catholic Church” (p. 173).

An aspect of wartime developments that remains unknown to the reader concerns the Partisans’ crimes against political opponents committed in the name of the “revolution” and their onslaught on “class enemies”, especially in 1941/2 in Montenegro and Herzegovina. Calic does mention but in passing the clampdown on “alleged traitors, spies and saboteurs” who were sentenced to death by makeshift “popular courts” without due judicial process, a fate that also befell “hesitants, deserters and collaborationists” (p. 206).

The last chapter of this part of the book devoted to the Second World War is concerned with the estimated number of war victims but most of all with how those victims, as a negative legacy, burdened relations among the Yugoslav peoples, notably Serbs and Croats. Calic rightly observes that the official figure of 1.7 million dead is an overestimation. The figure in fact represents the demographic loss submitted as the actual number of war victims

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43 Viktor Novak’s classical, unavoidable work on the subject, Magnum Crimen. Pola vijeka klerikalizma u Hrvatskoj, was first published in Zagreb and had 1 119 pages (1948), and then, in an abridged version, in Sarajevo (3 vols, 1960) and, finally, reprinted in Belgrade (1986, with a preface by Jakov Blažević).

by E. Kardelj at the Paris conference in 1946. She then relies on the amateur works of Kočović (1985) and Žerjavić (1989) and offers the figure of about one million victims, of whom “500,000 Serbs, 200,000 Croats and up to 100,000 Muslims”, and another million as an indirect loss, to conclude that “all in all, Yugoslavia lost about two million people in the Second World War” (p. 209). The censuses of 1931 and 1948 were not sufficiently reliable, and there was no way to estimate how many people had been killed, how many had died in concentration camps, how many had never returned from emigration or managed to leave the country at the end of the war. The only accurate thing that can be said is that “the number of killed, tortured and exiled has become a political issue” as well as the rather general claim that “many subsequent Yugoslav problems had their roots in that epoch” (p. 210), which may be a euphemism for denazification that never took place.

As an example of such a political issue Calic gives the Jasenovac camp, the infamous symbol of the Ustasha regime of terror, and quotes the official Yugoslav figure of 700,000 victims and the figures put forth by Croat and Serb emigration circles, 30,000 and 1.1 million respectively. However, in his report to Himmler of February 1942, Glaise-Horstenau gave an estimate of more than 300,000 Serbs viciously murdered by the Ustashas. Calic, instead of trying to explain why the communist authorities, which are the source of the abovementioned official figure (which she fails to mention), did not permit independent inquiries, simply states that they did not, and adds the fact that Jasenovac has become the place of opposing cultures of memory. And she does not stop there but proceeds to add a highly debatable assumption, which she even repeats in another place in the book, that “probably about 200,000 people perished in all Croatian concentration camps”, relying solely on the Croatian-American historian Jozo Tomasevich (p. 210). To accept this figure would necessarily mean to accept that in 1941–1945 in “more than twenty concentration camps” an average of 10,000 people per camp perished, which is highly unlikely to say the least. Namely, as early as 1941, 38,000 Serbs, about 2,000 Jews and 188

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45 Prilozi istraživanju zločina genocida i ratnih zločina, ed. J. Mirković (Belgrade: Muzej žrtava genocida, 2009)


Croats carefully recorded by name were killed in the Jadovno camp alone (the Gospić-Jadovno-Pag system of camps).\textsuperscript{49}

Contrary to Calic’s claim, what decided the outcome of the civil war in Yugoslavia was not the self-reliant fight of Tito’s Partisans. The decision to relinquish Yugoslavia to communists and to shift military and political support from Mihailović to Tito had been made in Tehran in 1943 as a concession of the Western Allies, Roosevelt and Churchill, to Stalin and the USSR.\textsuperscript{50} The liberation of Belgrade on 20 October 1944 is misattributed to the Partisans instead of the Red Army whose several divisions, hundreds of tanks and aircraft, motor corps and brigades, incomparably more numerous and better equipped than Tito’s forces, were instrumental in establishing communism in Yugoslavia (p. 213). There is no mention in the book of the fact that the Soviets met a friendly reception from Mihailović’s troops and that they jointly liberated several towns, from Kruševac to Kraljevo; in return, the Soviets turned Chetniks over to Partisans, who arrested them en masse. This policy is explained a few pages later, where we learn that Tito secretly flew from the island of Vis to Moscow to “persuade Stalin to send Red Army troops for the liberation of Belgrade” (pp. 217–218). Combined with the author’s unqualified claim that communism in Yugoslavia “won on its own strength” (p. 218), this boils down to a denial of the historical fact – acknowledged even by the Titoist press until the split with Moscow in 1948 – that Soviet troops were instrumental in Tito’s installing in power. Once the German troops were driven out, they handed over power to the Partisans.

In her account of the liberation of Yugoslavia and “consolidation of communist rule”, Calic does not remain silent on the crimes the Partisans committed “systematically and extensively”. What she remains silent on is the communists’ crimes against “class enemies”, mostly in Serbia where, according to the latest research data, there were as many as 57,000 victims known by name, much more than in other parts of Yugoslavia. A few dozen thousand farmers, lawyers, pre-war civil servants, small and big industrialists, merchants, artisans, priests and intellectuals were accused of collaborationism and, as a rule without due judicial process, executed while their property was confiscated.\textsuperscript{51}


\textsuperscript{50} For more see V. Pavlović, \textit{Od monarhije do republike. SAD i Jugoslavija 1941–1945} (Belgrade: Clio, 1998).

\textsuperscript{51} For more see Srdjan Cvetković, \textit{Izmedju srpa i čekića. Politička represija u Srbiji 1944–1953} (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006).
As far as the establishing of “popular democracy” is concerned, Calic admits that the post-war elections can be considered as “neither free nor fair”. Yet, it seems that she finds arguments for justifying the imposition of the one-party system and dictatorship in a superficial and evidently unreliable report of a contemporary British diplomat that “the masses” in Central and Eastern Europe, “due to their war and post-war experience”, were willing to accept a “regime that promises order and security even at the cost of renouncing personal freedom and the freedom of political decision”, as well as Tito’s belief that democracy would lead to “ethno-political polarisation and the disintegration of the country” and thwart “politics based on industrial progress and social justice” (pp. 219–220). Speaking of the trials of major war criminals which were supposed to take place, she mentions A. Pavelić, M. Nedić and D. Mihailović in the same paragraph, thereby, inadvertently perhaps, subsuming them symbolically under one umbrella (p. 220). The reader is not informed about international mobilisation in Mihailović’s defence which, in addition to pre-war democrats, involved many European intellectuals and five hundred US army pilots rescued by Mihailović’s forces in the autumn of 1944 (Operation Halyard). On the other hand, a separate paragraph is devoted to the trial of archbishop Stepinac, his sentence to “sixteen years in prison he spent in house arrest” (p. 219) and the reaction or, more precisely, opposition of the Catholic Church which was what led to Stepinac’s transfer to house arrest after five years in prison, which Calic does not find pertinent to mention.

Tito’s alleged fear of “ethno-political polarisation” does not seem to have played any role either in the federal reorganisation of the country or in meeting national-political demands. Calic writes about the liberation of Istria and Dalmatia from the Italians, “whereby the process of the unification of Croats was rounded off”, but fails to mention the incorporation into Yugoslavia of the so-called Slovenian Littoral, probably subsuming it under Istria (p. 221). She proceeds to speak in detail about nation building from above carried out by the communists with a view to constructing Macedonian identity, and about the situation in Kosovo, where as early as 1943/4, at the Bujanovac conference, the Albanian communists stated that their co-nationals had always striven for unification with Albania (pp. 223–224). Calic mentions the quelling of the rebellion of the Ballists in 1945, their

collaboration with the Germans and Italians, but leaves out the murdering and ethnic cleansing of Serbs during the war years (about 10,000 murdered and nearly 100,000 exiled). She unconvincingly explains away Tito’s “conciliatory course” towards Albanians with the claim that “communists had never been strong in Kosovo, and many Albanians were nationalists”, which was why he “subsequently authorised the expulsion of the Serb colonists, which was decisive for the pacification of Kosovo Albanians” and that he “decided that Kosovo and Metohija be granted the status of an autonomous region of the Republic of Serbia, which was a sort of a compromise between the Serbian demand to rule the territory and the Albanian desire for independence” (p. 224). Calic stops short of drawing the logical conclusion that in that way Tito in fact awarded Albanian nationalism which, as she does say accurately, had fought on the side of fascism in the Second World War even though the task he placed before the communists was to “uproot all forms of nationalist and religious hatred” (p. 220). Also, she just mentions in passing that Tito was thinking now and then of uniting “Kosovo to Albania” in order for the latter to “join a larger union of states in the Balkans” (p. 224).

The following two parts of the book devoted to the “second Yugoslavia” – “Socialist Yugoslavia 1945–1980” and “After Tito 1980–1991” – discuss the establishment of the communist regime and the country’s reorganisation on federal principles. A piece of information that is missing, however, is that Tito’s regime in four post-war years was a mere copy of the Soviet system, and the Constitution of the country, Democratic Federal Yugoslavia soon renamed the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, a copy of Stalin’s Constitution of 1936. Calic admits that the communists gave up the idea of building “one supra-ethnic Yugoslav nation” and that “every people was given its own state”, i.e. republic. Also admitting that it was important to Tito “to preclude the dominance of the most numerous people, Serbs”, she does not find it in the least problematical that the Serbs, who even according to her own statistical data had made the greatest contribution to the struggle against fascism, were divided among three republics, that Montenegro was separated from Serbia (just as the Montenegrins became a separate people by decree) and that within Serbia itself were created “two autonomous regions”, Vojvodina, which in fact was an autonomous province, and Kosovo and Metohija, which was not granted the status of an autonomous province until 1963 and whose full name the author reduces to

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“Kosovo”. She claims that “people were not required to identify themselves as members of an ethnic group or as citizens of a federal state because these were easily combined in Yugoslavia” and that federalism “institutionalised multiple identities and allegiances” (p. 225). Calic seems to overlook that it was federalism that over time deepened the divides between peoples and republics and set the stage for further ethno-political polarisation. In a bid to rationalise the obvious contradiction between the communists’ struggle against nationalisms on the one hand and their instigation of them on the other, she comes up with the communist belief that “national identities must not be suppressed because they are the historically necessary transition to socialism” (pp. 225–226). A more careful perusal of the ample critical literature on Titoist policies and international strife might have hopefully led to more objective conclusions.54

The chapters devoted to the post-war reconstruction, general population education, the building of the socialist economy, transition to industrial society, urbanisation, development of tourism, consumerist society, cultural opening to the West and social change in general (pp. 227–230, 242–245, 253–260, 263–265, 273–276), reveal particularly well the author’s understanding of Yugoslavia as a country that Tito “turned into a development-oriented dictatorship”, which in a way implies her subscription to the idea of “authoritarian modernisation” as a theoretical model. All these quite sympathetic accounts of the achievements of Yugoslav socialism are not devoid of some, though softened, criticism. For instance, Calic’s account of the infamous collectivisation of the countryside, the “absorption” of the agricultural surplus workforce by industry and the compulsory sale of agricultural products says that in addition to party agitators “the police often assisted in mustering the labour force: men were threatened with guns, women and children were locked in dark cellars. Be that as it may, results were soon there”, as if collectivisation or the “socialist transformation of the countryside”, unlike the USSR, was meant to be brought about “more slowly and, above all, on a voluntary basis”. The latter is certainly not true, as evidenced by thousands of first-hand testimonies about forced collectivisation, arrests,

long prison sentences, pulling out men's moustaches and other ways of humilitating opponents to collectivisation.\textsuperscript{55}

The growing demands of Slovenia and Croatia for further decentralisation and economic liberalisation, met by the 8th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) and opposed by the alleged “Serbian centralists”, led to the breakdown of many companies and, consequently, to a loss of jobs. The author accurately observes that “the regime turned the situation to its advantage” by opening up the borders and allowing “1.1 million” people to leave the country in search for a job, or “temporary employment abroad” as it was called (p. 283). Had it not been for these “guest workers” and the generous remittances they sent home, the Yugoslav economy would have collapsed. Speaking of ever growing regional differences despite the “economic miracle”, Calic correctly observes that “the intra-Yugoslav terms of trade benefited only the industries of Slovenia and Croatia, while being detrimental to the structurally less developed parts of the country” and that “politically stronger republics”, which she fails to name but obviously thinks of Slovenia and Croatia, “sought to channel investment towards their regions” (p. 284). On the other hand, describing the downfall of A. Ranković, she offers no evidence to support her claim that he “above all advocated discrimination against the Albanians, Muslims and Turks in Kosovo” and that “he was increasingly considered a liability even by his Serbian party fellows” (p. 285). Calic either does not know or does not want to say that Ranković’s political belief was that of integral Yugoslavism. He was a proponent of centralism and, as such, a harsh opponent of separatism, Albanian included, and of the further crumbling of the Yugoslav state through further federalisation.

Calic takes a brief look at the Macedonians and their identity which, in her view, “grew roots very quickly because it was built on the real awareness of national distinctiveness”, and puts forward the inaccurate claim that Macedonia was granted a national church after its separation from the Archbishopric of Ohrid in 1958 and the alleged recognition of the metropolitan of Macedonia by the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1967 as a result of “difficult negotiations”. Established at the initiative of the Macedonian communists and in contravention to canon law, the Macedonian Orthodox Church has not till this day been recognised by any other Orthodox church in the world, the Serbian least of all.\textsuperscript{56}


\textsuperscript{56} Dj. Slijepčević, \textit{Makedonsko crkveno pitanje} (Munich: Iskra, 1969).
As for the cause of mass demonstrations in Kosovo in 1968 and the Albanisation of the province, Calic puts forward her conclusion that “Tito’s attempt to create a distinctive Kosovo Albanian national identity failed” (p. 304). It remains completely unclear where the author could get the absurd idea of a “Kosovo national identity” when she says herself that it was after the downfall of Ranković that “liberalisation opened the way for a far-reaching Albanisation of the province” (p. 304). Despite all concessions made to the ethnic Albanians since 1945 they were dissatisfied because “their province did not yet have the status of a republic and, consequently, the right to secession” and thus “in October and November 1968 violent clashes broke out in Kosovo and western Macedonia. The protesters demanded a republic and a constitution, and some of them, the unification of all Albanian-inhabited areas” (p. 305). An attempt at omission is obvious here considering that the central demand of the demonstrators, then as well as thirteen years later, was the secession of Kosovo, Metohija and western Macedonia from Yugoslavia and unification with Albania (“We are the children of Skanderbeg and the army of Enver Hoxha!”).

The author then proceeds to speak of “linguistic nationalism” (pp. 306–309) and the “Croatian Spring” or “Maspok” (abbreviation from “masovni pokret”, or “mass movement”) in 1971 (pp. 309–313), where the already mentioned tendency to draw false equivalence between Serbs and Croats is observable once again, and in the section concerned with language, Muslims are also included. Calic apparently believes that Serbian and Croatian and Muslim debates and disagreements reflected “the desire of national politics for greater independence” (p. 308), which makes her lose sight of the aggressive nature of Croat and Muslim national and linguistic policies and the defensive nature of the Serbian position, especially as far as the Maspok was concerned. She suggests that M. Nikezić and L. Perović wanted the same as the Croat political, economic and intellectual elites. The latter, however, contrary to the pro-Yugoslav policy of the Serbian communists, demanded their “own army and foreign policy, even the revision of borders with Bosnia and Herzegovina” (pp. 310–311). Also, Calic makes no mention of mass outbursts of hatred poured out on Serbs in Croatia during the demonstrations and other rallies in the Maspok period, including frightening slogans such as: “Comrade Tito [...] go and put on Ustasha uniform!”

Calic ends the section with a brief overview of the removal of leaderships in all republics from office, which also misleads the reader into

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concluding that there were equal shares of nationalism everywhere, which was not the case.\(^{58}\)

Contradictory is the claim that Tito decided to step up centralism and curtail the freedom of the media and that his “system punished critics and nationalists, but then made their demands its own” (p. 317). The amendments to the Constitution in 1968–1972 did not centralise but further decentralised the country, whereby Tito essentially met the demands of the nationalists of all peoples save the Serbs who, being dispersed across Yugoslavia, were interested in as unitary and as centralised a state as possible. Slightly impressed by Tito’s hedonist and luxury lifestyle, she claims that critics could object to it but that “open opposition was inadvisable because of his great popularity [sic]” (p. 322). She says herself that in the mid-1970s there were “4,000 political prisoners” in Yugoslavia, third “only to the Soviet Union and Albania” relative to the total population (p. 317).

The Constitution of 1974 indeed transformed Yugoslavia into a “federation with some elements of a confederation”. The author says quite precisely and accurately that the “decentralisation preached by Kardelj had little to do with democratisation because powers were simply transferred from the federal level to the republics without putting in place viable control mechanisms” and that the Constitution “made the federal state into an object of a complicated negotiation process among the republics where virtually all issues were imbued with a national charge” (pp. 319–320). The authors of the 1974 Constitution had no intention of creating such mechanisms; the purpose of the constitutional change was to cater to Slovenia and Croatia, the Croat Maspok in the first place. Serbia, on the other hand, was given a subordinate position not only in relation to the other republics but also to its two autonomous provinces. This highly unfavourable position is relativised by the author’s claim that Albanians were also dissatisfied because the province was not granted the status of a republic (p. 320) even though she is aware (p. 226) that Albanians were not a constitutive people even by the 1974 constitution but a national minority and consequently did not have the right to secession.\(^{59}\) It is unclear why Calic claims that Albanians orchestrated violent demonstrations in all larger towns of Kosovo in 1981 because they believed “the time had finally come” to realise their “desire for full equality” (pp. 335–336) if then, as well as back in 1968, the main demand was the status of a republic as a transition to Kosovo’s unification with Albania (p. 336). She also gives the figure of “about 131,000” Serbs and Montenegrins that left the province between the Second World War and 1981 but, without going deeper into the reasons for the exodus,

\(^{58}\) M. Djurić, *iskustvo razlike: suočavanja s vremenom* (Belgrade: Tersit, 1994).

is content to say that a “real migration boom” after 1981 was taking place in a “save-your-skin-if-you-can atmosphere” (p. 337). What lay behind it was the systematic intimidation of Kosovo Serbs; the albanisation of police, judicial and party structures, with the tacit approval of the federal and provincial authorities, left them without any legal protection and they moved en masse to central Serbia.

Calic is of the opinion that, in addition to other reasons, economic, political, ideological, international, the system lost legitimacy because “the communist policy of memory whose goal was to remove the civil war and nationalist persecutions from collective memory failed” (p. 358). Family memories obviously escaped the decreed version of the past built through Tito’s personal cult, the myth of the heroic Partisan struggle and “brotherhood and unity”.

Apart from the role of Germany in the Yugoslav crisis, Calic’s account practically comes down to retelling the politically correct narrative of The Hague Tribunal which places the blame for the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the wars almost solely on the Serbs, including almost unavoidable quotations from court proceedings. Had she consulted, say, the memoirs of Josip Boljkovac, Tudjman’s first interior minister, she would have found the claim that Croatia attacked the Yugoslav Army and started the civil war and not the other way round.\(^60\)

In the section devoted to ethnic cleansings, war crimes and destruction of cultural heritage, Calic describes at length and to the last detail the crimes committed by Serbs against Muslims, while Muslim and Croat crimes against Serbs are either not mentioned at all or are mentioned in passing and evasively, for instance, that “from 1993 Muslim and Bosniak forces also began to homogenise their areas” (p. 391). She does not take the trouble to mention that those forces also had camps where Serbs were imprisoned and tortured.\(^61\) As far as Croat crimes are concerned, in the section devoted to the outbreak of the Muslim-Croat conflict in the second half of 1992 Calic says that “ethnically mixed regions were meant to be

\(^{60}\) J. Boljkovac, “Istina mora izaći van...”: sjećanja i zapisi prvog ministra unutarnjih poslova neovisne Hrvatske (Zagreb: Golden marketing & Tehnička knjiga, 2009).

homogenised and proclaimed purely Croat” and singles out as the symbol of “devastation” the “destruction of Mostar, a former tourist attraction, and its historic 16th-century bridge by the Croat Defence Council [HVO]” (p. 389). The author does not find it relevant to mention the first war crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the village of Sijekovac on 26 and 27 March 1992, committed against local villagers by Croatian regular and HVO troops teamed up with paramilitary forces of Bosnian Muslims, nor any collective crime by Muslims against Serbs except the “bloodshed” committed by forces under the command of Naser Orić in the villages of Glogova and Kravica in 1993 (p. 400).

In her account of the 1995 operations of the Croatian army “Oluja” (Storm) and “Bljesak” (Flash), Calic mentions “150,000 to 200,000” expelled Serbs (p. 402) but fails to mention about 2,000 civilian victims of the operations, including women and children, and several thousand people still accounted as missing. The description of the situation in Kosovo in 1999 lacks the information about the number of Serbs, Montenegrins and other non-Albanians who fled the province after the arrival of UN peacekeeping troops: 246,000, of whom nearly 200,000 Serbs and Montenegrins as well as a large number of Goranci (Muslim Slavs) and Roma. After 1999 from UN-administered Kosovo migrated 60% of the Kosovo Serbs, 66% of the Goranci and as much as 70% of the Roma, and most never returned to their homes. Not a word about dozens of ethnically cleansed towns, more than 150 demolished and heavily damaged Serbian monasteries and churches, the necessity to place the most important Serbian monasteries under military protection, forcible takeovers of Serb-owned houses, flats and land by Albanians.

The author sheds light on the role of unified Germany in fuelling the Yugoslav crisis at its beginning in 1991 (pp. 385–386). Namely, eager to assert its political strength on the post-Cold War international scene, Germany’s initial political support followed by rash recognition of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence precluded a feasible solution for the status of the Serb community in Croatia and for reorganisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the contrary, this recognition gave a clear signal to Bosnian Muslims (and Bosnian Croats) to break away from Yugoslavia too, even at the cost of civil war. Calic, however, does not mention that Germany’s signature of the Treaty of Maastricht was conditional upon recognition of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence.

63 Raspad Jugoslavije: produžetak ili kraj agonije, eds. R. Nakarada, L. Basta and Sl. Samardžić (Belgrade: Institut za evropske studije, 1991); A. Pavković, The Fragmenta-
For all her undeniable effort Calic has not managed to produce a book that lives up to her own professed standards: “without prejudice but not without passion” (p. 17). As if her sympathy for the Titoist era and its official version of history came with prejudices, old and new. Considering her familiarity with the language, culture and literature of the western Balkans, the reader had every right to expect much, much more than a fairly one-sided portrayal of the recent and contemporary past of the Yugoslav space.

Bibliography


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